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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
HISTORY AND EVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM 
by 
Mohammad Homayounvash 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Messbahi, Major Professor 
What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what 
mechanisms have pushed Iran’s nuclear program (INP) towards being designated as a 
proliferation threat (securitization)? What actors and processes at what levels of analysis 
and through what mechanisms have pushed Iran’s nuclear program away from being 
designated as an existential threat (de-securitization)? What has been the overall balance 
of power and interaction dynamics of these opposing forces over the last half-century and 
what is their most likely future trajectory? 
Iran’s nuclear story can be told as the unfolding of constant interaction between 
state and non-state forces of “nuclear securitization” and “nuclear de-securitization.” 
Tracking the crisscrossing interaction between these different securitizing and de-
securitizing actors in a historical context constitutes the central task of this project.  
A careful tracing of “security events” on different analytical levels reveals the 
broad contours of the evolutionary trajectory of INP and its possible future path(s). Out 
of this theoretically conscious historical narrative, one can make informed observations 
about the overall thrust of INP along the securitization -- de-securitization continuum. 
 
 vii
The main contributions of this work are three fold: First, it brings a fresh 
theoretical perspective on Iran’s proliferation behavior by utilizing the “securitization” 
theory tracing the initial indications of the threat designation of INP all the way back to 
the mid 1970s.  Second, it gives a solid and thematically grounded historical texture to 
INP by providing an intimate engagement with the persons, processes, and events of 
Tehran’s nuclear pursuit over half a century. Third, it demonstrates how INP has 
interacted with and even at times transformed the NPT as the keystone of the non-
proliferation regime, and how it has affected and injected urgency to the international 
discourse on nuclear proliferation specifically in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “On March 6 [1957] the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department 
of State announced that representatives of Iran and the United States on March 5 signed a 
proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 
The signing was announced in Iran by His Imperial Majesty, the Shah, at the opening 
ceremony of the U.S. atoms-for-peace exhibit at Tehran on March 6;”1 So reads the 
Department of State Bulletin 36, April-June 1957. This event marks the official 
inauguration of Iran’s nuclear journey whose initial phase, both conceptually and 
operationally, was all but humble.  
 Almost a half-century later, on July 31, 2006, The UN Security Council 
(UNSC) adopted resolution 1696 “seriously concerned that the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) was still unable to provide assurances about Iran’s undeclared 
nuclear material and activities after more than three years, demand(ing) that Iran suspend 
all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, 
and (giving) it one month to do so or face the possibility of economic and diplomatic 
sanctions to give effect to its decision.”2 The UNSC resolution marks the official 
internationalization of a U.S. sponsored and led securitization campaign to designate the 
Iranian nuclear program (INP) as a credible existential threat whose trajectory should be 
deterred from going “rogue” at any cost.  
                                                        
1 U.S. Department of State, “Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran,” (Department of State Bulletin 36, 
Washington DC: 15 April 1957), 629. The agreement was signed at 2:30 p.m. on March 5, 1957 by Ali 
Amini, the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission, and William Rountree, Assistant Secretary of the State. 
 
2 Resolution 1696 (2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5500th meeting, United Nations, July 31, 
2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm (accessed January 10, 2010). 
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 Panoramically viewed, these two watershed events punctuate the atomic 
odyssey Iran embarked upon over a half century ago, a still unfolding voyage of self-
discovery for both the Iranian state and the Iranian nation whose coming to conceptual 
and operational grips with the atom has gone through a most tumultuous and tortuous 
path. The present work is an attempt to give a security-textured narrative of how the 
Iranian state set off on the nuclear road, how its nuclear consciousness evolved (self-
referentially and in interaction with the international system) under the Shah and in the 
first decade of the Islamic Republic era.  
The study is based on extensive archival research at the National Archives in 
College Park, Maryland, the Richard Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, 
California, and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. It has 
also benefitted from the National Security Archive documents collected and published by 
the George Washington University (GWU). The declassified documents edited by 
William Burr at the National Security Archive’s Project on Nuclear Documentation have 
been thoroughly examined as they shed the most illuminating light on the nuclear 
dynamics between the Ford and Carter administrations and the Shah’s regime.  
To complement the aforementioned material, I have examined relevant documents 
in the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) at the National Archives in College Park and 
the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Electronic Reading Room at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/. The CIA materials, although few and far between, proved 
especially critical as they shed light on the intelligence side of the INP and demonstrate 
crucial points of divergence in judgment between the U.S. intelligence community and 
the conventional wisdom on the Islamic Republic’s predilection for proliferation and 
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weaponization especially in the Islamic Republic era. The 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) was one such document whose crucial impact in retarding the drifting of 
Iran’s nuclear dispute to a military conflict could hardly be overstated.  
A note of caution on the intelligence side of the INP is in order here though. As 
National Security Archive senior analyst William Burr has noted, for the most part, CIA 
documents on the INP are yet to be declassified and without them one can not shed 
definitive light on the reasoning behind the Ford and Carter administrations’ arrière-
pensée in demanding from Iran safeguards beyond those stipulated by the IAEA before 
they could sell nuclear reactors to the Shah. Access to those materials assumes even more 
significance once one realizes that the CIA had an intelligence attaché in Tehran in the 
late 1970’s exclusively tasked with monitoring the INP and the Shah’s long-term nuclear 
intentions.3  
Additional materials, especially media accounts on the post-revolution era, have 
been gathered from the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and its 
successor, the Open Source Center’s (OSC) World News Connection (WNC) that contain 
invaluable primary and secondary source intelligence data on the INP obtained from mass 
media outlets across the globe. I have used the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
Monitoring to supplement the FBIS and OSC materials. Important nuggets of data were 
also found at the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) profile on the chronology of Iran’s 
nuclear program. I have also used the Vanderbilt Television News Archive to gain more 
context about the conventional wisdom on the evolutionary trajectory of the INP.  
                                                        
3 Assad Homayoun, interview by Mohamad Homayounvash, trans. Mohammad Homayounvash, 
Washington D.C. (July 23, 2010). 
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Furthermore and to fill in possible gaps on the Iranian side of the story, a wide net 
was cast to capture material from Persian sources. One invaluable source was Gholam 
Reza Afkhami’s interview with the founding figure of the Iranian nuclear program, 
Akbar Etemad, published by the Foundation for Iranian Studies in 1997.  The 
biographical interview accounts collected by Harvard University’s Iranian Oral History 
Project and The Foundation for Iranian Studies also contained significant insights into the 
Shah’s nuclear program on which the Persian paper trail is extremely scarce and 
sporadic.4 For media accounts on the post-Revolution era, I have used Iranian 
government-affiliated websites, newspaper archives, and news websites.  
To engage the INP more intimately and to supplement the primary archival 
material and secondary sources, I have also conducted a number of in-depth interviews 
with a number of key observers of the INP. These individuals are part of a steadily 
growing epistemic community that has formed, over the years, around Iran’s nuclear 
enterprise and their expert judgments reflect and shape the past and the future of the INP. 
Prominent among the interviewees are Gary Sick who served on the National Security 
Council in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, Hans Blix, former head of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ahmad Kamal, Pakistani Ambassador to 
the UN (1995-1999), Assad Homayoun, former Iranian diplomat in charge of political 
affairs in the Iranian Embassy in Washington under the Shah, Behrad Nakhai, a former 
Research Scientist at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and a prominent nuclear safety 
                                                        
4 One reason for the paucity of paper trail in the Shah’s era, as former Iranian diplomat Dr. Assad 
Homayoun mentioned, was that the majority of top strategic decisions on the nuclear issue were made 
directly and esoterically by the Shah and only then orally conveyed to the respective authorities for 
execution. Assad Homayoun, interview by Mohamad Homayounvashtrans. Washington D.C. (July 23, 
2010). This situation continued in the Islamic Republic era as the strategic-level nuclear decision making 
was completely privatized by the Supreme Leader.   
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expert, and Muhammad Sahimi, a Professor of Chemical Engineering and Materials 
Science at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.  
Methodology 
 
The Iranian Nuclear Program (INP) has captured the epicenter of international 
proliferation discourse and practice for nearly a decade now. This has given rise to a 
sizable body of literature on various aspects of Iran’s nuclear bid oftentimes geared 
toward “divining” Iran’s strategic nuclear intentions and the determinants “driving” them 
both prior to and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  
 This mode of analysis is generally in synch with how the question of nuclear 
proliferation is treated in International Relations (IR) theory. A survey of theoretically 
informed works on nuclear proliferation reveals two broad schools of thought: those who 
take an outward looking approach and afford primacy to the geostrategic context of 
nuclearization and those who turn their beam of inquiry inward giving precedence to the 
psychological context of the state’s top decision making apparatus.  
As viewed by the first school of thought, the geostrategic context of the state is 
the external strategic environment within which the state forms and performs its national 
security ambitions and decisions. IR theories drawing on this environment to account for 
a state’s nuclear behavior give pride of place, varyingly, to national security imperatives, 
economic inducements, bureaucratic causalities, and technological determinants.5  
                                                        
5 For a pithy and lucid illustration of these factors, see Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and 
Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007). Other important works include 
Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers 
During the Cold War ," Journal of Strategic Studies, 15, no. 4 (1992): 476 - 527 . David Albrigh, "South 
Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, no. 4 (July/August 1994). Peter R. 
Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 2, no. 3, 4 (September 
1993): 210. Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Policy Implications," World Politics, 24 (1972): 40-79.  As applied to Iran, see Shahram Chubin, Iran's 
Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). Trita Parsi, 
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On the other hand, the psychological context is defined by the “national cognitive 
space” in which ultimate nuclear decision-makers operate. This psychological context is 
populated by civilizational and/or national identity conceptions and symbols whose 
interaction with the geostrategic context defines the crystilization moment at which the 
ultimate momentous decision to go nuclear is finalized.6  
With this conceptual template at hand, the following pages put forth a survey of 
the explanatory framworks on proliferation and their applicability to the INP.  
Geostrategic Context 
National Security Imperatives 
 
Different strands of realist IR theory dominate the national security analytical 
models on proliferation. Kenneth Waltz, for example, provides five major security 
imperatives to explain the spread of nuclear weapons. These include counterbalancing 
mechanism by great powers (the USSR); security independence solution (Britain); 
security guarantee for a strategically lonely and atomically threatened state (China and 
Pakistan); deterrence against conventionally superior adversaries (Israel); and security 
independence solution at an affordable price (India).7 As Scott Sagan pithily puts it, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale University Press, 
2007). Ray Takeyh and Vali Nasr, "The Costs of Containing Iran: Washington's Misguided New Middle 
East Policy," Foreign Affairs (The Council on Foreign Relations), January-February 2008. George 
Perkovich, "Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Challenge," (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) April 
2003: 4.  
 
6 An excellent generic template is Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: 
Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). As applied to Iran, 
see Ardeshir Zahedi, interview by Bijan Farhoudi, IRAN US Relations- Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi's 
Historical Perspective, Voice of America (VOA), 2006. Akbar Etemad, Barnameh-ye enerzhi-ye atomi-ye 
iran, talash-ha va tanesh-ha (Iran's Nuclear Energy Program, Hopes and Challenges), ed. Gholam Reza 
Afkhami (Bethesda, MD: Bonyad-e Motaleat-e Iran (Foundation for Iranian Studies), 1997). 
 
7 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons,"Policy Papers, Institute on Global Conflict 
and Cooperation (UC Berkeley, Policy Papers, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 1995). 
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“from this perspective, one can envision the history of nuclear proliferation as a strategic 
chain reaction.”8 Similarly, John Mearsheimer, writing in the offensive realist spirit, 
views nuclear weapons as “the surest means of security,” arguing that:  “Conventional 
wars can be won rather cheaply; nuclear war cannot, because neither side can escape 
devastation by the other, regardless of what happens on the battlefield. Thus the 
incentives to avoid war are of another order of intensity in a nuclear world than they are 
in a conventional world.”9 
Considering Iran’s geostrategic location in an institutionally securitized Middle 
East and its antagonistic relationship with the United States over the last three decades, 
the security paradigm has been extensively applied to analyzing the Iranian nuclear 
program after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Writing in this spirit, for example, Ray 
Takeyh and Vali Nasr blame Iran’s regional security environment for its nuclear 
behavior.10 From this perspective, the best counter-proliferation strategy against the INP 
is to remove those strategic anxieties facing the Islamic Republic and once that has 
happened, the nuclear challenge will, as it were automatically, take care of itself.  
This approach, however, is not only too mechanical and deterministic in blaming 
the external environment for Iran’s nuclear behavior, but strikes one as oblivious to 
internal determinants of Tehran’s nuclear bid. Furthermore, as Trita Parsi cogently 
argues, nuclear weaponization will likely intensify Iran’s security anxieties rather than 
                                                        
8 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," 
International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-97): 58. 
 
9 John J. Mearsheimer, " Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War ," The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 2 
(August 1990): 35-50 . 
 
10 Ray Takeyh and Vali Nasr, "The Costs of Containing Iran: Washington's Misguided New Middle East 
Policy," Foreign Affairs (The Council on Foreign Relations), January-February 2008. 
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assuage them: “As long as the Middle East is kept as free as possible from nuclear 
weapons, Iran will enjoy a conventional superiority vis-à-vis its neighbors because of its 
size and resources,” he argues. “However, if Iran weaponizes, it will risk sparking a 
nuclear arms race that may lead small states such as Bahrain and Kuwait to opt for a 
nuclear capability as well. In such a Middle East, Iran would lose its conventional 
superiority and find itself at strategic parity with states less than one twentieth its size,” 
Parsi concludes.11 Therefore, despite having the Waltzian virtues of parsimony and 
elegance, the Realist one-size-fits-all framework falls fairly short in accounting for 
Tehran’s nonlinear and, at times, counterintuitive nuclear behavior.12 
“Bigger Bang for a Buck”13 
 
According to economics-driven proliferation explanations, nukes provide “robust 
and affordable security.”14  Proponents of this school claim, “nuclear weapons are 
cheaper to develop and to maintain than very large conventional force structures.” Cost-
efficiency considerations were purportedly the main reasoning behind choosing nuclear 
weapons over conventional munitions as NATO’s preferred defense strategy against the 
                                                        
11 Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (Yale 
University Press, 2007). 265 
 
12 One such example is Tehran’s rejection, in January 2010, of an IAEA-brokered deal to exchange its low 
enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile for 20 percent enriched fuel plates it needed for the Tehran Research 
Reactor (TRR) while essentially agreeing to a comparable deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil a few 
months later.  
 
13 Joe Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2007). 
 
14 Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers 
during the Cold War ," Journal of Strategic Studies, 15, no. 4 (1992): 476 - 527 . See also David Albright, 
"South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, no. 4 (July/August 1994). 
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Soviet threat in Western Europe during the Cold War era.15 A well-known proponent of 
this argument is Homi Bhabha, India's famous nuclear scientist who, advocating a 
nuclear weaponization defense policy for India in 1964, contended, “atomic explosives 
were some twenty times cheaper than conventional explosives.”16 
As far as this author is aware, this cost-benefit calculus of nuclear vs. 
conventional weapons has not been applied to Iran’s proliferation behavior in a 
systematic way. One explanation for this analytical blind spot, especially in the post-
revolution era, could be the hyper-securitized framework within which the INP is 
conventionally conceived.  
These hyper-securitized analyses either deliberately or subconsciously center their 
explanation on an irrational regime with nuclear-adventurous eschatological clerics in 
charge who are impervious or insensitive to consequentialist calculations. A natural 
consequence of these analytical biases is uncritically relegating the INP to the 
psychological realm17 or viewing it in apocalyptically offensive terms.18 Analyzed as  a 
non-secular, irrational and fatalistic regime, Tehran’s nuclear modus operandi is not 
amenable to rational calculations of cost vs. benefit or risk vs. reward. Perhaps best 
exemplifying this “mad mullahs” paradigm of thought on the Islamic Republic are 
professor Bernard Lewis’ comments on the inherent un-deterrability of a nuclear Tehran 
                                                        
15 Stephen M. Younger, "Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-first Century," Internal Report, Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (2000). 
 
16 Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Security Studies 2, no. 3, 4 
(September 1993): 210. 
 
17 Sharon Begley, Newsweek,"When Nukes Become Sacred: The psychology behind Iranian support for the 
country's nuclear program.,"January 8, 2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/229865/output/print (accessed 
January 25, 2010). 
 
18 See, among others, John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations 
(New York, NY: Threshold Editions, 2008). 
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along the lines of the USSR during the Cold War era: “MAD, mutual assured destruction, 
[was effective] right through the Cold War. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side 
used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work 
with a religious fanatic [like Ahmadinejad]. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a 
deterrent, it is an inducement.”19 
Bureaucratic Causalities 
 
Advocates of this school see no reason why nuclear decisions should be lifted 
above the “messy fray” of bureaucratic interests and organizational pressures within the 
domestic national security decision-making apparatus.20 From this perspective, 
“bureaucratic actors, with certain vested interests that may or may not be consistent with 
the broader national interest, ultimately make the case for or against a nuclear weapons 
program.”21  
The body of literature on the INP utilizing this framework is laser focused on the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commonly referred to as the Sepah.22 In this 
view, while the bureaucratic factor was virtually absent from the Shah’s nuclear decision  
 
 
                                                        
19 Bernard Lewis quoted in Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism 
(New York, NY: Doubleday, 2007). 
 
20 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications," World Politics, 24 (1972): 40-79.  Also see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear 
Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (1996-97): 54-86. 
21 Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2007): 63.  
 
22 Gregory Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in 
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons , ed. 
Scott Douglas Sagan, James J. Wirtz Peter R. Lavoy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
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making M.O., in the post-Revolution era the Sepah encapsulates the interests, ambitions, 
and inertias of the “pronuclear lobby” in the Islamic Republic’s bureaucratic politics.23   
Although intellectually more adventurous in prying open the black box of Iran’s 
nuclear decision-making apparatus, the near-obsession of the bureaucratic model with the 
Revolutionary Guards as the monopoly custodians of the INP leaves out a number of 
other significant players not least among them the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran 
(AEOI). The latter played a noteworthy institutional role in de-politicizing the INP 
domestically and in de-securitizing it internationally until the appointment, on 13 
February 2011, of Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani (a former IRGC member designated by the 
UNSC Resolution 1747 as “a person involved in Iran's nuclear or ballistic missile 
activities”) as the head of the AEOI. This appointment stripped the AEOI and its 
pronouncements on the INP of much of their de-securitizing credibility, as they were not 
flowing from a purely scientific and technical entity anymore.  
From the present work’s perspective, attributing and reducing Iran’s nuclear bid 
to the bureaucratic interests of the Sepah pays inadequate attention to the 
uncommunicative and highly centralized structure of decision-making in Iranian politics 
where the Supreme Leader reigns truly supreme, unfettered by the bureaucratic 
impediments traditionally associated with more diffuse power distribution mechanisms. 
More specifically, this modality of analysis under-appreciates the private, even at times 
esoteric, fashion in which Iran’s strategic nuclear decisions seem to have been 
formulated. This reality makes discerning Iran’s “nuclear innermost circle” a highly 
speculative exercise since the composition and configuration of the nuclear decision-
                                                        
23 Charles C. Mayer, "National Security to Nationalist Myth: Why Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons," Thesis 
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2004). 
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making circle do not necessarily overlap with the existent distribution of political power 
relativities among different factions or follow its fluctuations. Consequently, it seems to 
be the case that the Sepah’s role in shaping the Islamic Republic’s nuclear behavior at the 
strategic level has been hyperbolized in the West.  
Technological Determinants 
 
According to this school of thought, there is a causal relationship or proximate 
correlation between nuclear technology and proliferation as the former acquires and 
accumulates its own momentum and incrementally translates itself into the latter.24 From 
this perspective, due to the inherent similarity in technology and infrastructural 
requirements between civilian and military nuclear facilities, nuclear weaponization 
rather quickly ensues nuclear capacity. The father of the Israeli nuclear program Ernst 
David Bergmann most cogently drives this argument home: "by developing atomic 
energy for peaceful uses, you reach the nuclear option. There are no two atomic 
energies."25 In this view, the causal link between technology and weaponization is further 
reinforced by the military’s fascination with the power and prestige attending nuclear 
weapons.  
Implicit in this technologically deterministic diagnosis of proliferation is a lack of 
faith in international non-proliferation regimes (the NPT and the like) to intervene 
between “nuclear capacity” and “nuclear weaponization” and institutionally discourage 
proliferation. Viewed as such, the only way to hold technology in check is technology. In 
other words, the most reliable antidote against weaponization is development of next 
                                                        
24 Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1984). 
 
25 Quoted in Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
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generation proliferation-resistant reactors and fuel cycles: an ambitious prospect whose 
full-fledged realization lies far in the future.  
Technological determinism is one of the predominant paradigms within which the 
INP has been analyzed especially after the 2002 revelations about the INP and Tehran’s 
unflagging insistence on building an indigenous nuclear full fuel cycle infrastructure. 
Having bought into this paradigm either implicitly or explicitly, prominent figures across 
the INP epistemic community have assumed an unproblematic straight line from Iran’s 
progressing nuclear advancements to its eventual drift toward weaponization.26 One 
wonders whether this automatic securitization of Iranian nuclear know-how in the West 
emanates from the United States’ nuclear experience where “latent capacity longevity,” 
i.e., the time gap between a latent nuclear capacity and actual nuclear weaponization,27 
was virtually zero. In this view, America’s nuclear socialization is institutionally 
securitized and president Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace initiative was, by and 
large, an unsuccessful attempt in de-securitizing Washington’s attitude toward civilian 
nuclear technology especially by its rivals and adversaries. The Bush Administration’s 
thinly disguised threats aimed at nuclear de-education of Iran through the use of kinetic 
force snugly fits into this framework.28 On the other hand, Tehran’s obsession with the 
                                                        
26 Henry D. Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, ed., Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, ed. Henry D.  
Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Carlisle, PA,: U.S. Army War College, 2004). John Bolton, Surrender Is 
Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations (New York, NY: Threshold Editions, 2008). 
Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, 2005). Fore a more moderate assessment of the link between nuclear technology an 
proliferation see Gary Samore, Iran's Strategic Weapons Programme: A Net Assessment (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). 
 
27 Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1984). 
 
28 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York , NY: Crown Publishers, 2010). 
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notion of “nuclear independence” and “fuel cycle self-sufficiency”29 and its domestic 
articulation in purely technological, rather than security, terms after the 1979 Revolution 
indicates a different Iranian nuclear identity dismissive of the notion of technological 
determinism. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s August 2005 fatwa 
(religious edict) categorically forbidding procurement, development, stockpiling, and use 
of nuclear weapons, while underscoring the merits and virtues of a civilian program, can 
be analyzed within this context as well.  
Psychological Context  
 
According to this paradigm, due to their revolutionary and extraordinary nature 
and extreme rarity, proliferation decisions belong to a category of foreign policy 
decision-making (FPDM) that is, at least partially, extricable from the geostrategic 
context of the state’s international emplacement. Bomb decisions, in this reading, require 
“an extraordinary effort of will” reflective of “the psychology of the leaders who make 
them.” From this perspective, “there are discrete decision-making pathways leading from 
different national identity conceptions, through emotions, to ultimate nuclear choices.” 30 
Focusing the analysis on the “psycho-milieu” of the ultimate decision makers, these 
cognitive behavioralist works aim to distill nuclear decisions into the idiosyncratic actor-
level interaction between the decision makers and the broader socio-institutional context 
surrounding and shaping them. The agency factor in the form of each state’s unique 
nuclear psychology figures prominently in these conceptual frameworks where decisions 
                                                        
29 Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, Protokole Elhaghi va Rahborde Jomhourye Eslamye Iran (The Additional 
Protocol and The Islamic Republic of Iran's Strategy)) (Tehran: Expediency Council Strategic Research 
Center, 2007). 
 
30 Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Italics added. 
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are not structurally imposed through the state’s emplacement in the international system, 
but agentially actualized by the decision-makers.31 
A cursory survey of the INP literature reveals two distinctive pathways taken on 
the application of the psychological paradigm to Iran’s nuclear enterprise: A Persian 
narrative and an Islamic Republic rendition. Proponents of the Persian narrative subscribe 
to a secular civilizational/national reading of the INP. In this view, Iran’s nuclear 
program is a prestige exercise reflecting the nation’s glorious past and aimed at re-
discovering and resurrecting its “rightful place” among the community of nations. Thus 
conceptualized, Iran’s nuclear ambitions emanate --self-referentially, as it were-- from its 
long-standing national and civilizational consciousness and the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
hardly constitutes an inflection point in Tehran’s nuclear-thinking curve. In this view, 
Iran’s nuclear interests are not susceptible to the ebb and flow of Iranian politics since 
they belong to a uniquely Persian “level of analysis” with its own codes and modes of 
decision and action that superimposes itself on the idiosyncrasies of decision makers. 
Ardeshir Zahedi, the foreign minister who signed the NPT in 1968 on behalf of Iran, and 
Akbar Etemad, the founder and first president of the AEOI, are among the most 
prominent figures who see the INP in this secular national light.32 
The second is the “Mad Mullahs” strand of thought that takes a religiously 
imbued approach toward the INP. From this perspective, the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
marks a genuine change of heart on the part of the Iranian state in terms of its strategic 
                                                        
31 For a brief review of this theoretical framework, see Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic 
and Contemporary Theory (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006). 
 
32 Ardeshir Zahedi, interview by Bijan Farhoudi, IRAN US Relations- Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi's 
Historical Perspective, Voice of America (VOA), 2006. Akbar Etemad, Barnameh-ye enerji-ye atomi-ye 
iran, talash-ha va tanesh-ha (Iran's Nuclear Energy Program, Hopes and Challenges), ed. Gholam Reza 
Afkhami (Bethesda, MD: Bonyad-e Motale'at-e Iran (Foundation for Iranisn Studies), 1997). 
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destiny. In this reading, Tehran’s nuclear efforts after the Revolution cannot be de-
contextualized from the broader Shi’a Islamic themes that were politically embodied and 
actualized in the Islamic Republic. This is a cosmically laced interpretation of Tehran’s 
nuclear consciousness and socialization whose proponents in the West see “nuclear 
ayathollahs” --in an international system securitized toward religion in general and 
especially antagonistic toward Islam—as an ominous harbinger for the future of 
international peace and stability.  
Advocates of this cosmic rendition of the INP conclude that Iran’s hermetically 
sealed clerical establishment is not only reckless and fatalistic in its security speech-acts 
(e.g. their attitude toward Israel and the Satanic Verses controversy) but also radically 
insensitive to secular mechanisms of dissuasion and persuasion. These qualities make the 
Iranian state all but impervious to the otherwise sobering effects of “nuclear 
endowment,” hence rendering the Islamic Republic an unqualified candidate to be 
educated into the secular doctrine of nuclear deterrence.33 Based on this reading Iran’s 
apocalyptically offensive interests have already been conclusively and irreversibly 
established and its rock-bottom intentions are static and unimpressionable. 
With this theoretically informed review of the literature on proliferation and the 
INP at hand, I will now turn to the present work’s perspective on how best to draw upon 
these models in exploring Iran’s nuclear behavior and teasing out its atomic interests. 
Before that, though, an important caveat is in order: The foregoing theoretical categories 
are not, by any means, mutually exclusive and substantial overlaps are observable among 
them. As a matter of fact, in an effort to bridge the psychological and geostrategic 
                                                        
33 For an extreme case, see Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism 
(New York: Doubleday, 2007). 
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contexts of proliferation, a number of works on Iran’s nuclear thinking have traversed the 
boundaries between these two paradigms.34  
Although these analyses tend to be more broadly based as they have a longer 
temporal horizon in sight and are more inclusive in their treatment of attention-worthy 
developments, the generic problem of framework-intensive historical explanations 
persists here too. From this perspective, as the explanatory model grows hegemonic it 
dictates the inclusion, exclusion, and truncation of historical evidence and, subsequently, 
the flow and direction of analysis. The latter is the unfortunate state of the bulk of 
academic and policy scholarship on the INP where the analytical narrative plays second 
fiddle to the theoretical or policy template.  
Such a reversal of roles produces a number of pathologies: For one thing, it 
creates “motivated reasoning” and emasculates the narrative’s ability to re-generate or 
transform itself from within as new and contradictory information become available. In 
this situation, framework-defying data are either not acknowledged or discounted or 
altogether discarded.35 For another, it gives rise to cognitive rigidities that limit the 
counter-proliferation decision maker’s capacity to devise imaginative policy solutions. 
The need for such imaginative and breakthrough thought patterns is becoming 
increasingly imperative as Iran’s nuclear standoff with the West is deadlocking as it is 
inching toward its second decade.36  
 
                                                        
34 A notable example is Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 
 
35 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976). 
 
36 Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006). 
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Conceptual & Methodological Framework 
 
As suggested above, the most intractable challenge to combining a theory-
conscious and historically rich analysis on the INP is maintaining a dialogical and 
constantly interacting balance between receptivity to time-sensitive and evolving 
political, technological, and military processes (on both domestic and international levels) 
on the one hand and structural nuclear intentions, interests, and inertias on the other. Such 
a balance could only be struck successfully by utilizing a history-intensive (as opposed to 
framework-intensive) and discourse-rich strategy that tracks the evolutionary trajectory 
of the phenomenon under study along a unifying theme.  
The present work endeavors to conduct one such intimate diachronic engagement 
with the INP by adopting an “analytical process-tracing narrative.” This narrative, in turn, 
will organically and incrementally generate a “conceptual framework” along the unifying 
theme and guiding post of securitization.  
Analytical process-tracing, as Alexander George and Andrew Bennett explicate it, 
is a powerful tool in extrapolating a case study’s “explanation into a generalization.”37 In 
other words, in analytical process-tracing an otherwise atheoretical narrative presented 
“in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” is 
embedded into “an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical terms.”38 
Such an analytical historical narrative, as applied to the INP, is bound to involve complex 
and non-linear patterns of causality and correlation due to the infinitely complex 
trajectory along which Iran’s nuclear socialization has evolved.  
                                                        
37 Andrew Bennett Alexander L. George, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005). 
 
38 Ibid. 211.  
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In order to give cogency, clarity, and directionality to such a labyrinthine 
phenomenon as the INP, it is imperative to define a powerful organizing theme around 
which all relevant events, persons, and processes could find their proper context and 
implications. In other words, the function of this organizing theme is to decide what 
events, decision-makers, and historical junctures have been instrumental in terms of their 
nuclear proliferation relevance in Iran’s half-century long atomic journey.  
Deciding on securitization39 as the organizing theme to historicize the INP is not 
an abstract or arbitrary or, for that matter, a compromise choice. Quite the contrary, one 
could easily argue that the INP’s security designation defines, implicitly or explicitly, the 
ultimate fault line along which the whole array of INP actors and events are deployed and 
demarcated. This reality will obtain unless a comprehensive international de-
securitization of the INP takes place through regime change or a drastic change of heart 
in Tehran, a relatively unlikely scenario in the foreseeable future.  
From this perspective, Iran’s nuclear story can be narrated as the unfolding of 
constant interaction between domestic and international forces of “nuclear securitization” 
and “nuclear de-securitization.” Within this framework, INP securitizers are state and 
non-state actors whose threat judgments have national and/or international security 
implications in that they noticeably politicize, securitize, and militarize Iran’s nuclear bid. 
The threat-designation implications of these judgments could be immediate or delayed, 
                                                        
39 Securitization, as employed in this work, is a “self-referential” discursive practice (securitizing move) 
through which a phenomenon (the INP in this case) is presented and designated as a “proliferation threat.” 
A successfully securitized referent object— i.e., a phenomenon accepted by a critical mass audience as an 
existential threat through a mix of coercion and consent measures— acquires sufficient “resonance for a 
platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures” to address it. The 
“rhetoric of existential threat” is a arguably the most critical step in the securitization process whereby an 
issue is lifted above “normal politics.” For a comprehensive analysis of securitization, see Ole Waever, 
Jaap de Wilde & Barry Buzan, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder , CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998). 
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implicit or explicit, direct or by association. These individual, institutional, and state 
securitizing actors are present in the domestic and international context of the INP and 
collectively pull the INP toward securitization and, ultimately, militarization. In what 
follows, I will try and sketch out a template of who these securitizing and de-securitizing 
actors are and how their roles have evolved:  
At the international state level, especially after the 1979 Revolution, the United 
States, independently or in conjunction with Israel, has been the INP’s core strategic 
(hyper)-securitizer. The international de-securitizing force counterbalancing the United 
States has come, on and off, from the Russian Federation and China. The latter force has 
been inconsistent, trepidatious, reluctant, at times tactically driven and hence malleable 
and vulnerable in the face of the INP’s more institutionalized and momentous securitizing 
forces in the post-Revolution era. The European Union-- especially Germany, Great 
Britain, and France (the so-called EU3)-- has had a swing role in the international 
securitization and de-securitization of the INP. The thrust of the EU’s posture toward the 
INP in general, though, has been toward bandwagoning with the United States either 
under the structural pressure of the Cold War in the Shah era or fear of marginalization in 
a unipolar post-Cold War world in the Islamic Republic era.  
Since the general securitization pattern of the INP has been toward further 
internationalization, one can observe a proliferation of state actors with alternating 
securitizing and/or de-securitizing functions. The newest arrivals on the scene, at this 
writing, are Brazil and Turkey both of which are currently playing a cautious de-
securitizing role. The present work will place special emphasis on tracking the trajectory  
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of asymmetrical interaction between securitizing and de-securitizing forces of the INP at 
the international level with a special emphasis on the United States’ predominant role.  
At the international institutional level, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) is the most consequential securitizer of the INP. The UNSC has been actively 
exercising this securitizing role through an incrementally tightening sanctions policy 
since the referral to the United Nations of Iran by the IAEA in July 2006. The 
counterbalancing institutional de-securitizing forces are the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC). The IAEA has oscillated between securitizing and de-
securitizing the INP, although since the referral of Iran to the UNSC, its de-securitization 
competence has grown substantially degraded at the expense of its more pronounced 
securitizing functions. The dominant argument in Tehran after the 2002 nuclear 
revelations has been that the IAEA actually triggered the institutional securitization of the 
INP by stepping beyond its technical and legal job description and by politicizing the 
issue of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle, otherwise an issue of pure technicality.  
De-securitizing forces at the individual and bureaucratic levels have historically 
dominated the domestic scene of Iran’s nuclear program. At the national level, the Shah 
and the Supreme Leader have performed the function by consistently privatizing the 
decision-making process on the INP and de-linking it from any military contingencies. 
Some signs of the securitization of the INP before 1979 are traceable in Khomeini’s 
critiques of the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program, although whether these 
pronouncements had any tangible securitizing resonance and traction is open to 
retrospective speculation. After the Revolution no consequential individual-level actor on 
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Iran’s domestic political scene has securitized the INP. This situation almost changed 
though, when the fallout of the 2009 Iranian presidential election gave rise to a highly 
organized opposition movement whose leadership floated the idea of redefining the INP 
in factional, as opposed to national, terms.40 At the domestic bureaucratic level, a 
securitizing entity has always been absent from the scene. The de-securitization forces at 
this level are bureaucratically represented by the AEOI whose leadership has traditionally 
tended to transcend the ebb and flow of Iranian politics.  
Between the above-mentioned domestic and international levels, there are a 
number of important non-state network actors whose relevance for the securitization of 
the INP became more visible after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and within the broader 
context of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), securitization of Islam in international 
politics, and the doomsday menace of nuclear terrorism.41 These are actors that confer on 
the INP urgent international security implications that wouldn’t otherwise attend Iran’s 
nuclear behavior even as a theocratic revisionist state. The Mujahedin-e Khalq 
Organization (MKO or MEK), without doubt, resides at the securitization extreme of this 
network level of analysis. 
The INP elite constitutes the last group of actors influential in making historical 
security sense of Iran’s nuclear drive. INP elite actors are domestic and international 
individuals with political visibility and scientific, bureaucratic, legal, or security 
credentials whose pronouncements on the INP have significant impact on the 
                                                        
40 So far, Mir Hossein Mousavi as the plausible leader of the so-called Greens has shown no sign of inching 
towards securitizing the INP, a position prone to change if centralization of power in Iran grows 
excessively exclusionary and the Reformist camp is completely and irretrievably shut out of the power 
structure.  
 
41 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York, NY: Holt 
Paperbacks, 2005). 
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atmospherics and dynamics of its securitization. These actors’ function and significance 
is most conspicuous in pronouncements of the INP’s “epistemic community” on domestic 
or international levels. The non-state character of INP elite actors renders their scientific, 
political, bureaucratic, legal, military, religious, or environmental judgments on Iran’s 
nuclear bid objective and hence influential in accelerating or decelerating INP’s 
securitization drift. For example retired general John Abizaid’s iconoclastic remarks in 
September 2007 on the possibility of living with a nuclear-armed Iran had a tremendous 
impact in slowing down the hyper-securitization of INP in the U.S. national security 
community.42 Such also was the case with Thomas Schelling and Kenneth Waltz’s 
sentiments regarding the deterrability of a nuclear Iran.  
To conclude, these six:  
1-International state,  
2-International institutional,  
3-Network,  
4-Domestic bureaucratic, and  
5-Domestic institutional  
6-Nuclear elite 
layers of analysis constitute the broad organizing layers of the present work. Each of 
these layers has a securitization and de-securitization extreme with a gray middle area 
along which the so-called “swing players” operate.   
 
 
                                                        
42 John Abizaid, Retired general: U.S. can live with a nuclear Iran, September 18, 2007, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/09/18/france.iran/index.html (accessed January 15, 2010). 
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I. International State Level  
  De-securitization        Securitization/Militarization 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Cuba/Venezuela Pakistan Turkey Brazil  Russia/ China   Persian Gulf Arab States    US       Israel 
 
II. International Institutional Level  
De-securitization                 Securitization/Militarization 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCO NAM OIC   IAEA     UNSC 
 
III. Network Level  
De-securitization            Securitization/Militarization 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
IV. Domestic Individual Level 
De-securitization                Securitization/Militarization 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Mousavi (After June 2009?) Khomeini (Before 1979)                                        
 
V. Domestic Bureaucratic Level 
De-securitization                  Securitization/Militarization 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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VI. Elite Level 
De-securitization                      Securitization/Militarization 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          
Tracking the crisscrossing interaction between these different securitizing and de-
securitizing actors in a historical context constitutes the central task of this project. A 
careful tracing of security-relevant events on these levels will reveal the broad contours 
of the evolutionary trajectory of the INP and its future path(s). Out of this theoretically 
conscious historical narrative, one can make educated observations about the overall 
thrust of the INP along the securitization-desecuritization continuum.   
I. Securitization Continuum 
(Technological/Legal) Non-politicized  Politicization     Securitization       Militarization  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->> 
 
II. De-securitization Continuum 
Militarization Re-politicization   De-politicization    De-securitization 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------->> 
 
Within this framework, if international forces of securitization get the upper hand 
(possibly further energized by the de-nationalization of the INP on the domestic scene) 
complete nuclear securitization and even militarization of the INP would become a 
distinct possibility. A rough analogy of this analogy would be the militarization of the 
Iraqi WMD program that culminated in the Operation Iraqi Freedom of March 2003. This 
scenario gains more plausibility and reinforcement by the triangulation of the Iran-nukes 
nexus with international terrorism following 9/11, placement of Iran on the so-called 
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“axis of evil” by the Bush administration and their atmospheric impact on how the INP 
was contextualized afterwards.  
On the other hand, if de-securitizing agents of the INP coalesce into a 
consequential coherent force with international credibility, directionality and visibility 
(an unlikely scenario under the circumstances) or if the United States’ ability to sustain 
the INP at the top of international security discourse fizzles out in the face of more urgent 
and intractable domestic and international concerns like the Arab Spring and the 
Financial Crisis, the Iranian nuclear program could be re-prioritized as a technical/legal 
proliferation challenge rather than an urgent existential security dilemma.  
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CHAPTER 2
 
1957-1973: NUCLEAR INFANCY 
 
This era marks Iran’s first exposure to, raw fascination with, and unsophisticated 
socialization into the nuclear world. President Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace 
Program rolled out the introduction of a host of Third World countries into the nuclear 
age. Iran was no exception to this unfolding trend as the enervated country was trying to 
find its self-confidence and define its regional and international role following the 
strategically bruising experiences of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941, the 
Soviet tardiness to leave Iran’s Azerbaijan Province in 1946, and the CIA orchestrated 
coup of 1953 that toppled democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq.  
The 14 July Revolution (1958) in Iraq and Brigadier General Abdul Karim 
Qasim’s subsequent withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact were also instrumental in 
rendering the young Shah sensitive to Iran’s external vulnerabilities through indirect 
Communist subversion. Viewed from a strategic perspective, 1958 was the beginning of a 
securitized era in Iran’s relations with its Arab neighbor to the west. This securitized 
atmosphere was additionally reinforced by the Shah’s rather disproportionate alarmism at 
the Soviet threat from the north and Moscow’s courting of Tehran’s Arab rivals and 
adversaries in the Middle East and North Africa. 
During this founding period Iran was gradually coming to conceptual grips with 
the notion of the atom and its hardware and software implications. Lacking a 
sophisticated conceptual framework (either domestically generated or externally granted 
to or imposed on it) to help cultivate and calibrate its nuclear identity, Tehran lacked the 
scientific, bureaucratic, and infrastructural foundations commensurate for a solid national 
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nuclear enterprise. This was in contrast, for instance, to India’s nuclear journey where the 
Atomic Energy Research Committee was founded by the government in 1946 (prior to 
the country’s independence) with a prominent nuclear physicist Homi J. Bhabha as its 
chairman.  
In 1957, the Council of Ministers also established the National Iranian Atomic 
Energy Commission (IAEC). The body was headed by the Prime Minister with the 
Minister of Industry and Mines acting as his deputy. The IAEC was predominantly a 
policy-formulating organization whose role in conceptualizing and streamlining Iran’s 
nuclear efforts was only of symbolic significance.   
In Iran, the Shah virtually embodied and encapsulated the country’s dabbling with 
the atom in this period and almost single-handedly gave visibility, texture, and 
directionality to it. As a matter of fact, the whole nuclear enterprise in this period 
amounted to little more than an exercise in crafting the sorely needed prestige factor for 
the person of the Shah following his humiliating escape in 1953 and his re-accession to 
the throne in a foreign orchestrated coup d’état, events that ingrained his image as a U.S. 
client figure for the decades to come.  
The available archival evidence does not shed a definitive light on the initial 
epiphany moment of the Shah’s nuclear fascination or its subsequent evolution into a 
full-fledged obsession toward the mid 1970s. Having said that, one person has credited 
himself explicitly with having been the inspirational figure behind the Shah’s nuclear 
initiation. Abolfath Mahvi, the Shah’s cousin whose name as the owner of the consulting 
firm, Iran Nuclear Energy Co. (INECO), appears sporadically in U.S. documents, relates 
a story where he asks His Imperial Majesty (HIM) during his 1963 visit to the USA: 
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“since the U.S. President will not support your request for America to increase its 
purchase of Iranian oil that would, in return, allow you to purchase more arms, why not 
consider acquiring nuclear weapons? It will reduce the need to purchase more 
sophisticated arms and military hardware and will add to Iran’s prestige among the 
international community.” Mahvi claims this conversation made a profound and lasting 
impression on the Shah and how he came to approach to the question of the atom.  Many 
have, however, come to dispute and refute this claim of Mahvi’s in subsequent years. The 
foundational figure of Iran’s nuclear program Akbar Etemad finds Mahvi’s claims 
disingenuous at worst and hyperbolic at best calling him a run-of-the-mill influence 
peddler who, riding on the Shah’s coattails, made a fortune on secret commissions and 
not-so-secret kickbacks. Etemad, on the other hand, believes that the Shah’s riveted 
nuclear fascination had as much to do with HIM’s principal conviction that “oil was too 
precious to be burned up” as with anything else.43 In any event, a balanced reading of the 
available archival evidence does not even circumstantially suggest that the Shah’s nuclear 
consciousness was, as Mahvi claims, born with an eye on the atom’s national security 
dividends. This is in sharp contrast to the Islamic Republic’s war-borne nuclear 
awakening that has rendered a de-securitized narrative of the INP a hard sell to this date.  
Based on a well-rounded reading of the available evidence, the trigger on the 
Iranian side to enter the nuclear world seems to have come from the Shah’s personal 
interest in the issue and embassy reports on nuclear cooperation between the United 
                                                        
43 Akbar Etemad, interview by Sergei Barseghian, Nagofteh-haye Akbar Etemad, Pishgam-e Fan Avari-ye 
Hasteh-i ye Iran (The Untold Story of Akbar Etemad, The Pioneer of Iran's Nuclear Technology), Etemad 
Melli (9 April, 2008). Abolfath Mahvi, 40-year-old Dream How Iran's Muclear Program was Born , 
January 6, 2009,  
http://www.iranian.com/main/2009/jan/40-year-old-dream (accessed July 14, 2010).  
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States and other Third World countries within the Atoms for Peace Program.44 For 
example, on January 12, 1955 Ali Asghar Hekmat, the Iranian ambassador to New Delhi 
informed the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indian and Pakistani nuclear efforts. 
Hekmat specified the conference India had organized on various aspects of nuclear 
technology and emphasized the personal interest Jawahar Lal Nehru had taken in 
developing a nuclear infrastructure.45 Hekmat also mentioned a trip by a US delegation to 
India to explore avenues for nuclear cooperation between the two countries.46 He 
recommended officials in Iran follow India’s suit and start exploring various aspects of 
nuclear technology as well.47  
In 1956, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a report in which it 
referred to a cable by the Iranian embassy in Amman, Jordan on the nuclear cooperation 
between the US and Israel and arrangements to establish a nuclear science lab. According 
to the report, this nuclear facility would enable Israel to make practical headway in the 
nuclear field. The document also alluded to similar arrangements in place between the US 
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and Lebanon.48 Impressed by the report, Iranian Prime Minister Hossein Ala inquired 
why was it that the Iranian Government had not rolled out similar negotiations with the 
United States.49  
 Following up on the Prime Minister’s keen interest in the issue, Tehran 
University Chancellor Manoucher Eqbal started negotiations with Loy Henderson the 
former US ambassador to Iran (1951-1954) and the director of the Office of Near Eastern 
Affairs in the U.S. State Department. Looking favorably upon the issue, Henderson 
pledged to take up the issue with the relevant American officials. Following Eqbal's 
negotiations with Henderson, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a series of 
preliminary talks with the US embassy in Tehran. Even at its most exploratory and 
tentative stages the nuclear issue was not a purely technical matter devoid of political 
overtones as far as Washington was concerned. For instance, in November of 1955 
Washington sought the advice of the US embassy in Tehran regarding the favorability of 
the over-all political situation for sending a physicist to Tehran to conduct informal 
negotiations to initiate a nuclear research program in Iran.50  
As Iran’s efforts to dip its toes into the nuclear world were assuming higher 
priority, on July 18, 1956, in a letter to US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Iranian 
Ambassador to Washington Ali Amini (who went on to become Prime Minister in 1961) 
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“communicated to His Excellency the desire of the Iranian Government to enter into 
negotiations looking toward the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement for 
cooperation in matters concerning the civil uses of atomic energy.”51 On July 27, the 
United States responded affirmatively to the Iranian request and on August 16, 1956, the 
United States government presented a draft agreement to the representatives of the 
Iranian embassy in Washington. The draft was subsequently sent to a "Scientific 
Committee of the University of Tehran" for review.52  
The draft agreement proposed by the United States followed the same guidelines 
in place in agreements concluded "with 32 other countries." The main pillars of these 
guidelines were “A) exchange of unclassified technology; B) lease of up to 6 kilograms 
of U-235 for reactor fuel, as well as laboratory quantities of other special materials; and 
C) Appropriate safeguards.”53  
Iran’s main impediment, as far as the Americans could diagnose, in the way of 
getting the ball rolling on a pilot-scale nuclear program was a virtual lack of trained 
personnel in the country. Asked about "the nature of research facilities and trained 
physicists in Iran, during a 1956 visit to the United States, an Iranian delegate to the 
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IAEA replied, "there are about 40 full professors on the faculty of science at the 
University of Tehran.”  
During his visit to the U.S., the Iranian delegate tried to contextualize Tehran’s 
nuclear quest in a broader setting citing the "political pressure, supported by popular 
demand, which had descended upon the Government and thence the faculty of science, to 
develop atomic energy for Iran." Rather interestingly, the Iranian delegate was adamant 
that it was "imperative” for him to “return to Iran with the necessary information 
prerequisite to initiating a reactor project." During the meeting, the Americans suggested 
that considering its lack of trained personnel Tehran opt for the swimming pool type 
reactor, as the water boiler type (the first reactor the Japanese had decided on and Iran 
had an eye on) would require an "ample cadre of trained technicians".54   
Following the delegate’s report to Tehran, in October 1956 the Iranians, through 
the embassy in DC, signaled their willingness to sign the agreement as proposed by the 
US. The Shah, right from the get-go, took a personal interest in the issue expressing his 
desire to personally announce the agreement "on the occasion of the opening of a US 
Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit” in Tehran.55 On November 1, 1956, the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) recommended to the President the approval of the Agreement 
negotiated jointly by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State in 
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keeping with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The AEC considered the agreement "an 
important and desirable step in advancing the development of the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy in Iran” through “cooperation between the two countries with respect to the 
design, construction and operation of research reactors."56 Thereupon, having made the 
determination that it "would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense 
and security," President Eisenhower authorized the execution of the agreement in a letter 
dated December 22, 1956 sent to the AEC.57 
 The agreement was finally signed at 2:30 p.m., on March 5, 1957 by Dr. Ali 
Amini, the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the 
AEC, and William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State. The signing was formally 
announced by the Shah at the opening ceremony of the US Atoms-for-Peace exhibit in 
Tehran on March 6, 1957.58 Almost two years later, in a February 4, 1959 letter to the 
AEC, the Iranian Embassy in Washington D.C. informed the Americans of the 
ratification of the Agreement by both houses of the Iranian Parliament.59 Thereupon, the 
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U.S. Government notified the Iranians of entry into force of the Agreement on April 27, 
1959.60 Coming on the heels of the 1955 “Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations and 
Consular Rights” between Iran and the United States, the 1957 nuclear treaty was signed 
in an atmosphere of comity between the two countries and was of tremendous prestige 
value to Tehran.  
The press released to the media on the occasion of the signing of the treaty by the 
Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission contained a lot of future-
looking sentiments on the potential for Iran and the United States to work in the nuclear 
field. Chief among them was expression of “hope and expectation” that the initial 
agreement would lead to “consideration of further cooperation at some future date of an 
agreement in the field of nuclear power,” an ambition that proved more elusive than the 
Americans and Iranians expected as the geopolitical terrain in the Middle East and the 
Indian Subcontinent underwent some tectonic shifts with massive implications for 
securitization of national nuclear programs as we will see in the next chapter.  
The 1957 agreement also expressed optimism that it would "enable the Iranians to 
enhance their own country's training and experience in nuclear science and engineering 
for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy within the framework of the 
‘Atoms-for –Peace Program.” Mention was also made of the Iranian enrollees "attending 
the reactor technology courses at the International School for Nuclear Science and 
Engineering operated for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission by the Argonne National 
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Laboratory in cooperation with Pennsylvania State University and North Carolina State 
College.”61  
Iran’s 1957 nuclear agreement with the United States should also be situated 
within the broader context of the Baghdad Pact, a loose alliance modeled after NATO 
and concluded (under US promise of military and economic aid) between Iran, Iraq, 
Turkey, Pakistan, and Great Britain in 1955 to fend off Soviet infiltration into the Middle 
East. As the United States and Great Britain deemed the pact membership an appropriate 
platform to get the Middle East started on the Atoms for Peace Program, on March 31, 
1957 Iraq’s King Feisal II formally inaugurated the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training 
Centre in Baghdad’s Salchiyah district. The center was conceived to provide training in 
“nuclear physics, radiochemistry, electronics, medical applications, and agriculture” to 
the scientific community of the Pact member states and other countries in the Middle 
East.  
The general assessment of the possible power-generating applications of nuclear 
power at the time was that: “The application of nuclear power will not be worthwhile in 
Iraq and Turkey in the foreseeable future, owing to the abundant supply of oil and hydro 
power. Iran and Pakistan are, however, interested in the potentialities of nuclear power 
units of medium output for some areas, and the Centre will help by advice to promote this 
development.” Britain assumed an advising and supervisory role in the enterprise.62 
Within this context Iran was also singled out as one of the countries in the Asian-African 
                                                        
61 For the Press. United States Department of State. United States Atomic Energy Commission. "Atoms for 
Peace" Agreement Signed by Iran and United States. March 6, 1956. RG 59 General Records of the 
Department of State Office of the Secretary Special Assistance to Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and 
Outer Space General Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962 Box 500. National Archives 
at College Park, College Park, MD. 
 
62 John Cockcroft, "The Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre," Nature 179, no. 4567 (1957): 936. 
 
 
 38
area with strong interest in the economics of nuclear power in a 1957 hearing before the 
"Joint Committee on Atomic Energy" in the U.S. Congress.63  
According to a report published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the 
Baghdad Pact Nuclear Training Centre would also offer “post-graduate work in 
radioactive isotopes” and include “facilities (electronic and radiochemical) to train 20 
students” with Sir John Cockcroft as the chairman of the Center's council.64 The Center 
posted a fairly successful track record over its short lifespan training about sixty nuclear 
scientists from the Pact member states before the 1958 Iraqi Revolution terminated its 
activities.65  
Following the 14 July coup in Baghdad during which the anglophile King Faisal 
was swept from power, Iraq drifted toward the Soviet orbit and withdrew from the 
Baghdad Pact. Consequently, as per the decision to re-establish the Baghdad Pact Nuclear 
Centre in Tehran taken jointly by the CENTO countries in January 195966, the CENTO 
Institute of Nuclear Science officially replaced the Bagdad Pact Nuclear Center, its 
headquarters moved to Iran and was officially inaugurated by the Shah in Tehran 
University’s newly built Faculty of Science building.67 One could mark the occasion as 
an embryonic sign of His Imperial Majesty’s operational interest in the atom.  
 
                                                        
63 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress of the United States Eighty-Fifth 
Congress First Session on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry - 1957,  (1957). 
 
64 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists XIII (September 1957): 271. 
 
65 H. A. C. McKay, "The Cento Institute of Nuclear Science in Tehran," Nature 186, no. 4724 (1960): 513-
515. 
 
66 H. A. C. McKay, "The Cento Institute of Nuclear Science in Tehran," Nature 186, no. 4724 (1960): 513-
515. 
 
67 Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, Parliamentary papers, Volume 9, (HMSO, 1959). 
 
 
 39
As the Center’s director, H. A. C. McKay described the internal workings of the 
Center in Nature, “All the CENTO countries contributed to the running of the Institute. 
Its scientific policy was in the hands of the Scientific Council consisting of a leading 
scientist from each of the four countries; the United States sent an observer. The 
Scientific Council reported to the Economic Committee of CENTO, and in general 
administrative matters the Director of the Institute maintained liaison with the Deputy 
Secretary General for Economic Affairs of CENTO.”68 The main thrust in the Center’s 
research and training activities was on “radioisotope work, with some bias towards 
agricultural applications.”69 There is some evidence in CENTO meetings minutes, 
coming especially from Pakistani representatives, suggesting the United States should 
consider deploying nuclear weapons in CENTO countries à la NATO. Iran, nervous 
about the Soviet Union’s nuclear saber rattling over its CENTO membership and 
uncertain whether US extended deterrence would alleviate or aggravate its security 
anxieties, never embraced the idea. 
In the very same year, Iran made preliminary arrangements to establish a 5MWe 
reactor at the Tehran University for which, on May 8, 1959, Tehran requested an 
amendment to the 1957 agreement allowing Tehran to receive HEU (90% enriched U-
235) and Plutonium from the United States.70 The U.S. government, after inquiring as to 
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the design and construction of the reactor, the organizational configuration for its 
operation and utilization, the key personnel of the facility and "particularly the research 
and training program which was planned for the utilization of the reactor", and the 
“particular objectives” that had prompted Tehran to shift from the initially proposed 
1MWe to the 5MWe reactor, did not grant Tehran’s request.71 After an exchange of 
multiple letters, the United States, in anticipation of the fact that Tehran Research 
Reactor (TRC) would not be completed until the nuclear agreement’s expiration on April 
27, 1964 decided not to go along with amending the agreement. The Department of State 
instead, citing the policy of the US government "to encourage its bilateral partners, 
wherever practical, to satisfy their requirements for special nuclear materials through the 
International Atomic Energy Agency," referred Iran to the IAEA to obtain the HEU and 
plutonium it required.72 
As time wore on, the Shah’s fascination with atomic energy went beyond 
cooperation with the United States within the Atoms for Peace framework (this was in no 
small part thanks to Washington’s stringent conditions for cooperation) and expanded 
toward Europe.  For instance, on May 7, 1959 during a three-day visit to Great Britain the 
Shah paid a high-profile visit to the Atomic Research Establishment at Harwell during  
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which Lord Edwin Plowden, Chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (AEA), gave 
him a guided tour of the Dido reactor.73 
  As touched upon earlier, the Shah’s personal fascination with nuclear technology 
and the pomp and circumstance accompanying it is testified to by his enthusiastic 
presence in the extravagant inauguration ceremony marking the conclusion of the first 
nuclear agreement between Iran and the USA in April 1957.74 Along the same lines was 
the replacement in 1959 of the Bagdad Pact Nuclear Center by the CENTO Institute of 
Nuclear Science headquartered in Tehran and inaugurated by the Shah.75  
This was followed, in July 1960, by Iran hosting the Cento Symposium on 
Nuclear Science in Hamadan. Experts from the CENTO member states, the US and 
France attended the symposium. Among the issues discussed was the possible uses of a 
large research reactors, and the value to the region of some of the larger nuclear 
instruments. During the meetings Tehran hinted at its interest in exploring the more 
operational aspects of the atom like nuclear energy.  
Although amounting to no more than some preliminary gestures geared toward 
generating personal gravitas for the Shah and symbolic prestige for the country, the issue 
of the atom for Iran in the late 1950s and early 1960s could also be situated within a 
broader context. The nuclear effort, in addition to highlighting the Shah’s efforts to 
broaden and consolidate his domestic prestige and authority base in the post-Mosaddeq 
era, also marks the initial phase of the young monarch’s maturation into the “national 
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security leader” he became toward the 1970s. As professor Ramazani aptly points out, in 
this period “Iran’s foreign policy became clearly the Shah’s foreign policy after the 
overthrow of the Mosaddeq regime. As such, it primarily reflected his perception of the 
Iranian position in world politics, his assumptions about the nature of the Iranian 
problem, and his projected solution for that problem.”76 
Arguably “modernization” as a broadly conceived theme best encapsulates the 
gist of HIM’s strategy of choice to energize Iran’s leap forward and assuage its multiple 
social, political, and economic ailments. The theme figures prominently both in the 
substance and stylistics of the Shah’s modus operandi in this period. Again, as Ramazani 
points out, “Unlike Mosaddeq, who assumed that the root cause of Iranian malaise was 
the pernicious influence of the British, the Shah might appear to have assumed that the 
social and economic backwardness of Iran was the most fundamental reason.” Military 
security assumed such a prominence within this framework for the Shah that he observed, 
“freedom-loving peoples forget—but Communist powers never forget—that most of the 
world’s economically underdeveloped countries are also militarily underdeveloped.”77 
This inextricable and mutually reinforcing correlation between modernization and 
military prowess remained a bedrock component to the Shah’s international posture with 
manifest implications for the intense politicization and securitization drift of Iran’s 
nuclear program under his rule.  
A natural consequence of this paradigm was that the Shah’s resource allocation 
priorities were grossly lop-sided in favor of military purchases. This translated into 
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unremitting US concern over the Shah’s long-term or subterranean intentions since he 
would invariably tilt toward defense at the expense of development even under the most 
trying financial straits. One could argue that within this generic framework (defined by 
HIM’s laser-focused attention on the security dividends of modernization) the eventual 
securitization of the Iranian nuclear program under the Shah by Washington was 
inevitable. Put crudely, the kind of cart blanche the monarch had given his nuclear 
superstar and bureaucratic celebrity Dr. Etemad was simply hard to reconcile with a 
purely civilian nuclear enterprise with no military rewards to extract down the road.  
Viewed from this perspective, a case can be made that the decision to play with 
the idea of the nuclear was a by-product of the Shah’s fascination with modernization. 
This was a perennial leitmotif in HIM’s addresses to the nation as he was trying to 
transplant the modern world’s (donya-ye motejadded as HIM used to call it in Persian) 
politico-economic values and socio-psychological attitudes onto the country’s national 
psyche. Having said that, it is hard to gauge the outer limits of the Shah’s nuclear 
imagination and expectations in this era as his eagerness to overcome the puppet image 
that had bruised and scarred his image after the 1953 coup and his desire to project 
hegemonic power onto the domestic and regional scenes evolved significantly in this 
period.  
Closely monitoring the evolutionary trajectory of the Shah’s passion for 
hegemonic power, the Americans were also extremely mindful lest they might 
excessively whet the Shah’s appetite in the nuclear direction. Despite this cautiousness, 
though, the declassified evidence demonstrates that Washington briefly gave some 
thought to the idea of deploying nukes on Iranian territory considering the country’s 
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geostrategic indispensability to the Cold War. This was not to be, however as it would, in 
Washington’s judgment, introduce unnecessary escalatory kinks to US relations with 
Moscow. Although the Americans went so far as to consider using nuclear weapons 
against the Soviet Union to defend Iran against a strategic Soviet attack in the 1950s78 
and a 1957 “Special National Intelligence Estimate” placed Iran squarely at the heart of 
the Soviet Union’s strategic concerns, the US national security apparatus stopped short of 
recommending deployment of nuclear weapons systems in Iran on the grounds it “would 
probably cause the most serious concern of all possible areas of deployment. US 
deployment there would involve the possibility that, "in spite of the risk of counteraction 
by the US and the Baghdad Pact countries, the USSR might move forces into Iran, citing 
the provisions of the 1921 treaty. It would, in any event, be a reversal of previous US and 
Western policy against stationing troops in Iran.”79  
Providing NATO-like extended deterrence to the CENTO was also deemed ill 
advised by Washington. “In keeping with U.S. policy and legislation”, the United States 
Department of State advised against giving the CENTO members “encouragement that 
the United States intended to provide to them, or share with them, any of its nuclear 
capabilities.” Not to completely alienate CENTO countries (and to confer some 
semblance of defensive alliance on the CENTO), however, Washington made known its 
discretionary “unilateral plans to use tactical nuclear weapons in support of CENTO 
forces in time of global war,” adding that “the nuclear weapons which will be allocated 
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for this purpose will not be deployed to the CENTO area until the United States 
determines that the requirement exists.”80 This combination of ambiguous security 
guarantees, however, fell well short of Iran’s security expectations as the most vulnerable 
CENTO country that didn’t enjoy Turkey’s NATO or Pakistan’s SEATO status.  
The Monarch’s Security Expectations  
 
         As the 1960s wore on, the Shah’s “almost pathological fear” of Nasserism and its 
metastasis into the Persian Gulf region came to dominate HIM’s list of national security 
concerns. In 1964, in an attempt to “immunize” the region against Nasser’s venomous 
influence and to consolidate Iran’s position in the region in anticipation of British 
withdrawal in 1971, Iran embarked on a comprehensive effort to cultivate economic ties 
with Kuwait, Qatar, and Trucial Sheikhdoms. 81  
The Shah’s exaggerated feeling of vulnerability from the Persian Gulf coupled 
with his “burgeoning self-confidence”, as some US Embassy cables put it, was a 
perennial theme in Iran’s foreign relations in the mid 1960’s. The Americans felt the 
actual manifestation of this newfound sense of hegemony on multiple fronts. Chief 
among them was HIM’s brutal repression of the domestic opposition, his reform-
mindedness specifically the so-called "white revolution," and his new policy of closer ties 
with the USSR and the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe. The most consequential 
of the Shah’s novel grandstanding postures, however, was a rabid public opinion 
campaign to “demonstrate that he was no longer an American stooge” and to cultivate a 
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new image of himself by decreasing his dependence on the United States for military 
procurements aimed at throwing Iran’s weight around in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Also contributing to the Shah’s “new-found self-confidence” in this era were: (1) 
the division, dispiritedness, and disarray created in leftist circles, particularly in the 
Communist movement, by the growing friendliness of the Soviets for the Shah; (2) the 
general disarray of other opposition elements, such as the National Front and certain 
religious circles; (3) the general detente between the USSR and the Western world and 
the new Soviet policy of wooing Iran rather than, as in the past, demonstrating hostility; 
and (4) the Shah’s soaring oil income which made his independent policy economically 
possible.82  
 One also has to bear in mind that that Shah’s independent policy was arguably as 
much a by-product of Iran’s changed fortunes and circumstances as the brainchild of the 
Shah’s thinly disguised admiration for and his effort to emulate France’s foreign policy 
under General Charles de Gaulle. Trying to take a page from de Gaulle’s “politics of 
grandeur” (politique de grandeur) that saw Paris adopt a highly independent foreign 
policy posture and turned France into the world’s fourth nuclear power, the Shah viewed 
Iran’s placement in the Middle East comparable to that of France in continental Europe. 
Adopting this new paradigm, in the Shah’s view, would enable Tehran to break itself 
loose from being a helpless hostage of politics of alliance and its vicissitudes in a tightly 
bipolar international system. This, in Chubin and Zabih’s words, “involved ‘bridge 
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building’ with Iran's communist neighbor and its socialist allies in Eastern Europe, and 
included a diversification of foreign policy interests.”83 
The Shah’s gravitation toward a more independent –hence less manipulable and 
responsive to US persuasion and dissuasion- defense posture and his desire to devise 
mechanisms to deal with Tehran’s security challenges “as he sees them” is well captured 
in a 1966 document where the Shah is described as literally “shocked” by the military 
treatment Pakistan, a close Iranian ally in the CENTO, received from the United States in 
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The war was a transformative experience for the Shah 
and put him in a “new mood” vis-à-vis Iran’s security precariousness and the depth and 
staying-power of Washington’s security commitments:  
“Although the Shah values the American security commitment contained in our 
1959 bilateral agreement, he considers the Soviet threat less ominous and believes that in 
any case it is in America’s interest that Iran be able to cope with regional threats (to 
preclude further Vietnams)… Developments affecting one of Iran's close allies have 
reinforced the Shah in his conviction that Iran must be prepared to stand on its own feet. 
U.S. action cutting off military assistance to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak crisis 
apparently left him profoundly convinced that not only might the United States not help 
Iran militarily in a conflict with the Arabs, it might cut off the flow of assistance it is now 
providing. Thus, the Shah was also disturbed to discover that when it comes to making 
available U.S.-supplied equipment (even that which he had purchased) to an ally such as 
Pakistan, delivery can be thwarted by the requirements of U.S. law. To the Shah this 
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means that his two closest allies, Pakistan and Turkey, cannot assist Iran militarily 
against a non-communist aggressor without the risk of United States interference.”84   
Within this context, in Washington’s judgment, having consolidated his position 
as both the monarch and the supreme ruler and decision-maker, the Shah in the mid 
1960’s, after a quarter century on the throne, enjoyed considerable self-confidence and 
self-sufficiency in his strategic judgments about “what [was] best for his people and how 
to achieve it.”85  
Also vividly detectable in this era is the Shah’s dissatisfaction with the United 
States’ under-appreciation of his contributions in turning Iran into “a progressive 
twentieth century nation-state” following the example of Cyrus and Darius. The Shah of 
the mid-1960’s, ambitiously and “with a messianic zeal,” assumed a “constructive role” 
for Iran in a Middle East “plagued by negativistic sloganism.” Brimming with self-
confidence, the Shah, by the mid 1960s, had turned into a security-first leader for whom 
military aspects of the national interest took absolute precedence over and were 
prerequisites for social progress and economic prosperity. Following this ever-ingraining 
philosophy of viewing socio-politico-economic flourishing as derivatives of security, the 
Shah was rapidly increasing his military procurements. In 1966, for instance, he was 
pushing for “a second Hawk battalion, super-sonic interceptors, gap-filler radars and anti-
aircraft guns, Sheridan tanks, additional war reserve ammunition, a destroyer, and an air-
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to-ground missile.” The monarch also made no secret of his willingness to secure and 
procure the military hardware he deemed imperative from anyone willing to sell. For 
example, he made known to the Americans the availability of a Soviet high-speed 
interceptor aircraft at a “favorable price.” 86  
The disagreements in judgment between the Shah and the Americans on the 
strategic threat environment Iran was presently and prospectively facing were steeply 
spiking as the 1960s was drawing to a close and Iran’s petrodollars were bulging. For 
instance, in a November 4, 1968 cable Stuart Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, took issue with the Shah’s thesis about “a serious 
threat requiring an all-out defense effort by Iran” in the Persian Gulf.87  
This independent mindset came even more conspicuously to a fore when HIM 
arrived more definitively at the realization that "the [US] commitment [toward Iran] was 
closely related to Soviet involvement in any threat to Iran" as opposed to being a purely 
bilateral commitment. With the Soviet threat growing "relatively latent,” the Shah 
became more concerned about “a radical Arab nationalist threat from the South" that he 
preferred to fend off with indigenous Iranian force.88 Within this context, for example, 
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Iraq’s acquisition of “more MIGs from the USSR and Lightnings from the UK” only 
intensified Iran’s rapidly escalating anxieties from the Nasser-inspired Arab world.89  
This international factor played an unmistakable role in circumscribing the scope 
and depth of the Shah’s reliance on the United States for sub-existential security needs. 
As touched upon before though, reinforcing the international factor in HIM’s more self-
reliant posture was an indispensible domestic ingredient: Iran’s ever-swelling national 
coffer thanks to windfall oil revenues and other financial resources. This domestic 
economic factor was essentially shifting Iran-US relations away from one of “donor-
recipient” onto a more “commercial basis.” One obvious manifestation of this 
transformation was the United States “terminating its AID assistance” and decreasing the 
grant component of its military cooperation to Iran and imposing more stringent credit 
terms on the Shah’s insatiable appetite for military hardware. 
The INP Muddles Through  
 
As the fissures in threat judgment between Iran and the United States were 
widening and proliferating, Tehran’s burgeoning and predominantly symbolic nuclear 
program was slowly edging forward. The trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program received a 
vigorous conceptual jumpstart with Akbar Etemad’s return to Iran from Switzerland in 
June 1965. The son of an affluent merchant from the ancient city of Hamedan in 
northwestern Iran, Etemad received his secondary education in the elite American 
College of Tehran known as Alborz High School before pursuing a higher education in 
electrical engineering in Switzerland’s École polytechnique de l'Université de Lausanne 
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(EPUL). Upon graduation, Etemad took up a research position in Baden (Switzerland) 
based Brown Boveri, a company specializing in nuclear power generators. Thereafter, he 
moved to Switzerland’s main reactor research center Institut Federal de Recherche en 
Matiere de Reacteura while pursuing a doctorate degree in Reactor Physics at the 
University of Lausanne. Following graduation in 1963, Etemad continued working at the 
Institut for two additional years and established himself as an internationally known 
figure in the field of “nuclear reactor shielding” giving consultation to the IAEA.90 In 
1956, having severed his ties with Iran’s communist Tudeh Party, a disillusioned Etemad 
heeded his inner calling and decided to return to Iran and “give back to his home 
country.”  
Upon his return to Iran in 1965, Etemad took on a managerial position in 
accelerating the completion of The Tehran Research Reactor whose commissioning had, 
much to the Shah’s annoyance, almost ground to a halt. Etemad, whose bureaucratic 
dexterity was increasingly shining through, also engineered the relocation of the Iran 
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) from the Ministry of the Economy to the Plan 
Organization in 1967. The new IAEC in the Plan Organization, whose founding charter 
Etemad drew up, would streamline and synchronize all policy-formulating and decision-
making functions related to nuclear energy. As Etemad later recalled, the relocation of 
the Iran Atomic Energy Commission coincided with the time the Plan Organization was 
preparing Iran’s Fourth Development Plan (1968-1973) in which no mention was made 
of possible uses of nuclear energy for generating electricity.  
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With the establishment of the Ministry of Science, Scientific Research, and 
Higher Education in 1968, Etemad was placed in charge of its Scientific and Research 
Department that took on all nuclear R&D responsibilities previously falling under the 
Plan Organization. While the responsibility for conceptualizing and operationalizing the 
atom was being shuttled between different government agencies, thanks to a lack of a 
meaningful national-level priority for the issue—despite HIM’s avid personal interest in 
it– no major tangible breakthroughs transpired until late 1973. In the meantime, Etemad 
stayed in the Ministry of Science performing various duties as the head of the Institute for 
Research and Science and Education Planning and later as the Chancellor of his passion 
project, the newly founded Buali Sina (Avicenna) University in his hometown of 
Hamadan.91    
Among the most significant functions of the Plan Organization in the field of 
atomic energy was to "prepare for submission to the Atomic Energy Council drafts of 
legislative bills, decrees, and regulations” related to atomic energy. It was also tasked 
with assuming "direct control over all atomic installations and radioactive material.” The 
IAEC also exercised “direct control over activities in the field of atomic energy within 
the ministries of government affiliated agencies, to establish coordination between the 
agencies and to examine atomic energy plans and budgets.” As part of this function it was 
mandated to “encourage various government agencies to use atomic energy to implement 
or to assist in the implementation of Development and Industrial Plans such as the 
generation of power, the desalination of sea water.” Also falling under the IAEC’s tasks 
were preparing “necessary programs for training scientists and technicians in the fields of 
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atomic energy” and “attracting foreign aid of all kinds as well as for distributing it among 
the various government agencies.”92  
Related to this bureaucratic reshuffle, on its April 22, 1967 meeting the Iranian 
Council of Ministers approved a decree establishing the "Atomic Energy Council" under 
the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The body’s broad platform was to convene every 
three months to "concentrate activities in the field of atomic energy." The Council 
comprised of the Minister of Economy, the managing Director of the Plan Organization, 
the Chancellor of the Tehran University, the Chancellor of another university, and four 
Atomic Energy experts selected by the Prime Minister. The most important function of 
the newly established body was to “determine overall policy in the field of atomic energy 
as well as to determine priorities.”93 
In this period, the 1957 nuclear agreement between Tehran and Washington went 
through two revisions in 1964 and 1969 respectively. The 1964 amendment was 
especially of operational significance since it would provide for the transfer of highly 
enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and for gram quantities of 
other nuclear material for research projects. The most significant change in the 1969 
amendment was that it modified the 1964 agreement to "permit fueling of reactor  
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experiments in addition to research reactors."94 Iran also signed an agreement with 
Canada on January 7, 1971 for “Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.” 
On November 25, 1967, the 5MWe swimming pool-type Tehran Research 
Reactor (TRR) was inaugurated on the newly constructed Amirabad campus of the 
University of Tehran. TRR, built in two vaults and a five-story building and dedicated by 
the Shah and the Queen, was part of the contract the University of Tehran had concluded 
with AMF atomics in 1958. The reactor was comparable to the ones the United States had 
constructed for Israel and Pakistan and was capable of producing up to 100 grams of 
plutonium per year.95 The reactor, built within the Center for Nuclear Studies and the 
research labs it housed at the University of Tehran, was constructed under the Shah’s 
direct authority. At this point the Center for Nuclear Studies staffed some seventy nuclear 
experts and technicians trained in Europe and the United States. As part of the TRR 
project, in September 1967 the United States supplied about 5 kilograms of HEU (93% 
enriched) to Iran to fuel the TRR in addition to about 100 grams of plutonium as "start-up 
sources for research reactor."96 Iran, the USAEC, and the IAEA concluded an agreement 
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in June 1967 that would authorize the transfer of enriched uranium and plutonium to Iran 
under the IAEA supervision.97 
The TRR went critical on November 4, 1967 in coincidence with the Shah’s 
inauguration of the "Atoms in Action" Exhibition on Tehran University’s Amirabad 
campus. This was an exhibition operated by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 
(USAEC) scheduled to run through November 1967. Referred to by the Department of 
State as “the largest combined educational-cultural-scientific foreign exhibit program of 
this nature of the U.S. Government and the most comprehensive on science and atomic 
energy,” its objectives were to "advance the knowledge that atomic energy is one of the 
most effective means to further the betterment of mankind" and "to negate the notion that 
atomic energy and destruction are irrevocably associated.”98  
In his message to the ceremonial occasion, US President Lyndon B. Johnson 
called the Nuclear Science Demonstration Center and Exposition “an exposition of 
progress in Nuclear Science… and an operating laboratory and a meeting-ground where 
your [Iranian] scientists and ours will work side-by-side to learn more about nuclear 
energy and the many blessings that its peaceful development promises for mankind.” He 
further expressed hope that the Center would prove a platform where “ideas about  
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nuclear science will find a useful forum for exchange, will encourage other similar 
projects of mutual benefit for our countries and other nations of the world.”99  
But arguably the most consequential of Iran’s nuclear actions in this period was 
Tehran’s rush to accede to a host of international organizations and treaties aimed at 
establishing an international nuclear regime. As part of this policy, Tehran ratified the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) statute on May 16, 1958, less than a year 
after the nuclear watchdog agency’s establishment on 29 July 1957. On August 9, 1963 
Iran signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and ratified it on 23 December 
1963. Tehran also signed and ratified the Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1971.  
The most significant of these treaty accessions, however, was Iran’s signing of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commonly known as the NPT on 
the day it was opened for signature on July 1, 1968. Tehran ratified the NPT on February 
2, 1970 and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that entered into force on 
May 15, 1974 establishing its rights and responsibilities under NPT articles. Some have 
speculated that Tehran was coerced into signing the NPT by the United States as the 
finalization of the sale of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers was implicitly conditioned on the 
treaty’s ratification.100 Whatever might have prompted such a hasty decision, however, 
there exists a near consistency and consensus in the declassified documents and people 
who have commented on the subject that a serious debate never took place on the pros 
and cons of joining the treaty. Assad Homayoun believes that the decision was made 
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personally by the Shah simply to avoid antagonizing the Americans who were pushing 
hard for garnering maximum signatures for the treaty.101 This was a decision that many in 
the Iranian nuclear “epistemic community” later came to lament. Chief among them was 
Akbar Etemad, the father of the Iranian nuclear program who, with his characteristic 
candidness, frequently referred to the “inherently discriminating nature” of the treaty, 
called the decision to join it “imprudent in the first place”, and underlined the Western 
countries’ consistent violation of articles IV and VI, and advocated Iran’s withdrawal 
from it.102  
The Shah’s nonchalant attitude toward Tehran’s non-proliferation obligations 
under the NPT regime when he was being pushed on the question of Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions in the mid 1970s was a manifest symptom of Tehran’s reluctant membership in 
the treaty. This got some Iran observers wondering whether the conspicuous absence of 
the NPT as a proliferation dissuader in Iran’s nuclear discourse was a sign that by 1974 
the treaty had grown “too dated to be relevant” as far as a completely transformed Iran 
was concerned.103  
On another front, in 1972 Iran’s nuclear thinking inched closer to finding a 
preliminary sense of strategic direction when the government went public with its 
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principled intent to build multiple nuclear power plants within the next decade or so.104 
The country, however, still woefully lacked the requisite financial, scientific, and human 
resources capabilities commensurate with such a declaratory vision.  
Things took a dramatic turn in 1973, however, following the October oil crisis 
when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or 
OAPEC (consisting of the Arab members of OPEC, plus Egypt, Syria and Tunisia) 
proclaimed an oil embargo "in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli 
military" in the Yom Kippur War. As we will see in the next chapter, Iran’s refusal to 
jump on the Arab bandwagon and the windfall revenues generated by the ensuing oil 
bonanza gave the Shah both the requisite strategic latitude and the financial wherewithal 
to embark upon an ambitious and cost-intensive nuclear enterprise.  
Deterrence Creeps into the Monarch’s Security Lexicon  
 
The problem of keeping the Shah’s military appetite within proportional 
dimensions entered a paradigmatically new era in 1969 with the finalization of the British 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region slated for 1971. The Shah, still wary of the 
USSR’s sinister, subversive, and aggressive intentions-- albeit now cloaked in a more 
surreptitious fashion-- considered the Peacock Throne as heir apparent to Whitehall and 
deemed Tehran a natural candidate to fill London’s stabilizing role in the region and to 
stem the feared radicalization drift of the emerging Arab nation-states.  
Although the Nixon administration continued, just like its predecessor, to insist 
that the Shah’s security anxieties were hyperbolic, his security expectations were 
hegemonic, and his reading of Iran’s role was “overdrawn”, there was decidedly a 
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generic sense of recognition in Washington that HIM was irreversibly "wedded" to his 
judgment on Iran’s strategic environment, its operational imperatives, and the fact that 
the country had the "wherewithal to look to other arms sources if he decided the US 
(was) not sufficiently meeting his demands for arms." The alienating, alarming, and 
provocative impact of this maximalist security posture and insatiable thirst for 
sophisticated weaponry figures prominently in the United States’ appraisal of power 
relativities in the Middle East and Iran’s placement in it.  
Also with the advent of the Nixon administration, one notices a new theme with 
potential nuclear overtones entering the tenor of the Shah’s security posture: deterrence. 
The Shah, starting as early as the early 1970s, developed a rather novel security 
preoccupation essentially to the effect that “only a strong deterrent posture can provide 
the necessary guarantee of Iran's security against radical Arab nationalist incursions into 
the Gulf region."105  
The Shah, on many occasions, kept reminding the Americans of the Soviet 
Union’s “grand design” to penetrate the Middle East following the British withdrawal 
and the need for Iran to have a credible deterrent posture to fully implement its own and 
the region’s vital security and stability requirements within the framework of the Nixon 
Doctrine. His Imperial Majesty even went so far as to admonish the Americans for 
having sidetracked themselves onto a marginal and distracting theater in Vietnam and for 
not fully appreciating the high-stakes global game unfolding in the Middle East. This 
time around, he was even more scathing in his criticism of the way Washington was 
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patronizingly deciding for Iran what military wherewithal it needed while shying away 
from offering iron-clad NATO style security guarantees to Tehran. 
For the Shah, the most vivid manifestation of the half-heartedness of the United 
States’ security commitments to Tehran was its refusal to join CENTO as a full-fledged 
member. Further aggravating the Shah’s concerns was Washington’s dismissive attitude 
toward and lack of sympathy for his diagnosis of the gravity of the unfolding situation in 
the Persian Gulf, Iran’s pivotal role in it, and the formidable odds Tehran was up 
against.106  
In the U.S. intelligence community’s judgment, the Shah viewed US reluctance, 
denial, or deferral on providing sophisticated weaponry to Iran as emblematic of the 
United States’ dwindling “regard for him and for his policies” and as a sign of Iran 
getting “downgraded” on Washington’s priority list. As a matter of fact, the intelligence 
community projected, in as early as 1970, that HIM would reorient his policies away 
from the United States “in the direction of closer ties with certain West European states, a 
more accommodating attitude toward the USSR, resistance to U.S. advice on 
international issues, probably increased pressures on US oil interests, and possibly 
termination of US special facilities and military over-flight rights.”107  
One can logically expect the new theme of deterrence, along with the Shah’s 
condescending attitude towards international norms and regimes, to have played at least a 
permissive and facilitating function in the securitization drift of a full-fledged Iranian 
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nuclear program, especially considering Tehran’s uncompromising insistence on 
possessing full fuel cycle and reprocessing rights in the mid-1970s.  
Another theme that crept into the Shah’s security judgments in this era was one of 
Iran emerging from under the shadow of the United States and other great powers and 
Tehran’s eagerness to embrace the operational imperatives of acting like a hegemonic 
power in the Persian Gulf. As early as 1969, the Monarch conveyed his unequivocal 
judgment to Washington that he had come to believe "time had passed when great powers 
could intervene in the Middle East and Asia," and that Iran should be given broad latitude 
in regaining its authority as the master of its own house capable of accurately diagnosing 
its security shortcomings and the ways and means to address them.108   
This theme in the Shah’s foreign policy posture was additionally reinforced by 
HIM’s growing conviction that as the prevailing systemic atmosphere had deescalated to 
one of détente, the United States would leave Iran to its own devices or at least pull its 
nuclear punches were it to be attacked by the USSR or its regional allies.109 These two 
factors had undeniable implications for the Monarch’s insistence on nuclear 
independence in the mid-1970s and the trepidation with which the United States was 
monitoring Iran’s nuclear leap forward. In other words, the ubiquitous desire for self-
sufficiency that began in the realm of security gradually grew into a predominant theme 
in the Shah’s strategic thinking subsequently finding expression in the nuclear field with 
Iran insisting on an indigenous full fuel cycle capacity.  
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Iran’s strategic concerns in a radicalizing Middle East and the Shah’s relentless, 
yet reluctant, efforts to outgrow Tehran’s subservient dependence on the United States 
and alleviate its adverse implications are recurrent themes in the Shah’s conversations 
with the Americans. By way of example, in a 1970 cable, US ambassador to Iran, 
Douglas MacArthur II makes mention of the Shah's "absolute conviction-- or obsession-- 
that unless he substantially strengthens his military posture, the Arab side of the (Persian) 
Gulf will, after British withdrawal, fall before massive radical Arab campaign of 
subversion encouraged by Soviets with Iran standing alone."110 Washington, however, 
questioned the validity of these threat judgments by the Shah indicating that the Shah’s 
“exaggerated” threat perception and his craving for preponderant deterrent capability 
were deliberate plans that betrayed a more subterranean motive.  This assessment threw a 
thoroughly different light on the Monarch’s hysterical threat assessments following the 
anticipated British withdrawal from the region.  
America’s disagreement with the Shah’s threat perceptions reached a pitch in 
September 1970 when the Defense Department asked the intelligence community to do a 
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on the "military threat" facing Iran.  
The resultant memo, drawing a parallel between Iran's predicament and that of 
Israel, noted that the Shah was not simply seeking to deal with “visible threats” (those, in 
the memo’s judgment, were not imminent or massive enough to “justify” the military 
hardware he was seeking), but was keen on a military posture formidable enough to have 
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a “deterrent” impact on the would-be aggressors so that Iran would be above challenge at 
least in the Persian Gulf.111  
Such a force would dissuade potential aggressors from attacking the Persian 
homeland or fettering with Iran’s maneuverability in the Persian Gulf and the Indian 
Ocean. According to the 1970 SNIE on Iran’s international position, the Shah, “acutely 
conscious of Iran’s great past”, saw the British disengagement as presenting not simply a 
threat but also an historic opportunity for Iran to project power and reassert the kind of 
leadership it was entitled to.112  
The Shah called such an impressive posture by Iran in the Middle East a “Policy 
of Wisdom,” one that purported to portray Iran as a country that made rational decisions 
and whose strength was the keystone of security in the Middle East. A theme the Shah 
was fond of sounding to the Americans every opportunity he got was that “insofar as the 
Middle East is concerned, it is important to the U.S. and the Free World that Iran be 
capable of providing for her security and that of the Gulf. … Iran must be capable of 
handling local conflicts and she should not look to the U.S. to become involved except in 
case of general war.” Yet, to the Americans, the operational military imperatives of 
Iranian-style wisdom were steeply moving upward and bordering on extravagant.113  
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To address this issue in the early 1970s Washington was engaged in a diplomatic 
campaign to put a reality check and a sense of perspective on HIM’s power expectations. 
As part of this policy, for instance, the U.S. Secretary of Defense urged Under Secretary 
of State Elliot Richardson to knock some sense of proportionality into the Shah in his 
1970 visit to Iran:  
“Although the Shah is aware of these facts, it does not appear that he fully 
recognizes, or is willing to recognize, the special position and consideration Iran has in its 
military relationship with the U.S. As you are aware, these include the largest MAAG114 
outside SEA115, almost one third of our FMS credit116, the USAF F-4 Technical 
Assistance Field Team (TAFT), one-half of all our foreign jet pilot training spaces, and 
DoD assistance in the M-47 retrofit program.”117  
In December 1970, having sensed the United State's sense of trepidation and 
suspicion over Iran's purported lack of proportionality in seeking military equipment, the 
Shah informed the Americans, in his newfound point blank style, that he was not after a 
“great imperial armed force like Kaiser Wilhelm or like Hitler,” rather his strategic 
objective was to possess a nimble, efficient, and compact military that could "counter 
anything but a major Soviet attack."118  
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In analyzing the Shah’s changing posture vis-à-vis Washington, one should also 
take stock of Iran’s amicable relations with Israel during this era and that relationship’s 
indispensability for a Shah up against a reluctant U.S. administration to satiate his ever-
increasing thirst for military hardware. For instance, following reports that the United 
States Congress might be stonewalling the consummation of an F-4 deal, a disillusioned 
Shah in December 1970 made no bones about his true feelings “acidly” reminding his 
American audience that he could obtain all he wanted from Israel.119  
One should also be cognizant of the fact that the Shah’s Soviet allergy was 
diminishing in parallel with Iran’s bulging oil revenues and his growing self-confidence 
coupled with Iran’s perceived demotion in Washington’s strategic calculus during the 
détente. The Monarch’s independent attitude hit a new high mark in 1970 when the Shah 
reminded the Americans of his readiness to purchase military equipment from Moscow– 
particularly T-62 tanks—if the West were to give him the runaround on his military 
needs.120 This attitude, if operationalized and were the Soviets to sell significant amounts 
of military equipment to Iran, would be tantamount to a major defeat for the Americans 
as it would provide the Soviets with a foothold in Iran, a scenario to which the United 
States was avidly averse. 
 Another important factor that started developing in the late 1960s and early 
1970s and appreciably contributed to the subsequent securitization drift of the Iranian 
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nuclear program in the mid-1970s was a gradually institutionalizing feeling in 
Washington that the Shah had an obsession with national prestige and was willing to go 
to any lengths to secure its hardware prerequisites. This was undermining, in 
Washington’s judgment, the legitimacy of HIM’s security concerns that he claimed were 
the main driving force behind Iran’s quest for added power differentials vis-à-vis the rest 
of the Persian Gulf states. Pushed to its logical conclusion, this would entail the Shah 
seeking to follow Israel and India’s suit in its vicinity and develop, at a minimum, a 
readily weaponizable nuclear capability.  
As a matter of fact, in January 1972 in two separate meetings with US officials, 
Senator Stuart Symington and Ambassador MacArthur, the Shah underscored Tehran’s 
opposition, on principle, to the nuclearization of “the Middle East and South-Asian areas 
adjacent to Iran.” The Monarch, however, was quick to emphatically observe, “should a 
country such as India develop nuclear weapons capability at some future time, perhaps 
with Soviet assistance having China in mind, Iran would have to reconsider its present 
policy and would probably itself wish to develop a nuclear capability.”121 The utter 
disregard for the NPT in the Shah’s articulation of Iran’s future nuclear posture a mere 
month before the treaty was up for ratification in the Iranian Parliament was hardly a 
reassuring sign of Iran’s commitment to its contractual non-proliferation obligations.  
Reinforcing these troubling comments by the Shah and contributing to the 
securitization slide of the Shah’s nuclear program in the 1970s was also the Monarch’s 
discounting, at times flat-out dismissive, attitude toward the Iranian armed forces’ simple 
numerical superiority. The Shah, rather, wanted the kind of qualitative supremacy 
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complete with state-of-the-art weaponry that would be unmistakably deterring of any 
would-be aggressors. Naturally, for a decision-maker with such a predisposition the 
nuclear option would be irresistibly tempting. In the Shah’s view, the key imperative for 
Iran to properly discharge its role as the sole "guardian and protector" of two third of 
world's oil reserves in the Persian Gulf was unrestricted access to state-of-the-art military 
hardware.  
For a leader with an acute encirclement mentality (the Shah felt particularly 
vulnerable in the Strait of Hormuz or as he called it Iran’s “jugular vein”) possessing a 
formidable military apparatus assumed existential proportions. For instance, in a 1973 
trip to the United States, he was seeking to purchase Grumman’s swing-wing F-14 
Tomcat Navy fighters complete with its "full suit of sophisticated equipment" including 
the Hughes AIM 54-A Phoenix missiles and a long-range state-of-the art radar.122 It is 
interesting to note that these Phoenix missiles were capable of carrying nuclear warheads. 
The Shah justified the interest in the F-14 purchase as a response to frequent high-altitude 
flights by the Soviets’ MIG-25 over Iranian territory for which Tehran’s existing F-4s 
were no match. To further boost Iran’s air supremacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its 
Baath Socialist ally in Baghdad, the Shah also expressed interest in the McDonnell 
Douglas's F-15 Eagle, the most advanced tactical combat fighter in the U.S. Air Force at 
the time.123 This insatiable appetite for sophistication and supremacy in the military 
wedded to HIM’s “impatient and Napoleonic vision of history” (where Iran was 
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“destined to become one of the five great powers of the world by 1983”) was hardly 
reassuring for the Americans.124   
In the early 1970s the Shah became even more vocally concerned over an all-
important question for Iran: What, in operational terms, did the special relationship 
between Iran and the United States mean and to what extent did Washington appreciate 
Iran’s uniqueness and indispensability? The issue assumed core strategic status in late 
June 1973 when the United States and the USSR signed the Agreement on the Prevention 
of Nuclear War. Especially troubling to Tehran was Article II of the Agreement where 
Washington and Moscow agreed to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in 
circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.”125 Tehran, on pins 
and needles over whether it belonged to the “ally” or “other countries” category within 
the agreement, tasked foreign minister Abbas-Ali Khalatbari to inquire Secretary of State 
William Rogers and National Security Advisor Kissinger on the exact meaning and 
implications of Article II and seek the US government’s public or private clarification 
and reassurance on the matter.126 After much contemplation, Washington decided to 
remain ambiguous on Iran and CENTO’s placement within the agreement. This was, as  
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far as the Shah was concerned, a clear signal that the US was not prepared to extend 
unequivocal NATO-esque assurances to Tehran.  
The irritated Monarch decided to push the issue again in his visit to Washington a 
month later. In a July 1973 conversation with Henry Kissinger, the Shah reiterated “that 
Iran should not be looked at as just another Middle Eastern country” confident in the fact 
that “in 5-10 years time, it will be very different and will stand out from its neighbors.” 
He conveyed with his characteristic aplomb the same sentiment to the Soviet ambassador 
to Iran calling on the superpower to the North to treat Iran “the same as other big 
countries in the world." Elaborating on this theme to Henry Kissinger, he went on to 
claim, “what is important is for the Russians to understand that we are not afraid of 
fighting them.”127 Excessively self-confident, HIM also warned his American audience 
that the U.S. could descend into anarchy and “move from a first-rate power to a fifth or 
even a tenth-rate power.” When the issue of Iran’s arms procurement came up, the Shah, 
emphasized the fact that “he knew what he was doing” and reminded Dr. Kissinger he 
had “a friend in the U.S. that was ready to provide anything he needed --short of atomic 
weapons and they are not an issue.” 128  
These allusions by HIM to Iran’s “indispensible” past and prospective 
contributions toward the United States’ interests in the Persian Gulf were recurring 
themes in Iran-US relations whose initial signs one could trace back to the earl 1970s. 
The rather hyperbolic assertions as to Tehran’s entitlement to the strategic rewards of the 
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“special relationship” (if it was genuinely special) did lead the Americans to develop 
second thoughts as to the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program in the mid 1970’s. One could 
safely speculate that getting some leeway and latitude on the nuclear issue was on the 
Shah’s mind as Tehran was pushing against the boundaries of the special relationship to 
see how much nuclear diversion it could get away with. Gary Sick, a veteran observer of 
Iran who served on the U.S. National Security Council under Presidents Ford and Carter, 
believed that the United States was highly unlikely to extend the “Israel treatment” to the 
Shah on the issue of nuclear weaponization.129  
Of course, as we will see in the next chapter, with the Carter administration 
coming to power, the Shah, much to his chagrin, found out that his room for maneuver 
was not as expansive as he thought on the nuclear issue as the Iranians and Americans 
came to loggerheads on the issue of reprocessing. The United States’ denial to grant Iran 
the “Israel treatment” in the nuclear field came as a rather shocking realization for HIM 
reminding the Monarch that Tehran’s indispensability in U.S. strategic thinking was more 
circumstantially, than directly (like Israel’s) driven and was therefore prone to 
reprioritization should the atmospherics of the Cold War radically transform.  
These were early indicators that the Shah was thinking big on the nuclear issue 
and if the Shah’s nuclear enterprise was not explicitly identified and designated as a 
“proliferation threat”, it was under the de-securitizing pressures at the international level 
where Washington couldn’t simply run the risk of alienating its key ally in the Middle 
East. In other words, all the elements for legitimately securitizing the INP under the Shah 
were there only lying fallow as their articulation and designation in proliferation threat 
terms would require operational imperatives that would go against the thrust of the more 
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urgent and macro securitization between the international archrivals. After the 1979 
revolution and once that indispensability element was eliminated, even more so after the 
implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, once the systemic level pressures were gone, the 
Iranian nuclear program came under massive securitization and gradually assumed a 
central position in the threat package the United States assembled against the Islamic 
Republic.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
1974-1978: NUCLEAR EXUBERANCE 
 
The years from the establishment of the Iran Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) 
in March 1974 until the heady months of late 1978 mark the golden age of Iran’s atomic 
program. This was an era when the state’s elite bubbled with nuclear enthusiasm and the 
program picked up operational and, concomitant with that, visionary and futuristic steam. 
In this period windfall revenues generated by the 1973 oil bonanza coupled with 
atmospherically amicable ties to the Western bloc made for unprecedentedly ideal 
material and normative platforms for the Shah to push through with a grandiose nuclear 
enterprise.  
In this period, an all-important bureaucratic layer was established and added to 
the INP and a remarkable socio-cultural engineering campaign was launched to wean the 
Iranian bureaucracy and public off of an oil-dominated energy policy re-gearing it toward 
a genuine appreciation for the cutting-edge nuclear technology. One can hardly overstate 
the impact of Swiss-trained nuclear scientist Akbar Etemad in shaping and orienting the 
INP in this era. As a matter of fact, it was Etemad who took upon himself the 
responsibility of educating His Imperial Majesty into the world of the atom and the socio-
political and bureaucratic imperatives of establishing a visionary and truly national 
nuclear program.  
In an era in Iran’s nuclear journey probably best characterized as the 
institutionalization period of the INP, Akbar Etemad who, in no small part, thanks to a 
lack of personally entrenched ties to either the United States or Great Britain, ran the 
AEOI as independently of great power politics as feasible. An almost puritanically 
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nationalistic figure, Etemad made the devising of an indigenous capacity on all matters 
nuclear a top strategic priority. One might go so far as to claim that the roadmap Etemad 
chartered for the INP created a path dependency along which Iran’s nuclear program 
evolved even after the 1979 tectonic shifts in the political configuration of power in 
Tehran. One wonders what an Islamic Republic nuclear program would have looked like 
had the Shah not gotten the enterprise off the ground in that particular direction.  
 Apart from that, in this era one could also detect the initial signs of the 
intertwinement of a nuclear capability with national security imperatives in the Shah’s 
long-term calculations. The links are especially poignant within the context of India’s 
“peaceful nuclear explosion” of May 1974, a monumental event that exercised an 
indelible atmospheric impact on the gravitation of INP towards security thinking in these 
years.  
Establishment of the AEOI and the Indian PNE 
 
In early March 1974, Reza Ghotbi, the Queen’s cousin and the head of Iran’s 
National Radio and Television Organization, informed Etemad that the Shah, unhappy 
with the lethargic pace and rudderless movement of Iran’s nuclear projects, had made a 
final determination to get the ball rolling on a massive atomic program and was 
contemplating putting Etemad at the helm. In a preliminary meeting, the Shah tasked 
Etemad with charting a roadmap for Iran’s nuclear energy program within two weeks. In 
a follow-up meeting, Etemad gave HIM a fifteen-page concept paper that laid out the 
broad contours and overall trajectory of a national nuclear enterprise for Iran. The Shah 
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went through Etemad’s proposed plan a few times and approved it on the spot as the 
country’s strategic nuclear document.130 
Following that meeting between Etemad, Hoveyda, and the Shah, on March 9, 
1974 in an imperial decree addressed to Prime Minister Hoveyda, HIM ordered the 
creation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI):  
“In view of the importance that we attach to the utilization of nuclear power in 
the country's industrial and agricultural development programs, under this firman 
(decree) the government is duty bound to set up organizations which will establish 
coordination and supervision over all matters pertaining to the use of nuclear power as 
well as in the construction of nuclear power generators and desalinization plants and in 
preparing the necessary scientific and technical infrastructure necessary to implement 
these projects.  
We also stipulate that Mr. Akbar Etemad be assigned to prepare the organization 
and the duties of this establishment, in a maximum period of 1 month, to be implemented 
upon approval.  
Because of the importance of the matter, these organizations will carry out their 
duties under our direct supervision.  
Niavaran Palace Esfand 18, 1352 (March 9, 1974).”131  
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Following the decree and leaving no doubts on the significance he attached to the 
nuclear issue, in his address to the nation on the occasion of the Iranian New Year 
(March 21st), the Shah reiterated the importance of atomic energy and promised that Iran 
would “enter the era of utilizing nuclear energy ... as soon as possible so that the 
consumption of oil, this vital and exhaustible material whose nobility we have been able 
to prove, is reduced to a minimum and so that this precious substance can be used to 
produce chemical and petrochemical products instead of being used as ordinary fuel."132 
The AEOI had a unique inception in that its establishment as an autonomous 
organization in March 1974 was consummated by an imperial decree. What made the 
organization even more an object of curiosity was its rather “unusual authority to hire 
staff” unencumbered by the Iranian bureaucracy’s established SOPs133 and the 
unprecedented latitude it was granted to jumpstart a massive nuclear enterprise 
encompassing functions as wide-ranging as generating electricity, nuclear R&D, 
international nuclear diplomacy, nuclear technology, and human resource training.134 The 
exponential soar in the AEOI’s official budget from hardly over $30 million in 1975 to 
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almost $1.5 billion in 1976 and about $3 billion in 1978 was testimony to the nuclear 
programs absolute top priority in Iran’s hierarchy of national goals.135  
As touched upon in the previous chapter, the upsurge in demand for nuclear 
energy as a strategic alternative to oil following the October 1973 Arab oil embargo 
against the United States and the Netherlands set both the feasibility and necessity 
conditions for the Shah’s nuclear enterprise. The Shah’s ubiquitous emphasis on the 
imperativeness of redirecting Iran’s hydrocarbon endowments toward producing high 
value-added derivatives like petrochemicals defined the political economy of the Shah’s 
civilian nuclear program.  
Apparently, left underexplored in the Shah’s visionary paradigm was the 
sustainability of high oil prices to bankroll an extravagant nuclear infrastructure over the 
long-term and an ambitious reading of the Iranian economy’s absorptive capacity for the 
projected 23000 megawatts of nuclear electricity to be generated by 1994. This figure 
would essentially amount to some fifty percent of Iran's projected power capacity by that 
time.  
The AEOI director laid out more concretely the extravagant dimensions of Iran's 
nuclear program in a December 1975 interview with Le Monde: “Iran's power capacity 
today is in the order of 5,000 MWe, half of which is linked to the [national] grid. Of this, 
80 percent is produced by thermal power stations and 20 percent by hydroelectric power 
stations. In 18 years' time, we want to possess an installed power capacity of 70,000 
MWe.” Pressed by the befuddled interviewer on the practicability of and the rationale for 
such a steep surge in power production, Etemad condescendingly intoned, “In terms of 
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Western norms this development plan does indeed appear unrealistic, but we consider it 
accessible for several reasons. Our human resources are far from fully mobilized, our 
finance possibilities are enormous and never before has there been such a political and 
national will to achieve rapid and continuous industrialization."136    
A lack of an explicit securitized response by the United States to this ambitious 
goal later became a theme that the Islamic Republic constantly used as ammunition in 
response to the nuclear weapons allegations leveled against it by Washington. The 
Islamic Republic’s position was that whereas the issue of Iran’s hydrocarbon resources 
was skated around by Washington and never militated against the Shah’s nuclear 
program, the West constantly trumpeted it as justification for internationally designating 
and marketing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program as a security threat. 
In any event, as Iran’s fledgling nuclear industry suffered from a severe lack of 
trained manpower in 1974, the establishment of the AEOI serendipitously coincided with 
an available pool of highly experienced nuclear professionals on the market. This came 
about, Etemad later recounted, as shortly before the establishment of the AEOI there 
transpired a mass exodus of nuclear scientists from Argentina following the populist 
Peronist government’s academic purge in the early 1970s. The exodus only worsened 
with fears of “budget cuts or of anti-upper-class terrorism” gripping the nuclear industry 
under Peron’s widow.137 Chief among those who left was Rear Admiral Oscar A. 
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Quihillalt, the director of the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA138) 
for almost two decades (1955-1973) whom Etemad hired in May 1974 at a whopping 
monthly salary of $10,000 to act as senior advisor to the AEOI.139  Quihillalt brought 
with him a handful of former CNEA scientists and technicians that were indispensible in 
jumpstarting Iran’s embryonic nuclear bid.  
As a matter of fact, it was Quihillalt and his close associates who constituted the 
technical and operational core of Iran’s nuclear program at this initial phase. In order to 
maximize the transfer of technical and logistical know-how and create an intimate 
atmosphere of collaboration, Etemad recalls, three or four Iranian technicians were 
assigned to work under the supervision of an Argentinean professional. In time, the 
camaraderie between the two in the AEOI grew so strong that the Argentineans started 
referring to themselves as Argentine Iranians.140  
Quihillalt’s legacy as a fierce advocate of indigenizing the full spectrum of the 
nuclear energy cycle in Argentina was hardly a reassuring factor for the U.S. national 
security elite. The Argentine connection was instrumental in how Tehran’s nuclear 
activities became an object of suspicion for Washington later in the 1970s. Quihillalt’s 
presence in Iran was specifically disconcerting to the Americans since under his 
directorship, Argentina catapulted itself to the avant-garde of the nuclear industry in 
Latin America. In 1958, for example, Argentina was the first Latin American country to 
commission a research reactor. A decade later, in 1968, it was the first nation to operate a 
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pilot chemical reprocessing plant in the region and again in 1974 Latin America’s first 
nuclear power plant was commissioned in Argentina.141  
The Indian PNE and its Fallout 
 
As the Shah and his visionary nuclear mastermind Dr. Etemad were meticulously 
setting the domestic and international stage for the newly founded Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran (AEOI) to hit the ground running, the entire architecture of the 
international nuclear industry was thrown for a loop on May 18, 1974. On this day, India 
detonated a 12-kiloton plutonium device -rather oxymoronically termed a “peaceful 
nuclear explosion” (PNE)- in the Rajasthan desert. This development touched off a 
quantum shift in the tenuous equilibrium of power in South Asia with unmistakable 
proliferation implications for the Middle East.  
The timing of India’s PNE couldn’t have been worse for Iran as it caused a 
change of heart in Washington about national nuclear programs and cast a long shadow 
over the prospects for nuclear cooperation between the United States and Iran. The fact 
that India used the research reactor provided by Canada and the United States for 
producing the required fissile material for the PNE marked the beginning of the 
designation of nationally run full fuel cycles and reprocessing facilities as proliferation 
threats in successive U.S. administrations from Nixon on. The Indian explosion also 
incorrigibly stigmatized the Atoms for Peace Program bringing to the fore a host of 
proliferation pathologies associated with indigenous nuclear efforts.  
From this perspective, the coincidence of the establishment of the AEOI with the 
Indian test was the most fundamental impediment in the way of a nuclear deal between 
Iran and the United States. This timing factor essentially turned the deal with Iran into a 
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trendsetting and precedent-defining phenomenon for the White House. In other words, 
even if Washington was willing (and the declassified evidence hardly lends credence to 
this argument) to give the Shah the benefit of the doubt on proliferation, being at the 
forefront of the United States’ new nuclear export policymaking process following the 
Indian PNE made the nuclear deal with Iran an impossibly sensitive and thorny issue. On 
this score, Washington’s argument was that cutting the Shah too much slack would make 
it difficult to demand more stringent control mechanisms elsewhere. 
The Nixon Administration’s National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202 
(imposing additional restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment, and 
fuel to receiving countries) was the immediate manifestation of a drastically changed 
atmosphere.142 Right on the heels of NSSM 202 came National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM) 255 of June 3, 1974, a watershed document that explicitly 
securitized national chemical reprocessing and uranium enrichment programs and 
advocated their replacement by “multinational enrichment, fuel fabrication and 
reprocessing facilities.”143  
Under these changed circumstances, the United States introduced a new policy of 
enforcing “special bilateral controls” – beyond those required by the IAEA—on transfer 
of nuclear reactors and fuel. This dramatic policy shift following the Indian explosion 
was decidedly a departure from NSDM 235 of only a few months earlier (October 1973) 
when the United States had declared that it would “not require as an essential 
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precondition of supply that fuel fabrication and reprocessing take place in the United 
States or in multi-nationally owned facilities.”144  
The United States’ proposal, however, didn’t sit well with the Iranians (This was 
true especially in the Ford Administration when the concept of multilateral chemical 
plutonium reprocessing facilities as a mechanism to reduce proliferation risks in 
instability-prone regions like the Middle East came to the fore). Tehran’s core argument 
against such an arrangement was premised on feasibility and logistical grounds. The 
Iranians believed that, due to the severe trust deficit between Iran and its periphery in the 
Persian Gulf, working out the operational requirements of such an enterprise would be a 
nightmare. Tehran, furthermore, viewed such a multilateral concept as impinging on its 
national sovereignty rights as, in Iran’s judgment, it essentially amounted to depriving 
Iran of the economic and strategic benefits accruing to stockpiling plutonium on its 
territory.   
Immediately following the Indian explosion, Tehran adopted a declaratory policy 
of nuclear ambiguity with the Shah's spokesman emphasizing HIM "would have no 
immediate comment on India's explosion."145 Tehran’s continued failure to publicly and 
categorically condemn the Indian explosion gave rise to speculation in Washington that 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi "might have told the Shah of the scheduled detonation of a 
 
 
                                                        
144 Secret. National Security Decision Memorandum 235.  
United States Policy on Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium for Fueling Power Reactors October 4, 1973 
Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries 
http://nixon.archives.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_235.pdf (Accessed May 17, 2011) 
 
145 New York Times, May 30, 1974.  
 
 
 82
nuclear device" when Tehran and New Delhi concluded a communiqué in Tehran to 
cooperate in the nuclear field just shortly before the May explosion.146  
It is important to note that Iran’s official position on the issue of nuclear 
proliferation was less than clear-cut even before the Indian explosion heightened the 
Shah’s anxieties that Tehran was falling behind in the nuclear field. Despite being a 
signatory to the NPT, Tehran’s official position on non-proliferation was that “the issues 
[related to non-proliferation] will become more and more difficult as time passes, and 
therefore a universally acceptable agreement should be approved as soon as possible on 
the basis of the US-USSR proposals.147 This statement was a clear indication of a 
carefully calibrated policy by Tehran to de-emphasize the NPT as a strategic response to 
the challenge of proliferation in South Asia.  
The Indian explosion, however, brought to the boiling point an already simmering 
strategic competition between Tehran and New Delhi in the Indian Ocean basin. Within 
this context, remarks by K. Subramaniam, director of the Indian Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analysis, on the Shah's (and other Middle Eastern countries’) military 
buildup were unmistakably poignant. In his rather condescending remarks, Subramaniam 
dismissed the notion that the Shah’s sophisticated military buildup “in an area where the 
societies are yet to make their transition into modern age” was simply a reaction to 
Tehran’s legitimate security needs.148 Depicting such a conflicting relationship between 
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Tehran’s security needs and its developmental imperatives by a prominent Indian 
strategist exactly mirror imaged the Shah’s judgment on New Delhi’s nuclear explosion 
which, in HIM judgment, showcased India’s striving to punch above its strategic weight 
at the cost of its people’s welfare.149  
The Shah, on the other hand, partly in resignation to the fact that Iran as a late 
comer to the nuclear game was bound to trail India and Pakistan for some years to come, 
redoubled its efforts to procure state-of-the-art conventional military hardware to 
compensate for Tehran’s inferior nuclear status. As part of this policy, he developed a 
keen interest in putting the Iranian navy in such a formidable position that India’s nuclear 
test wouldn’t drastically tip the balance of power in the Indian Ocean. This would foil, in 
HIM’s judgment, New Delhi’s efforts to put the Indian Ocean beyond the pale for 
Tehran. Within this paradigm, one of the primary objectives of the Shah’s foreign policy 
in the early 1970s was to maintain a permanently projective naval capacity in the Indian 
Ocean. As an operational component of getting a credible and durable foothold combined 
with maximum maneuverability in the Indian Ocean, the Shah sought to purchase and 
incorporate Spruance-class destroyers to the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) during his July 
1973 trip to Washington.150 
Whether deliberately or by default, during these years in the mid 1970s, 
Washington was also embracing of the Shah’s conventional build-up concept viewing it 
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as a strategy to conventionally bribe the unquenchable Monarch away from getting any 
big nuclear ideas. The notion fit so well into the Shah’s military thinking in the mid-
1970s that it convinced him to put a premium on obtaining conventional supremacy. This 
vision of the Shah was most cogently expressed at the conclusion of the Imperial Air 
Force air show on March 14, 1977: "Our army will be nonnuclear and will defend our 
peace and security. Naturally, a nonnuclear army ought to be much stronger than a 
nuclear army in both numbers and the quality of equipment."151 
Well aware of the Shah’s mode of thinking on the issue, in June 1974, a Defense 
Department official revealed Washington's agreement to sell three Tang-class submarines 
and six Sprunce class destroyers to the Shah. On top of that, mention was made of 
tentative plans to sell a small carrier to the Imperial Iranian Navy suitable for amphibious 
operations. As Tehran didn’t have any use for the submarines in the Persian Gulf, the 
Shah’s interest in purchasing them could only be tied to HIM’s vision on the Indian 
Ocean basin as Iran’s natural sphere of influence where a Persian balancing act was 
imperative. In concurrence with HIM’s judgment, Washington believed that since both 
India and Pakistan possessed some submarine capability, their provision to the Shah 
would be a fitting addition to Iran’s naval strength.152  
It is worth mentioning here that the documents declassified so far do not shed a 
definitive light on whether the United States consciously viewed and sold the cart 
blanche it granted the Shah to acquire a formidable conventional capability as a 
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dissuasive mechanism to hedge against the Shah’s potential nuclear weapons ambitions. 
Such an inside logic in Washington is not far-fetched, however, considering the fact that 
the United States pursued such a strategy vis-à-vis Israel in the 1970s.153 As a matter of 
fact, in 1976 the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a prestigious UK 
based think-tank, floated the idea that the United States’ proliferation concerns could be 
manipulated by countries like Iran to extract non-nuclear concessions in other issue areas. 
According to this analysis, these weaponization concerns could potentially “enhance the 
risk that” for countries like South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, “a minimal 
nuclear option might become attractive, not for reasons of military security but as a lever 
to bargain for American concessions in non-nuclear fields, particularly over the supply of 
conventional arms.”154   
But it is also equally plausible to argue that Tehran’s evidently insatiable thirst for 
conventional armaments might have had an intensifying impact on the threat designation 
of its equally ambitious nuclear program. From this perspective, one could argue that the 
military dividends of Iran’s nuclear program were contextualized within the broader 
theme of its enthusiastic bid for “supremacy” – a cherished term in HIM’s strategy 
nomenclature—in the Persian Gulf and ultimately in the Indian Ocean.155 Having a 
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nuclear capacity would, from this viewpoint, broaden Iran’s maneuverability and power-
projection perimeter by ensuring—through nuclear deterrence-- its homeland security. 
Just to give some sense of perspective to the latter point, according to one expert, 
“unless other nations engage in similar military buildups, when the Shah’s orders of F-
14s, attack helicopters, antisubmarine reconnaissance aircraft, tanker aircraft, destroyers, 
TOWs, Mavericks, Hawks, Tigercats, Rapiers, and Sidewinders are in inventory, Iran 
will be one of the ranking conventional military powers in the world.” Within such a 
context, even if Washington’s private strategic thinking was one of dis-incentivzing Iran 
toward the nuclear option by rendering such a capability cumbersome and redundant 
through giving HIM a carte blanche to buy conventional weapons, the regional narrative 
might have been one that placed Tehran’s civilian nuclear program within a broader 
military-strategic context.  
In this regards and as we will see in the following pages, the Shah’s remarkable 
success in securing conventional armaments from the U.S. also had a deleterious impact 
on the conclusion of a comprehensive Nuclear Agreement between the US and Iran as it 
further spooked and antagonized an already alarmist anti-Shah U.S. Congress. 
The First Proliferation Red Flags Emerge 
 
The Shah’s (purportedly misquoted) statements just a few weeks after the Indian 
explosion gave even more credibility to fears in Washington that a nuclear arms race 
between Iran and India might be rapidly unfolding. Pressed on the question of whether 
Iran would go nuclear in the future, the Shah, allegedly in some off-the-cuff remarks, 
quipped, "certainly, and sooner than is believed, but contrary to India, we have first 
thought of our people and then of technology." Although these remarks were later 
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categorically retracted and denied by the Iranian embassy in Paris, their impact on the 
designation of Iran as a proliferation threat down the road were undeniable. During the 
same interview with the French weekly Les Informations, on June 23, 1974 the Shah 
referred to his sophisticated military machinery and his ambitious future plans to advance 
it as a “force de dissuasion et de frappe."156 To some apprehensive observers, the 
deterrent connotations of the phrase clearly betrayed a Shah harboring nuclear capability 
ambitions. To heighten Washington’s consternation even further, in a later interview 
broadcast on French TV, a visibly irritated Shah took to task the notion that it was 
“totally normal” for countries like Great Britain to possess nuclear weapons while 
“automatically” enjoying NATO’s protective nuclear umbrella whereas a strategically 
lonely Iran’s right to self defense was viciously being touted as problematic.157  
Shortly afterward, the Shah’s interview with Le Monde during his state visit to 
France didn’t help dispel or assuage concerns either. This time around, the Shah 
pointedly declared that if small Middle Eastern countries embarked on a nuclearization 
path, no matter how primitive or crude, then Iran’s “national interests” would compel it to 
follow suit.158  
Following these remarks, in an immediate cable to the Secretary of State, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Tehran and former Director of National Intelligence (DCI), Richard 
Helms, commented that the Shah had Egypt and Israel in mind when referring to other 
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countries’ nuclear behavior.159 Israel seemed to be the most credible referent object in the 
caveat clause of the Shah’s speech as HIM specified “little” countries in the region. As is 
evident, the external circumstances were not helping curb the Shah’s nuclear appetite. 
In this connection, it is also worth remembering that in 1974 Iran was aware of 
Israel’s capability to make the atomic bomb as in December 1974 Israeli President 
Ephraim Katzir went public, for the first time, with his country’s possession of nuclear 
weapons know-how.160 Furthermore, a few days before these statements by the Shah, on 
June 14 1974, President Nixon and President Sadat had signed an agreement entitled 
“Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Egypt and the United States" that 
provided for Washington to supply Cairo with nuclear reactors and fuel.161  
These major developments seem to have injected a sense of urgency in the Shah 
that Iran was lagging behind in the nuclear field and had to, rhetorically at least, play 
catch up. This was part of HIM’s reasoning to refrain from categorically ruling out the 
nuclear option in Iran’s security paradigm in his multiple interviews after the Indian 
explosion where His Imperial Majesty chose to keep the United States guessing by 
linking up Tehran’s non-proliferation posture to the continuation of the status quo in the 
Middle East’s strategic environment. This was a decision that infinitely compounded 
Washington’s proliferation apprehensions. Following the Indian explosion, in the U.S. 
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intelligence community’s judgment, Iran was “likely to reassess the recent warming of its 
relations with India” in light of the fact that the Shah was “determined to develop Iran 
into the region's paramount power, and was probably miffed at having been upstaged by 
India.” From this perspective, the Indian test would further accelerate Tehran’s quest for 
nuclear energy facilities in Iran.162 
 It is also worth mentioning that lurking beneath Iran’s heightened threat 
perceptions in the wake of India’s explosion was an opportunistic desire by the Shah to 
get maximum mileage out of an air of nuclear inevitability created by India. For instance, 
in a joint communiqué issued at the end of the Shah's visit to India on October 4, 1974, 
the two sides made a point of emphasizing the "importance of insuring that access to 
nuclear technology is not confined to a few countries" underlining its implications for 
economic development and human welfare."163 
  The international community’s, with the exception of Canada and the U.S., fairly 
tolerant and lenient response to India’s 1974 explosion was also another factor in 
accentuating the United States’ worst fears that countries like Iran would push against the 
boundaries of the non-proliferation regime in a tightly bipolar international system to see 
how much nuclear adventurism they could get away with. France, Iran’s main nuclear 
partner during the mid 1970s was at the forefront of Washington’s countries of concern 
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about the transfer of proliferation-prone technology to Third World countries in exchange 
for financial gains.  
It was within such context that the United States came to internalize the 
inadequacy, unenforceability and potential credulity of the IAEA safeguards and the NPT 
commitments as counter-proliferation measures. The intelligence community was 
specifically concerned that these international contractual mechanisms would fall short 
either in detecting clandestine diversion of nuclear materials and equipment or in 
dissuading "any state bent on developing a weapon." Thus viewed, in Washington’s 
judgment, this shortcoming coupled with the French and German governments’ subpar 
commitment to prioritizing their non-proliferation interests over their commercial and 
political gains made for a permissive, if not promiscuous, proliferation environment in 
the international system.164 
In such an atmosphere in mid-1974 and as the securitizing factors were piling up 
on Iran’s nascent nuclear program, the Shah made a determination to take the lead, along 
with Egypt, in initiating the idea of establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) 
in the Middle East. As part of this de-securitizing posture, on July 13, 1974, Tehran made 
a request to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to take up an item entitled 
"Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East." The 
conventional wisdom at the time was that the Shah had a broadly-conceived notion of the 
term Middle East that included Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt whom Tehran feared were 
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predisposed to make a run for the bomb following the Indian explosion.165 It is worth 
mentioning here that although Iran had made the original proposal in 1968 for the 
international community to recognize the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone, in the hectic 
circumstances surrounding the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, it was not put on the UNGA 
agenda. Despite its lack of substantial traction, as State Department documents 
demonstrate, this initiative had some moderate impact in ameliorating the United States’ 
worst proliferation fears especially following the controversy over HIM’s remarks in 
Paris on June 23, 1974.  
On a more pragmatic level, Iran’s advocacy of the NWFZ idea also fell well in 
line with the argument marshaled by nuclear pundits as a possible determinant holding in 
check Iran’s proliferation desires. This line of thinking was essentially based on the 
strategic imprudence of initiating a potentially game-changing nuclear arms race by a 
country of considerable strategic depth and conventional superiority. From this 
perspective, considering the “equalizing” function of nukes in neutralizing conventional 
quantitative and qualitative power relativities, it would be self-defeating for Tehran to 
nuclearize its strategic environment, as it would trigger a proliferation domino effect in 
Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.166  
Tehran’s Nuclear Standoff with Washington 
 
As previously touched upon, despite Tehran’s high hopes and keen interest in 
securing maximum nuclear cooperation from the United States, the fallout of the Indian 
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explosion nipped, for all practical purposes, its materialization in the bud. This situation 
was in stark contrast with the prevailing atmosphere in Western Europe where Iran made 
fairly smooth and long strides in securing both nuclear hardware and software 
acquisitions. As the Shah attached infinitely more strategic weight to nuclear partnership 
with the United States though, however, the standoff with Washington incrementally 
turned into the litmus test of the resilience and profundity of the latter’s commitment to 
Tehran as an indispensible ally.  
Following the Indian explosion, a major impediment in the way of finalizing a 
strategic nuclear cooperation document between Tehran and Washington was the United 
States’ dogged insistence on long-term sole source fuel contracts with the U.S., 
disposition of plutonium, and physical security. The United States’ new position was 
based on a new policy of enforcing “special bilateral controls” – beyond those required 
by the IAEA—on transfer of nuclear reactors and fuel. These new requirements were 
diametrically opposed to Etemad’s insistence on Iran having full command & control 
over its indigenously enriched and processed fissile material.  
Although Washington initially played with the idea of settling only for IAEA 
safeguards and the NPT obligations as satisfactory counter-proliferation measures, a host 
of second thoughts, partly associated with the high concentration of power in Iran and 
transition of power contingencies associated with Iran’s political system quickly kicked 
in. These apprehensions emanated from HIM’s peculiar decision-making style that 
betrayed a deteriorating “Super Shah syndrome,” and its accompanying “invincibility” 
delusions.167  
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For instance, according to a June 1974 State Department Internal Memorandum, 
“Although Iran is a currently stable, that stability is heavily dependent on the Shah's 
remaining in power. In a situation of instability, domestic dissidents or foreign terrorists 
might easily be able to size any special nuclear materials stored in Iran for use in 
bombs…. An aggressive successor to the Shah might consider nuclear weapons the final 
item needed to establish Iran's complete military dominance of the region.”168 
Washington’s concerns with the stylistics of the Shah’s mode of governance were 
even more candidly articulated in the mainstream U.S. media. For instance, a 1974 
Newsweek article quoted a Washington strategist warning the United States against 
creating a “Frankenstein monster” that would prove an unstablizing force “with his 
egomania and his expansionist vision of the revival of ancient Persia's power.”169  
It is worth remembering that the United States’ concern with the stylistics of the 
Shah’s rule as a potential source of uncertainty and instability and an obstacle for a 
smooth transition of power went back at least to the mid-1960s. A 1966 State Department 
cable, for instance, reads: “Despite the fact that the Shah is presently riding tall in the 
saddle serious weaknesses remain on the Iranian scene. The Shah’s life continues to be at 
the mercy of the fanatic or disgruntled who may be prepared to give his life to eliminate 
the Iranian ruler. This, of course, is an internal security threat by no means peculiar to 
Iran. However, the narrowness of the political base in Iran renders this threat more acute 
than in other countries enjoying a broader base of political support and greater prospects 
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for an effective follow-on-government.”170 Under these atmospherics, as the symptoms of 
popular discontent grew visible in 1977, Washington grew even more apprehensive of the 
prospect of a sophisticated nuclear infrastructure in a country in imminent danger of 
regime-change with anti-Western Islamists pounding on the door. 
Well aware of these domestic uncertainties in Iran and mounting anti-Shah 
sentiments on the home front, the Nixon Administration came to the position that only an 
agreement along the lines concluded with Egypt and Israel, which had made allowances 
for additional safeguardability beyond the IAEA and NPT mechanisms, stood a realistic 
chance of passage through a U.S. Congress increasingly leery of Iran’s sable-rattling and 
the Shah’s military extravaganza in the Persian Gulf. Iran, adamant about having 
indigenous reprocessing capacity, vehemently opposed the special safeguards stipulation 
partly on the grounds that Tehran, while a member in good standing of the NPT, was 
essentially being (mis)treated as a non-member.   
It should be noted here that the implications of this last point apply equally to 
both the Shah and the Islamic Republic era and have to do with differing modes of 
interpreting the NPT between Iran and the United States. Put simply, Washington, as the 
progenitor and custodian of the international non-proliferation regime, viewed the NPT 
commitments of member states as constituting only a bare minimum mechanism to 
establish the country’s non-proliferation credentials –hence in need of being reinforced 
and fortified through auxiliary reinsuring measures like bilateral safeguards agreements 
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). From Iran’s perspective, however, NPT 
membership denoted a clean bill of health on the signatory’s nuclear activities whose 
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bona fides shouldn’t be constantly second guessed. But the reality of the situation was 
that not only was the United States impossibly reluctant to put the Shah on a long nuclear 
leash, it was not even fully willing to grant Iran the indigenous fuel-cycle privileges that 
were completely within its NPT rights. 
At a time when Iran was bending backwards to wean itself from oil and move 
toward the atom to meet its industrial electricity demands, in Etemad’s assessment, denial 
of these rights to Iran was tantamount to a breach of Nuclear Weapons States’ NPT 
obligations under Article IV of the treaty.171 Etemad believed that the imposition of 
rigorous extra-NPT control mechanisms blurred the difference between civilian and 
military nuclear technologies that lay at the very foundation of the bargaining between 
nuclear haves and have-nots that roped the latter into the NPT regime in the first place.172 
Etemad’s reasoning for Iran’s go-it-alone philosophy on the fuel cycle was that Iran 
couldn’t afford to be held hostage to any foreign country for its fuel requirements and 
live with that vulnerability since any reneging by the foreign supplier on its contracts 
would render Iran’s nuclear investment and infrastructure operationally useless.   
This rationale of Etemad was not entirely lost on the Americans either. In point of 
fact, numerous State Department cables drew the Ford Administration’s attention to the 
inherent incompatibility, both in spirit and substance, between pursuing draconian extra-
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NPT restrictions across the board and championing universal membership for the 
embattled treaty.173  
Additionally, the Shah believed that, due to its domestic stability and its pivotal 
position in stabilizing the Middle East, Iran shouldn’t be treated like Egypt and Israel, 
countries that in HIM’s judgment, were trouble spots and potential sources of instability. 
Put simply, from the Shah’s perspective, lumping Iran together with Israel and Egypt in 
the same category was Washington’s way of saying that Iran was not a mature state. As 
far as HIM was concerned, nothing could be farther from the truth.  
On the basis of these realities, the Shah was unyielding about his demands to 
receive “preferential treatment” in technology and fuel supply. Such a treatment would 
essentially exclude the additional stringent measures the United States had included in its 
agreements with non-NPT member states like Israel and Egypt. These measures included 
“reprocessing, fabrication and storage of U.S. material and plutonium produced from the 
use of U.S. supplied material or equipment outside the [recipient] country; offering the 
U.S. first option to "buy back" produced plutonium; the provision of mutually agreed 
physical security measures; expressed confirmation that the recipient would not use U.S. 
material for PNEs and that all future nuclear material and facilities entering the country 
would be subject to IAEA safeguards.”174 
Over almost four years of intense negotiations with Iran (that practically made 
Iran part of the legislative debates leading to the Jimmy Carter’s Nuclear Non-
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Proliferation Act of 1978), the United States envisaged four possible scenarios in striking 
a nuclear deal with Iran. The first and least favored option by Washington was to 
conclude a civilian nuclear deal without any additional controls on top of those imposed 
through the NPT and IAEA mechanisms. Washington reasoned that the option, referred 
to as the standard agreement, would have the great merit of rewarding the Shah’s 
adherence to those two non-proliferation regimes while not discrediting their efficiency 
by imposing additional restrictions. Concluding an agreement along those lines would 
essentially grant Iran the “most favored nation” status on a par with Japan and Western 
European states, a privilege HIM deemed Iran was fully deserving of in light of its 
“special relationship” with the United States.  
The State Department’s reasoning against this option, however, was based on 
three grounds. For one thing, being ill-timed, on the bureaucratic front, such an 
agreement had only minimum chance of passage through an alarmist Congress without 
some serious and potentially time-consuming arms wrestling. Furthermore, on 
“substantive” grounds, such a deal would expose U.S supplied technology and fuel 
supply to a slew of potential risk situations, not least among them diversion, sabotage, 
terrorism, theft, and regime change. Last, Washington was nervous that the Shah’s 
commitment to Iran’s NPT obligations was not ironclad and irreversible and, when push 
came to shove, His Imperial Majesty might decide to reverse course and pull out of the 
NPT.  
The second scenario consisted of concluding an agreement within the parameters 
set by the IAEA safeguards and the NPT commitments with the bare minimum of 
additional “physical protection” controls. Although this via-media option, the State 
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Department argued, stood a fighting chance of clearing a gun-shy and foot-dragging 
Congress, it would not alleviate the Shah’s ever mounting suspicions that Iran was being 
“singled out” by receiving subpar and double-standard treatment.  
The third scenario, most favored by the Department of State and the Atomic 
Energy Commission, fell between the first two scenarios. According to this option, the 
United States would have “veto rights over reprocessing, fabrication, and storage of U.S. 
material and plutonium produced from the use of U.S. supplied material or equipment.” 
This option would modify the one-size-fits-all approach of subjecting all the future 
nuclear agreements to the stringent and sweeping cautionary measures applied to Israel 
and Egypt, both non-signatory to the NPT at the time, and reward Iran’s NPT 
membership by not requiring the external disposition of plutonium as required of Egypt 
and Israel. It is interesting to note, however, that the U.S. State Department thought even 
the veto rights incorporated in the third scenario were inadequate in finalizing the nuclear 
deal with the Shah. State officials’ rationale was that the physical presence of plutonium 
on Iranian territory constituted a potential proliferation risk. In the State Department’s 
judgment, this option only stood a minimum chance of receiving the Shah’s blessing as 
HIM would interpret veto rights as discriminatory, infringing upon Iran’s sovereignty and 
dignity, and running afoul of the spirit of Iran’s relations with the United States.  
The fourth option entertained by the United States was one of subjecting Iran to 
the same maximalist and proliferation-proof standards imposed on Israel and Egypt. 
Although this option, the Americans argued, would be ideal in placating proliferation 
concerns of the Congress, it had its own major drawbacks: for one thing, it would have a 
detrimental atmospheric impact on the credibility of the international non-proliferation 
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regime on the eve of the First NPT Review Conference in May 1975. The thrust of the 
argument was that, if the United States failed to offer “preferential treatment” to the NPT 
signatories like Iran, it would deal a paralyzing blow to the incentive mechanisms 
envisioned and enshrined in the NPT to consolidate the treaty into the cornerstone of an 
all-inclusive universal non-proliferation regime. For another, the State Department 
reasoned, the Shah would find “especially onerous” the explicit preclusion of any 
reprocessing, storage, and fabrication involvement by Iran in the U.S. supplied fuel and 
technology.175  
The very existence of such wide-ranging scenarios was testimony to massive 
chasms in the US government on how best to cope with the nuclear wishes of a major 
ally constantly knocking on the door. The time constraints imposed on the situation-- 
with an anxious AEOI chomping at the bit to cut a deal with the Washington, the U.S. 
nuclear industry turning up it lobbying pressure, and the mercantilist Europeans waiting 
in the wings to gobble up lucrative nuclear deals—made the emergence of a consensus 
opinion practically impossible. For example, whereas Richard Helms was on the most 
liberal side of the spectrum, calling for the administration to give the Shah the benefit of 
the doubt on proliferation, the Department of Defense positioned itself on the 
conservative extreme advocating the imposition of the most stringent conditions on 
chemical reprocessing and plutonium stockpiling rights.  
The DoD’s position was that the issue of chemical reprocessing in sensitive 
proliferation-prone areas like the Middle East should be “delayed as long as possible” 
before diversion-resistant mechanisms, like multinational reprocessing facilities, could be 
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adequately conceptualized and realistically operationalized. Based on this judgment, the 
DoD believed that Tehran’s push for reprocessing rights was premature at least by a 
decade since Iran wouldn’t need such a facility until the mid-1980s. Put simply, the 
Pentagon’s advice was one of “we will cross that bridge when we come to it,” advising 
the administration to avoid jumping the gun on reprocessing and trapping itself into an 
inflexible commitment.176 Heeding such advice would require leaving the issue in as 
malleable and noncommittal shape as possible, an arrangement certain to be construed by 
an already skeptical Etemad and company as a dilatory, if not outright obstructive, 
attitude.  
Under these circumstances, Etemad’s inflexible insistence on establishing such a 
capital-intensive reprocessing facility for a budding nuclear program, in the face of 
concrete evidence against its short-term economic viability, only helped exacerbate the 
United States’ proliferation concerns. In the U.S. judgment, under the prevailing 
circumstances, anticipated to obtain for another decade or so, “the value of the products 
from reprocessing (enriched uranium and plutonium) exceeded the costs of 
reprocessing,” thus rendering the spent fuel rods of no commercial value.177 
Richard Helms, on the other hand, was arguably the most sympathetic figure in 
the U.S. Government toward concluding a relatively lenient nuclear deal with Iran. As 
U.S. Ambassador to Iran from March 1973 to January 1977, Helm’s friendship with the 
Shah went way back to the days they were schoolmates in Switzerland’s prestigious 
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boarding school, Institut Le Rosey. Putting aside their interpersonal affinity, Helm’s core 
argument was that a compromise deal with the Shah should be sealed in the interest of 
time. In the Ambassador’s judgment, considering the fact that Washington’s near-
monopoly position on nuclear power plants and fuel supply was rapidly wearing out, 
finalizing an expeditious agreement would not only secure the United States’ commercial 
interests but would, more realistically, be in line with its non-proliferation interests as 
well. Pursuing a long-drawn-out principle-based-- as opposed to time-sensitive and 
pragmatic-- negotiating strategy with Iran, in Helm’s judgment, would push an otherwise 
reluctant Iran toward European suppliers who were more likely to bend their counter-
proliferation standards to reap lucrative power-plant deals. Under such circumstances, 
Helms argued, perfectionism in negotiating a bilateral deal would be a self-defeating 
strategy, as it would estrange Iran from the U.S. nuclear community and deprive 
Washington of a hands-on monitoring advantage to detect proliferation symptoms early 
on.  
In 1975 and arguing against measures that might be construed by the Shah as 
draconian and discriminatory, Helms maintained, the administration should undertake 
whatever measures required and in a timely manner to become Iran’s “principal supplier 
for fuel and plant.” Helms believed that fostering such a high-density interaction with 
Iran would make Iran’s “most vital interests” so vulnerable to and dependent on the 
United States that Washington would gain “ultimate sanction against an Iranian desire to 
develop a nuclear weapons capability.” This mechanism, according to Helms, along with 
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the NPT and the IAEA guarantees, would give the United States a capability to go for the 
full-court press should Iran’s nuclear program went awry.178  
The Iranians, on the other hand, stuck to their guns in demanding a nationally 
built, managed, and operated indigenous chemical reprocessing facility. The issue 
constituted the most significant reason for the threat designation of the INP in mid 1975. 
For the Americans, Iran’s apparently unexplainable reluctance to act as a site for the 
United States’ multinational reprocessing concept could only stem from an “unspoken 
unwillingness” to submit Iran’s nuclear facilities to “foreign surveillance.”179 
Cognizant of the strategic implications of concluding a nuclear agreement with 
Tehran in a timely fashion, in late 1974 Washington showed some readiness to temper its 
maximalist demands, especially on the issue of US veto rights on indigenous plutonium 
reprocessing by Iran suggesting it would “look sympathetically” on the issue. The 
mechanism the United States was entertaining to preclude the diversion of plutonium for 
proliferation purposes was the establishment of multinational reprocessing plants assisted 
and monitored by the United States. As this promising development on the executive 
level was being entertained and as Iran was signaling tentative receptivity to the idea of 
multinational reprocessing, however, the Ford Administration was forced to re-calcify its 
negotiating under the pressure of two factors. First, came a hardening of US position due 
to an increasingly anti-Shah Congress some of whose members had now developed 
country-specific proliferation concerns about Iran. Under such trust-deficit 
                                                        
178 Secret. Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State. Draft Agreement on Atomic Energy. April 1975. 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc05b.pdf (Accessed July 24, 2010).  
 
179 Secret. From Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State. Multinational Nuclear Centers: Assessment of 
Iranian Attitudes toward Plutonium Reprocessing.  July 17, 1975. 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc07.pdf (Accessed May 25, 2011).  
 
 103
circumstances, Iranian concessions, on the concept of multinationalizing reprocessing 
facilities, wouldn’t simply cut it.  
The second factor emanated from Washington’s proliferation concerns in 
Pakistan. On this score, as any nuclear deal with Iran would define the broader contours 
and set a precedent for the United States’ post-India nuclear policy, Washington was 
concerned lest an excessively lenient approach toward Iran have a detractive impact on 
US efforts to discourage other suppliers from giving Islamabad the reprocessing 
capability it was feverishly shopping around for.180  
In any case, a cursory survey of the foregoing four scenarios demonstrates a 
seemingly irreconcilable disharmony of objectives in the U.S. Government’s efforts to 
negotiate a comprehensive nuclear deal with the Shah. The misalignment of interests 
flowed, in no small part, from the fact that Washington’s macro-security interests, 
epitomized by the US-USSR superpower rivalry, were inherently clashing with and had a 
dampening impact on its non-proliferation interests applied to its strategic partners.  
The discordance of interests at macro and micro levels in a tightly bipolar 
international system during the Cold War provided invaluable maneuverability for 
nuclear aspirants strategically allied with either pole to run proliferation-prone nuclear 
activities without being publicly singled out or treated as security threats. Iran, for its 
part, tried to make the most of the gap generated by this incoherence at the geostrategic 
and doctrinal levels.  
As previously mentioned, further widening this gap was the fact that, despite 
Washington’s strenuous efforts, the designation of indigenous nuclear programs as 
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proliferation threats following the 1974 Indian test was not universally shared. Western 
European countries, specifically France and Germany, didn’t construe the Indian 
underground explosion as warranting the subordination of their commercial interests to 
security concerns (as Washington expected) and forged ahead with power plant sales 
under relatively permissive conditions. It was under such circumstances that Germany’s 
Kraftwork Union AG (KWU) commenced construction of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plants 
(known as Iran-I and Iran-II) in November 1974 simply based on a letter of intent (LOI) 
pending the conclusion of a formal contract.  
Under these circumstances, as the United States’ dominant (its monopoly had 
already been compromised by now) position in both technological and fuel supply fields 
was eroding, the divergence in proliferation risk judgments had real consequences if 
Washington failed to bring Bonn and Paris onto the same page with its threat perceptions. 
This was exactly the reality of the situation on the ground in the mid-1970s as the United 
States’ efforts to nudge the Shah’s nuclear program away from the purely commercial 
zone into the security zone met with relatively little success in Europe. Put crudely, as far 
as Germany and France were concerned, the 1973 oil embargo trumped the tentative 
proliferation implications of India’s 1974 explosion and Western Europe’s energy 
imperatives and commercial stakes were just far too high to be abandoned or even put on 
the backburner.  
Additionally adding to the Ford Administration’s subpar success to 
institutionalize its proliferation concerns in Europe was an underlying inconsistency and 
conflict of interests between crucial commercial incentives and long-range security 
concerns existing in Washington. For instance, at the same time as Washington was 
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perceptibly worried about the scope and depth of the nuclear net the Shah was casting, 
the U.S. State Department was encouraging the Bechtel Corporation to “approach” the 
Shah about investing some $300 million in a future private uranium enrichment facility in 
the United States181 and was anxious to finalize a six to eight billion dollar reactor and 
fuel deal with Iran.182  
Still further complicating the delicate juggling game Washington was playing in 
the post-1974 era was the unpromising prospect of obtaining the approval of an 
increasingly trepidations and anti-Shah Capitol Hill whose imprimatur the White House 
needed before consummating any nuclear deal with Iran. Under these untoward 
conditions, finding a mutually satisfactory common ground without alienating the Shah in 
an evolving strategic environment had an air of squaring the circle to it.  
In any case, as the Ford Administration was endeavoring to mollify Capitol Hill’s 
heightened non-proliferation concerns without alienating a nettled Shah from the US 
orbit, a whole slew of external factors were introducing new challenges to an already 
difficult situation. Important among them was the Shah’s dissatisfaction with the 
treatment he was receiving from Washington when Iran was not invited to the newly 
established Nuclear Supplier Group’s (NSG) first meeting in November 1975 in London. 
This non-invitation happened despite HIM’s expressed strenuous desire for the NSG 
 
 
                                                        
181 Confidential. From New-Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. OES/ Nelson F. Sievering Jr. to Secretary of State. 
Nuclear Energy Agreement for Cooperation with Iran. December 6, 1974. 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc04.pdf (Accessed July 16, 2010).  
 
182 Secret. Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State. Draft Agreement on Atomic Energy. April 1975. 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc05b.pdf (Accessed July 24, 2010). 
 
 
 106
members to adopt an interactive approach with the nuclear technology recipient countries 
instead of blackballing them through the cultish London Club.183  
Unimpressed by Iran’s exclusion from the NSG, in a December 1975 interview 
with Le Monde, Etemad unleashed a most scathing critique of the NSG’s mode of 
operation: “I find it rather difficult to understand the attitude of the seven [NSG] 
countries which meet in London regularly with a view to coordinating their attitude 
toward their nuclear customers,” Etemad observed. He then called into question the 
NSG’s “ostensible” objective of preventing nuclear proliferation and charged it with 
creating an “international atmosphere marked by mistrust and suspicion.” The AEOI 
director went even further wondering, “whether the real motives of the "London Group" 
did not extend beyond the proclaimed objectives.” “If it is true that only non-proliferation 
is being discussed,” Etemad challenged, “why are these talks held behind closed doors? 
Why are some countries that are more directly concerned with these problems are not 
asked to join the group?” The AEOI director’s rather disturbing prediction was that “as a 
result of this behavior the nonproliferation treaty [was] being endangered without any 
real new guarantees being added to the nonproliferation measures already extant."184 
As evident in these remarks, in Iran’s judgment, the NSG epitomized a self-
defeating cloak-and-dagger approach toward proliferation by the Ford Administration 
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whose net result was making the atomic option even more intriguing for nuclear 
aspirants.  
Miffed at Washington’s purportedly discriminatory and arbitrary policy of 
exclusion and inclusion (during a conversation with Ambassador Helms in June 1976) the 
chairman of the AEOI clearly laid out Tehran’s nuclear weapons thinking. Etemad 
argued that Iran, on geostrategic grounds, thought proliferation “anathema” to its interests 
and had a much more tenacious vested interest than the United States did in maintaining 
the Middle East a proliferation-free region. Etemad went on strongly urging the United 
States to practically help ease a Pakistan “traumatized” by India’s May explosion out of 
its “desperate frame of mind” if Washington didn’t wish to see a nuclear Islamabad and 
its spillover into the Middle East.185  
In the meantime, as Washington was gaining a fuller understanding of the scope 
and scale of Iran’s nuclear enterprise, the White House’s concerns over the Shah’s long-
term nuclear intentions were growing more acute and pronounced. Now, U.S. 
Government’s secret documents were explicitly questioning the Iranian economy’s 
absorptive capacity and maturity for 23000 MW of nuclear electricity over a matter of 
two decades. Further undercutting the exclusively electricity rationale for the existence of 
the nuclear program, in the US judgment, was the fact that Iran’s Ministry of Energy, the 
presumed consumer of the atomic energy, was not institutionally in the decision-making 
loop of the AEOI. This bureaucratic anomaly further intensified proliferation concerns. 
 
                                                        
185 Secret. From US Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State. Iranian Views on Non-Proliferation and US/Iran 
Nuclear Cooperation, June 7, 1976 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc19b.pdf 
(Accessed June 24, 2010). 
 
 
 108
 Around this time, the Americans also started viewing through a jaundiced lens 
His Majesty’s “lively personal interest” in the issue of the atom. The net result was an 
unprecedentedly candid judgment that "the components of the [Iranian Government's] 
motivation to acquire this complex and extensive technology [were] not entirely clear." 
Even less unmistakable was speculation that “it [was] possible that Iran’s interest in 
acquiring nuclear knowhow and plutonium [was], in part, motivated by the desire to 
preserve the option of developing nuclear weapons should the region’s power balance 
shift toward the nuclear.” 186   
These misgivings notwithstanding, the Ford Administration was hard at work, 
with much back and forth going on between different government agencies, to assemble a 
coherent action plan before a scheduled state visit by the Shah to the United States in 
May 1975. Knowing full well that the nuclear issue would figure prominently in his 
negotiations with HIM and succumbing to the Administration’s proliferation concerns, 
President Ford, in NSDM 292, decided to stick with a strict policy of maintaining US 
veto rights over chemical reprocessing of US supplied fuel on proliferation-risk grounds. 
The decision was made despite recognition in the Administration that the Shah might 
interpreter a hardened US posture as an “affront” to his dignity and his country’s 
sovereignty, a scenario that could derail Iran-US relations off their strategic path.187  
Just as expected, the Shah’s high-profile visit to Washington fell well short of 
extracting concessions on the nuclear front from the Ford Administration. Nor did the 
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May 1975 NPT review conference and the meetings between Etemad and the American 
delegation prove fruitful in surmounting the formidable dilemma of Iran’s right to 
reprocessing American supplied fuel rods. If anything, these meetings further widened 
the trust gap between the Shah and the Americans.  
In such an atmosphere, shortly after HIM’s U.S. trip, a July 1975 report 
conducted by the Hudson Institute, founded by Herman Kahn, came down heavily on the 
possibility of Iran pursuing a deterrent-worthy nuclear option at least within a regional 
context. The thrust of the report’s argument was that the Shah’s decision to acquire the 
nuclear option did not need to be driven exclusively by the developments in Iran’s 
strategic regional environment. Rather, Lewis Dunn, the ACDA188-contracted report’s 
author, argued, an ambitious Shah’s desire to acquire military hegemony in the Persian 
Gulf would constitute enough inducement for Iran to go nuclear in the mid 1980s.  
This judgment essentially amounted to a refutation of the Shah’s repeatedly 
articulated position that Tehran would not self-referentially and without being provoked 
seek a nuclear capability simply to throw its weight around in the Middle East. The report 
also mentioned an Israeli decision to shed the amimut189 and start brandishing its nuclear 
arsenal or a Pakistani, Libyan, or Egyptian move toward nuclearization as possible 
scenarios under which Iran would nuclearize.  
Following the Hudson Institute report, in an October 1975 cable to Richard 
Helms, Secretary of State Kissinger drew the Ambassador’s attention to the fact that Iran 
seemed to have calcified its position with Etemad categorically rejecting U.S. demand for 
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veto rights on chemical reprocessing and appearing unreceptive to the concept of 
multinational reprocessing. As mentioned before, in the Secretary’s judgment, Iran’s 
logic-defying reluctance to act as a site for the United States’ multinational reprocessing 
concept could as well flow from an “unspoken unwillingness” to submit Iran’s nuclear 
facilities to “foreign surveillance.”190 
In the cable, Dr. Kissinger contextualized the proliferation concerns emanating 
from such an inflexible stance by Tehran within the broader framework of Pakistan’s bid 
to purchase a pilot reprocessing facility from France and the Shah’s September interview 
with veteran Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal.191 In that interview the 
Shah had conveyed expressively the reversibility of Iran’s nuclear weapons abstinence by 
saying, “We do not want Iran to procure nuclear weapons just for the sake of having 
them,” before imperiously adding, “But I tell you quite frankly that Iran will have to 
acquire atomic bombs if every upstart in the region gets them.”192  
His Majesty brought this point home more poignantly again in an interview with 
the New York Times in September 1975: “Honestly, I am not really thinking of nuclear 
arms. But if 20 or 30 ridiculous little countries are going to develop nuclear weapons, 
then I may have to revise my policies. Even Libya is talking about trying to manufacture 
atomic weapons- God knows for what purpose.”193  
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The subsequent interview by the Shah with Business Week in November 1975 
further deepened the fissures in Iran-US ties and made visible the spillover impact of the 
nuclear standoff in eroding the relationship’s strategic depth. In his remarks the Monarch 
made known his bafflement at the United States’ failure to fully appreciate the situation 
by holding the future progression of such a mutually rewarding strategic partnership 
hostage to some disagreement over the seemingly trivial issue of chemical reprocessing. 
Venting out his frustration over the nuclear impasse, the Shah, in thinly disguised 
language, warned the deadlock could have a systemically detrimental impact and derail 
Iran-US relations. In the Shah’s judgment, the uncompromising treatment Washington 
was meting out on Tehran’s nuclear effort simply symbolized Iran’s downgraded status in 
the United States’ strategic hierarchy where, following the euphoric Salt I & II Treaties 
and the Helsinki Baskets, détente was the order of the day in US-USSR relations.  
Following the sensational coverage the interview received in Tehran’s pro-Shah 
daily Kayhan, the U.S. Ambassador to Tehran sent a sobering cable to Washington.  The 
cable first quoted the Monarch’s sentiments in the interview where he contrasted 
Europe’s forthcoming attitude on the nuclear issue with the United States’ humiliating 
demands which the French or Germans, in the Shah’s view, would never even dream of 
making. Helms then elaborated on the Kayhan piece’s unmistakable purpose in 
conveying the broader implications of the nuclear deadlock and lamented the fact that the 
United States had been so off the mark in assessing the depth and scope of Tehran’s 
disillusionment over the nuclear issue.194  
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In another cable sent to State shortly afterward, Helms spoke more concretely 
about the dilemma, this time offering operational advice to overcome it. Corralling the 
proliferation concerns associated with chemical reprocessing, the Ambassador drew the 
State Department’s attention to the verity of Etemad’s judgment that the concept of 
multinational reprocessing didn’t stand a realistic chance of operational and logistical 
success considering the impossibly intractable issues like "joint management, distribution 
of costs, and actual physical arrangements for storage, transport, and processing of 
material" associated with it in the Middle East. In order to propel the stalled, now almost 
deadlocked, talks forward, Helms recommended the United States give up on the 
multinational concept and instead pursue a stringently safeguarded “binational 
reprocessing plant to be managed and operated by Iran and the United States."195 This, in 
Helms’ view, would ensure the US nuclear industry benefitted from the Shah’s deep 
pockets before the lion’s share of Iran’s nuclear contracts slipped through to the 
European competitors.   
Obviously, conceding so much leeway to Tehran would require the presumption 
of innocence regarding HIM’s ultimate proliferation intentions, a leap of faith the White 
House was profoundly unprepared to take. Upon close scrutiny, however, one could 
detect some hardheaded realism combined with a sense of resignation in Ambassador 
Helms’ reading of the Iran-US nuclear cooperation dilemma. The same sense of realism 
also lodged at the root of the Ambassador’s lamentations of the United States’ unrealistic 
obsession with the issue of proliferation. From Helms’ vantage point, since Iran’s 
national security imperatives would ultimately reign supreme in its proliferation calculus, 
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whatever precious little contractual concessions the White House managed to squeeze 
from Tehran would only be of feel-good cosmetic value.  
In his characteristically point-blank language, Helms noted, "We have little 
choice but to accept at face value Iran's stated policy that it intends to honor its NPT 
commitments. Given the options it now has or may have in the future, it appears to us 
that the essential point is that Iran could develop a reprocessing plant and proceed to 
construct a nuclear explosive device if it so desired regardless of any additional 
safeguards we may succeed in writing into our bilateral agreement. India is an obvious 
example. Although Iran does not at present have the R&D cadre to compare with India's, 
it probably would not take it long to collect or buy the necessary talent to do what India 
did. With the means in hand, whatever commitments Iran may have made to the US or 
under the NPT is likely to fall by the wayside if Iran's perception of its national interests 
so dictate."196 As the passage sharply illustrates, Helms was convinced that India’s 
“original sin” could have set off a domino effect, especially in the Middle East, whose 
dynamics couldn’t be manipulated through contractual and legalistic mechanisms. These 
sentiments were very much in line with those Dr. Etemad expressed in his numerous talks 
with the American officials.  
As the trust deficit between the Peacock Throne and the White House was 
progressively deepening, Akbar Etemad’s late December 1975 visit to India ruffled even 
more feathers in Washington.197 During the trip, one that took place in an atmosphere of 
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Iran-India nuclear solidarity, Etemad lavished praise on India’s nuclear achievements 
expressing optimism Iran could "import Indian expertise for developing her atomic 
research laboratories.” Etemad also made mention, in Madras, of Iran's ongoing plans to 
"set up a chain of atomic research laboratories" that could benefit from India's 
experience.”198 These sentiments were more vehemently reiterated by the AEOI director 
on the sidelines of the conclusion of a sweeping nuclear cooperation agreement in 
Mumbai between him and Dr. H.N. Sethna, chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy 
Commission on February 25, 1977. In those remarks, Etemad indicated Iran's interest to 
"get as much as it can from India, rather than rely too much on Western sources" in the 
nuclear field.199 
Particularly alarming to the Americans were insinuations in Etemad’s remarks 
that Iran would be interested in pooling resources with India to explore the possibility of 
PNEs, an undertaking not explicitly prohibited under the NPT. These sentiments 
combined with Iran’s consistent refusal to condemn the Smiling Buddha200 gave further 
impetus to concerns that Iran was viewing PNEs as a potential loophole in the non-
proliferation regime it could capitalize on to position itself in an ambiguous gray zone 
with possible deterrent benefits. Admiral Quihillal’s presence in Tehran only helped 
intensify these concerns as there was real anxiety in Washington that Brazilian and 
Argentinean moves toward PNEs would leave Iran with no choice but to follow suit. As 
                                                        
198 Summary of World Broadcasts: The Far East. Weekly supplement, Part 3 (British Broadcasting 
Corporation. Monitoring Service, 1976).  
  
199 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Delhi General Overseas Service, February 25, 1977, 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation Accord Signed With Iran, 
http://docs.newsbank.com/s/HistArchive/fbisdoc/FBISX/1292EA9190AE6A90/0D0CB4F6C367F64A 
(Accessed August 23, 2011).  
 
200 The codename of India’s 1974 PNE.  
 
 
 115
one observer noted in this context, it was “easy to suspect linkages between an interest in 
explosives in Buenos Aires and in Teheran.”201 
In the wake of Etemad’s remarks in India (that smacked of endorsement of and 
interest in PNEs by Iran) the U.S. embassy in Tehran sprang into action pushing AEOI’s 
chief for sharper clarification on whether the comments marked a change of heart in 
Iran’s nuclear policy. Etemad’s response was as vague and double-edged as the 
sentiments expressed in India. While claiming his India remarks had been de-
contextualized, Etemad went on to reiterate his firm conviction that Iran’s nuclear 
position was “analogous” to that of India. Furthermore, he refused to categorically rule 
out PNEs as a nuclear route Iran might take – although he said the option wouldn’t be 
taken unilaterally and in breach of Iran’s NPT commitments and IAEA safeguards.  
Most important of all, however, were the AEOI chief’s unequivocal remarks that 
Iran was determined not to subject its nuclear enterprise to any restrictions imposed by 
nuclear weapons states (NWS) so long as those were not incorporated into a revised and 
universally applicable NPT that put equal emphasis on non-proliferation and 
disarmament.202  
As time wore on, the virtual nuclear deadlock between Tehran and Washington 
and its spillover repercussions were growing more visible. For instance, in a January 
1976 interview with the Kuwaiti Arabic daily Al-Siyassa, the Shah expressed frustration 
over the nuclear issue even more crisply: "we have given the Americans a pledge that we 
will use the nuclear reactors [obtained from the U.S.] for peaceful purposes and that we 
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will not produce nuclear weapons. They have asked for more pledges. We believe there is 
no reason for such pledges."203  
Palpably concerned over the escalating tensions, the White House stepped up its 
efforts to find the lowest common denominator with Iran to conclude a civilian nuclear 
agreement as promptly as possible. Reflecting the sense of urgency, in February 1976, 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in an unmistakably blunt memorandum-- 
addressed collectively to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and The Administrator of the Energy Research 
and Development Administration-- relayed the President’s "anxious" desire to see an 
accord with Iran in a timely fashion. Despite its urgent language, however, the memo 
revealed that Washington was yet to capture a sharp picture of the conditions the Iranian 
would find absolutely non-negotiable.  
This sense of loss was as much a function of the protracted nature of the talks and 
changing circumstances--that made the evolution of the two sides’ positions inevitable—
as the shift in Iran’s appraisal of the indispensability of the U.S. to get its nuclear 
program off the ground (especially with regards to the issue of fuel supply). Under such 
dynamic circumstances, the Ford Administration’s efforts to find common ground 
between "US proliferation interests, US-Iran mutual interests, and US domestic nuclear 
politics” was as unrealistic as Washington’s exhortations with Iran to forsake national 
reprocessing and become a role model for the rest of the world.204  
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Under these circumstances, as the February 2, 1976 meeting between the Shah 
and the U.S. delegation (director of the Energy Research and Development 
Administration, Robert Seamans and Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Caryle 
Maw) produced no concrete results, the Administration showed signs of receptivity to the 
Iranian redlines. The United States, in the talks, agreed to further concessions by 
scrapping the “veto rights” stipulation and by granting Iran the right to operate a 
“rigorously safeguarded” national reprocessing facility on Iranian soil. But Washington 
was still concerned that even these concessions might fall short of meeting Iran’s 
demands regarding a genuinely indigenous full fuel cycle if “rigorously safeguarded” 
meant “assigning [American] staff to an Iranian national facility to supplement IAEA 
safeguards."205 
As the Ford Administration was stepping up its efforts to work out a viable modus 
vivendi with the AEOI, Ambassador Helms’ hardnosed appraisals of the situation proved 
somewhat instrumental in softening the contours of the U.S. nuclear posture toward Iran. 
Arguably the most consequential result of Helms’ exhortations for the Administration to 
be pragmatic was that the notion of multinational reprocessing was dropped, at least 
informally, from the United States’ list of counter-proliferation solutions. In a May 12, 
1976 meeting with high-ranking State Department officials, secretary Kissinger revealed 
his change of heart on the issue as well: “I am frankly getting off the multinational 
concept. I have endorsed it publicly, but in any region you look at it is a fraud. Pakistan 
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does not want to be in a plant located in Iran and a plant in Pakistan would just be a 
cover…. I am not sure we should fall on our own swords to push others into 
multinational projects.”  
The Secretary of State didn’t just stop there. In some eerily candid remarks, 
reminiscent of Ambassador Helms’ hardheadedness, Kissinger undercut even further the 
sustainability of the whole concept of multinationalizing fuel cycles, wondering what 
would happen if the host country “kicked out” the other participants once the facility was 
up and running. On top of that, Kissinger appeared to have serious second thoughts 
whether multinationalization on the cheap would contribute to the proliferation of 
reprocessing technology to countries that wouldn’t otherwise have access or, for that 
matter, even interest in it.206   
Just as the shedding of the multinational reprocessing concept was promising to 
pave the way for the conclusion of an agreement with the AEOI, the Iranian side 
managed to rekindle Washington’s worst fears when the Shah’s purported desire to 
purchase fast breeder reactors (FBR) became widely known.207 This desire was more 
concretely articulated in July 1976 when Tehran officially informed the United States of 
“the construction of experimental and commercial fast breeder reactors [as] part of Iran's 
atomic energy program.”208 FBRs are essentially plutonium-fueled reactors, a technology 
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that makes weapons-grade fissile material readily available for weaponization. This was 
exactly the path India took to acquire the plutonium used in its 1974 nuclear explosion. 
Right about the same time, alarming news trickled out that the Shah’s nuclear 
enterprise was being rushed forward at an alarmingly accelerated pace. For instance, 
there was word circulating in the nuclear industry sector that the Shah was pushing 
Germany’s KWU to finish the Bushehr power plant’s first unit by October 1981so it 
could be ready for Prince Reza’s 21st birthday when he would be crowned as Crown 
Prince.209 The venturesome fashion in which Iran was pursuing the full spectrum of 
almost all available and futuristic nuclear possibilities exuded a feeling of urgency that 
the Washington couldn’t help but associate with some imminent threat perception by 
Iran. Although the U.S. didn’t explicitly raise the hurried pace of Tehran’s nuclear 
journey as a matter of substantive concern in the negotiations with the Shah, its 
atmospheric impact in breeding the United States’ proliferation anxieties was 
unmistakably perceptible. For example, the very fact that the area adjacent to Halileh was 
abruptly re-allocated from its original purpose as a petrochemical plant site to host the 
Bushehr Power Plants is quoted in a State Department cable as evidence that the nuclear 
issue enjoyed unusual prioritization.210  
In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the issue of site selection for Iran’s 
nuclear plants was also an object of curiosity. This had to do with the very fact that 
Iranian territory, due to high seismic activity where water was abundant, was hardly a 
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hospitable ground for building power plants. As a matter of fact, only four regions in the 
entire country could even be considered as candidates for nuclear power construction. Of 
these feasible areas, the Caspian Sea coast was dismissed due to a host of environmental 
and geological reasons, water level fluctuations, and strategic considerations associated 
with its proximity to the Soviet Union. High seismicity rendered the Persian Gulf coast 
only a marginally better candidate. The Karun River banks was another possibility that 
the AEOI decided upon by contracting two 900 MWe power plants to the French 
company Framatome. The last option was to build air-cooled nuclear plants on the banks 
of the Zayandeh River near Esfahan for which the AEOI was in preliminary talks with 
KWU. On the Bushehr plants, critics expressed concern that KWU and the AEOI had 
compromised safety measures, as the plants were not suitable for an earthquake prone 
region.211 
As the rift between Iran and the United States was widening, another layer of 
uncertainty began to capture the Americans’ attention: Visible signs of growing anti-
Americanism had crept into the corporate culture of Iran’s now sizable and fiercely 
nationalistic nuclear bureaucracy. Under the prevailing conditions, the AEOI’s anti-
American bias could only intensify over time as Etemad and his senior staff were coming 
to internalize the fundamental contrast between Washington’s hardball nuclear politics 
with the Western Europeans’ easygoing attitude. This reality and its bearing on the future 
trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program was of great concern to the United States.  
In April 1976 and May 1977, for example, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran put 
together two comprehensive character sketch profiles of key personnel involved in the 
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AEOI’s main decision-making offices and domestically affiliated subcontracting firms. 
These rather detailed cables made a point of going into the key personnel’s backgrounds 
and political orientations. In the 1977 cable, for example, Dr. Ghassem Arabian, the 
AEOI Deputy in Charge of Raw Materials and Fuel and one of Etemad's "first and 
foremost trusted assistants" was singled out as having an "anti-American bias."212 In this 
regard, in an August 1976 cable explaining the roots of the AEOI’s obdurate attitude 
toward the nuclear bilateral, Ambassador Helms placed the blame squarely on Etemad’s 
“senior staff.”213  
Lame-duck Ford Replaced by Anti-Nuclear Carter  
 
As the Ford Administration was going through its lame-duck year, the real 
damage done to the U.S. nuclear industry started to dawn on the White House. The 
sobering news came in April 1976 when the U.S. embassy in Tehran informed the State 
Department that due to the United States’ lethargic pace in concluding a comprehensive 
nuclear deal with Iran and the Shah’s dwindling oil revenues, the ambitious 23000 
megawatts nuclear electricity generating program would be “stretched out over a longer 
period” than initially conceived.  
This meant that new orders on top of the four already concluded with Germany 
and France would be “deferred.” The cable, in an apparent effort to at least partially shift 
the culpability from the U.S. government to the nuclear industry, blamed American 
companies’ reluctance to enter into the so-called “super turn-key contracts” (that the 
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European vendors were willing to do) for failing to secure a solid foothold for the U.S. 
companies in Iran’s lucrative nuclear market.214  
It is noteworthy that the notion of “super turn-key projects” was a term coined 
specifically to describe the terms and conditions the AEOI was demanding of vendors 
bidding to build nuclear reactors in Iran.  Such an arrangement essentially required the 
foreign contractor to not only supply the project to the AEOI in ready-to-operate shape 
but also develop and initially manage all the “ancillary facilities” like “water supply, 
homes for the personnel” and the like “in places where there literally was no electricity at 
all.” According to one source, “the ‘outside the fence’ costs for these projects would 
exceed the ‘inside the fence’ costs for a number of years” since “the provision of water 
and housing and mosques could cost more than the nuclear equipment itself.”215  
In any case, with Iran scaling back its ambitious nuclear program and the election 
season coming up in 1976, the finalization of a bilateral nuclear agreement with Iran lost 
its urgency toward the end of the Ford Administration. Despite the Ford Administration’s 
strenuous efforts to conclude a bilateral agreement to supersede the Nuclear Agreement 
between the US and Iran signed on March 5, 1957 and amended and modified by the 
follow-up agreements of June 8, 1964, and March 18 1969, the three shots Washington 
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took at the issue in February and May 1975 and May 1976 alongside a massive 
diplomatic effort fell well short of sealing a deal.  
The last draft, submitted to the government of Iran on May 31, 1976, in 
Washington’s judgment, contained the most ground the United States could concede 
without jeopardizing its non-proliferation interests and the uniformity of policy and 
practice it was seeking to adhere to in its future peaceful nuclear cooperation deals. An 
increasing self-confident and assertive AEOI’s feedback on the US proposed draft, 
however, was nothing if not defiant. For instance, diametrically opposed to the United 
States’ position of demanding “veto rights” over the reprocessing of US supplied fuel, the 
AEOI proposed “the Imperial Government of Iran” be granted "the right to effective 
control of the management and operation of the reprocessing facilities."216  
At the core of this fundamental disagreement were two different attitudes towards 
the issue of reprocessing in Tehran and Washington: Washington viewed the issue as a 
privilege (with security implications) to be granted under the most parsimonious of 
circumstances to some of the United States’ strategic allies, but the AEOI and especially 
its chairman Akbar Etemad viewed it as an inalienable right (with sovereignty 
implications) Iran could not be arbitrarily or discretionarily deprived of. In Etemad’s 
perspective, Iran was entitled to the full spectrum of “nuclear technology, including 
reprocessing.”217 
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Again, it was Ambassador Helms who, in his characteristically sympathetic tone 
to Iran’s nuclear sentiments, laid out his appraisal of Iran’s reprocessing rights 
counterproposal in disarmingly simple terms:  
 “Iran considers reprocessing as an important ‘downstream’ activity, and for 
obvious security of supply and economic reasons seriously intends to have it performed 
in facilities established in Iran. The United States, desiring to sell a large number of 
power plants, in all fairness, should be prepared to supply Iran with the means to 
establish all facilities which in the opinion of the Iranian government constitute integral 
parts of its nuclear power program.”218 
If presidential-hopeful Jimmy Carter’s campaign rhetoric was any indication, one 
could see a further tightening of U.S. nuclear technology transfer and conventional arms 
sales to Iran if he became president. Indicative of this was a presidential debate on 
October 6, 1976 during which Carter launched a scathing critique on the lavish shipment 
of military hardware by the Ford Administration to the Shah: “Iran is going to get 80 F-
14s before we even meet our own Air Force orders for F-l4s, and the shipment of 
Spruance-Class Destroyers to Iran are much more highly sophisticated than the Spruance-
Class Destroyers that are presently being delivered to our own Navy. This is ridiculous 
and it ought to be changed.”219  
 Before long, with Jimmy Carter winning the White House came sweeping 
changes to U.S. nuclear policy and further hindrances to the finalization of a bilateral 
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agreement between Tehran and Washington. The person in charge of devising the United 
States new strategy was Joseph Nye, Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security 
Assistance, Science, and Technology who also led the National Security Council Group 
on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran’s response to the change in the Carter 
administration’s introduction of more stringent guidelines on nuclear materials, 
technology, and equipment was expectedly incompliant. For example, in a February 1977 
press conference, Iran’s top nuclear official, while soft-pedaling Tehran’s obdurate 
reprocessing position, defiantly reiterated a well-known Iranian theme: that “no country 
or group of countries” should think they have the “right to dictate nuclear policy" on 
Tehran.220 
With Carter in power, Iran soon found itself on the receiving end of his 
Administration’s more stringent nuclear policy in mid 1977 when its request for 20.2 
kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) 
received skeptical reception in Washington on the grounds it exceeded the 6-kilogram 
ceiling stipulated in the last amendment to the bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
(NCA) in 1969.  
The AEOI’s request for an increased amount of HEU was part of an effort "to 
replace existing plate-type fuel elements to extend core lifetime and boost power level 
from five to ten megawatts" at the TRR scheduled for mid 1978.221 President Carter’s 
failure to sanction the transfer of HEU occurred despite the American Embassy’s blunt 
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warning that it would "feed" Tehran's "worst fears concerning the reliability of the US as 
a future supplier of nuclear materials" likely to be construed in Iran as yet another 
indication that Tehran was not receiving a nuclear treatment commensurate with its 
strategic weight as a close ally.  
This issue acquired even more prominence when, as the U.S. Embassy in Tehran 
noted, set against the backdrop of May 4, 1977 "presidential announcement of approval 
of significant quantities of HEU to 8 projects in Canada, the Netherlands, Japan, 
Belgium, and the FRG." This discriminatory authorization reinforced already held 
suspicions in Tehran that "the U.S. has and will continue to differentiate between various 
customers in favor of the industrial west."222  
This differentiated treatment became even more conspicuous with President 
Carter’s commencement speech at Notre Dame University in June 1977. The tenor of the 
speech couldn’t have been more foreboding for the person of the Shah. “We are now free 
of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who 
joined us in that fear,” the President intoned, before adding, “I’m glad that that’s being 
changed.”223  
Visibly miffed, Tehran took an expeditious and unprecedentedly visible 
leadership role on the international stage in response to the Carter administration’s new 
nuclear policy announced on 7 April 1977. The high-profile venue for this trailblazing 
role was the AEOI-sponsored Iran Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology held at 
Persepolis a mere three days after the introduction of the U.S. new policy. 
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Enthusiastically attended by the nuclear have-nots and the biggest nuclear energy 
conference in the world, the event brought together some 500 nuclear scientists and 
officials “from the West, the Eastern bloc and the developing countries.”224  
In his message to the Conference, President Carter supplemented his 
backhandedly complimentary comments by raising the pathologies associated with 
nuclear technology. “I am profoundly interested in nuclear energy and am acutely aware 
of its possibilities and potential danger" the President noted, adding, “In this connection, 
all countries ought to be aware of their responsibilities in enabling the human community 
to benefit from the knowledge of nuclear technology within the framework of preventing 
its destructive consequences."225 
The Shah’s response to Carter’s message was equally double-edged: “Your 
Excellency: I wish to emphasize the fact that I fully realize your special interest in the 
nuclear energy issue. I am fully aware of the dangers and problems which might arise for 
the human community from an irresponsible policy. In this regard, I wish to reiterate that 
Iran has devoted its efforts solely toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that in 
the future we will continue to cooperate with all countries of the world toward realizing 
this objective in the interest of the entire human community."226 
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At the conference, the Indian delegation caught the Americans off guard by 
labeling “anything that smacked of restriction” on nuclear technology by the nuclear 
haves “as a direct threat to [India’s] prospects for economic growth.” This position jibed 
well with the Iranian position proving yet again how intertwined Iran and India’s nuclear 
positions had grown over the years. The tenor of the panels and discussions at the 
conference left the American delegation with a most sobering impression: that “nuclear 
energy policy in the future will be used in fora as a focus for rallying Third World unity 
vis-à-vis the United States.”227  
On the sidelines of the conference came surprising pieces of news by the AEOI 
Director in charge of Prospecting, Extraction, and Fuel according to whom Iran would no 
longer allow “foreign investors” to participate in the projects on the enrichment of 
uranium on its territory. The AEOI also announced it had concluded contracts with 
several countries to purchase some 30,000 tons of enriched uranium to be delivered in 
installments by 1994. The IAEOI also disclosed plans to “invest 300 million in the 
exploration for uranium at home over the next 10 years.”228  
An unintended consequence of the event was that even if the United States was, in 
principle, willing to give the benefit of the doubt to Iran as a reluctant NPT member, the 
Persepolis conference in April 1977 threw Iran’s stance on the issue into sharp relief as it 
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betrayed an Iranian effort to position itself at the forefront of cultivating an alternative 
nuclear energy paradigm in the developing world.  
Following the Conference and pressing ahead with his defiant posture toward 
Carter’s nuclear policy, in an April 1977 official visit to Tokyo, the AEOI director 
unleashed another round of blistering criticisms of Washington’s nuclear behavior. 
Reiterating Tehran’s indignation at the London Club, Etemad warned, “Many countries 
who have signed the NPT have lost their previous confidence and trust in this 
agreement.”229 
Shortly following the Japan trip, during a meeting between Etemad and a US 
State Department delegation in May 1977, the Iranian position on the new US nuclear 
energy policy became even more cut and dry when the AEOI chief aired a litany of 
complaints against Washington. On the NPT, Etemad lamented a lack of "distinction" by 
the United States "in its handling of NPT and Non-NPT countries," claiming Tehran had 
"not benefitted" from joining the treaty. Also prominently figuring in Etemad’s list of 
grievances was the United States’ discriminatory treatment of different articles of the 
NPT. Chief among Tehran’s remonstrations on this score was Washington’s reluctance to 
“give full weight to its responsibilities under article 4 of the NPT” that called for “the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”230 between nuclear haves and have-
nots. Etemad took the U.S. to task for its lack of systematic cooperation on full 
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technology transfer as a matter of overriding concern to Iran. The London Club, another 
of the perennial items on Etemad’s woe list, was raised with the United States delegation 
as well. The AEOI chief made no secret of the Iranian government’s “bad feeling” about 
the news trickling out of the NSG’s sub-rosa meetings that essentially amounted to the 
excommunication of the nuclear have-nots from the inner circle of international nuclear 
decision-making and threatening their relegation into an outcast nonentity.231  
It is worth mentioning here that the allegedly cultish nature of decision-making in 
the London Club continued to be a recurring bone of contention between Iran and the 
west in the Islamic Republic era. The Iranians alleged that the London Club had morphed 
into a mechanism to perpetuate the atomic powers’ “apartheid” monopoly on nuclear 
technology, a reality that belied the latter’s adherence to the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
NPT’s article IV.  
At pains not to pass up any opportunity to take jibes at Washington’s nuclear 
policy, in September 1977 the Shah dispatched a critical message to the 21st General 
Annual Conference of the IAEA in Vienna. HIM, in unusually candid language, called 
“any attempt to replace” international non-proliferation regimes “by bilateral and 
multilateral agreements a real danger for [their] solidarity and effectiveness."232  
As the tumultuous clouds were looming on Iran’s domestic political scene, the 
Shah-sympathetic Richard Helms’ departure from Tehran in December 1976 and the six-
month delay in his replacement (on June 1, 1977) added yet another complicating wrinkle 
                                                        
231 Confidential. US Embassy Tehran to Secretary of State US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and 
US-Iran Energy Discussions. May 16, 1977. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc28.pdf 
(Accessed July 27, 2010).  
 
232 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Teheran, September 28, 1977, Shah Sends 
Message to IAEA Conference in Vienna,             
http://docs.newsbank.com/s/HistArchive/fbisdoc/FBISX/11D7C66EA716AB08/0D0CB4F6C367F64A 
(Accessed July 28, 2011).  
 
 131
to an already nebulous ambiance between Tehran and Washington. Helms’ replacement, 
William Sullivan, couldn’t have been a worse candidate to bridge the gap between 
Tehran and Washington’s nuclear negotiating positions. A career diplomat deeply 
disillusioned with the Shah, the new Ambassador tended to view with resignation the 
gathering storm unleashed by the clerics on a seemingly doomed monarchical regime. To 
make matters worse, he also visibly lacked the kind of authority and judgment on the 
nuclear issue that his predecessor had brought to the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Under 
Sullivan’s ambassadorship there are essentially no visible signs in the cables of Helms-
style efforts to smooth over nuclear matters with Washington.  
As Tehran was progressively moving apart from Washington in charting its 
nuclear program, Iran’s ties to France and Germany were growing tighter. On November 
10, 1977 Tehran signed a declaration of intent with the German firm Kraftwork Union 
(KWU) to build four additional power plants (on top of the two previously under 
construction by KWU) near the town of Saveh in central Iran. These reactors would 
collectively generate 4,800 MWe and were slated to come online between 1984 and 
1987. Dr. Etemad described the agreement, the largest and most comprehensive ever 
entered into by the AEOI, as "the most important event in the economic relations between 
the Federal Republic [of Germany] and Iran." The timing of the announcement of the 
agreement, described by diplomatic circles as a "shot across the bow" of the United States 
by Iran just five days ahead of HIM’s scheduled state visit to Washington, could hardly 
have been more rankling for the White House. The U.S. nuclear industry was especially 
irked since the Shah was scheduled to discuss with President Carter the issue of eight 
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nuclear reactors Tehran had been seeking to purchase from Westinghouse for over a 
year.233  
In such an atmosphere, in May 1978, the United States submitted yet another draft 
of an NCA to Iran following a round of negotiations held in Vienna in February 1977. 
The draft reflected Iran’s half-hearted acquiescence in the face of U.S. pressure to have a 
decisive say on the chemical reprocessing of spent fuel rods. It stipulated that Iran would 
not have the right to reprocess or engage in any reprocessing activity without 
Washington’s prior consent.234  
But even here there was only a partial meeting of minds as the devil in the details 
soon reared its head. The United States was in favor of a two-tiered arrangement for the 
"disposition of irradiated special nuclear material" that gave priority to storage of spent 
fuel either in Iran or the United States and only entertained reprocessing as “an option of 
last resort” if the storage option proved “impracticable” due to unfavorable “technical, 
economic, or political” circumstances. The Iranians, on the other hand, were pursuing an 
arrangement that would grant them the reprocessing right as “an equal option” on par 
with the storage option.235   
This last remaining complicating wrinkle was never completely ironed out as the 
United States got wind of a sweeping change-of-heart in Iran’s nuclear energy policy on 
                                                        
233 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Hamburg DPA, November 10, 1977.  
Nuclear Power Plant Agreement with FRG Firm Signed. 
http://docs.newsbank.com/s/HistArchive/fbisdoc/FBISX/11D81432C67C4F10/0D0CB4F6C367F64A 
(Accessed August 26, 2011).  
 
234 Confidential. Secretary of State to US Embassy Tehran. U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, May 
17, 1978 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc31a.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2011). 
  
235 Secret. From Secretary of State to US Embassy Canberra and Ottawa, Provisions of US-Iranian Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement. September 6, 1978 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc31b.pdf 
(Accessed May 14, 2011).  
 
 
 133
August 15, 1978 that cast serious doubt on the feasibility for Iran to purchase eight 
nuclear reactors from the U.S. nuclear industry as initially conceived. The news came in 
the form of a front-page article in The Kayhan International entitled “It's Time to Call a 
Moratorium on all New Negotiations in Nuclear Sector” that took to task the United 
States’ brassbound approach on reprocessing and its dilatory attitude toward the 
conclusion of the NCA.  
Throwing into doubt the expediency of finalizing the NCA in a rush mode and at 
a time when a comprehensive overhaul of Iran’s energy policy was on the cards, the 
editorial counseled, "Iran should not rush into an agreement [with the US] whose 
implications over the next decade or two are at best unclear, and at worst undesirable."236 
The Kayhan editorial’s prediction was on the money as shortly afterward, Iran 
scrapped all new nuclear power plant projects except the four units already under 
construction in Halileh by KWU and Darkhovin by Framatome.  This came about, partly, 
thanks to plummeting oil prices that rendered the Iranian economy incapable of buoying 
the AEOI’s nuclear extravaganza. Aside from the dwindling oil revenues, the INP was 
further plagued and started showing signs of faltering by two new elements: a host of 
domestic opposition pressures leveled by various interest groups like the 
environmentalists237 further complicated by intergovernmental turf wars especially with 
the Ministry of Oil. Amid the mounting domestic opposition to the nuclear program and a 
charged political atmosphere, the AEOI was stripped of a big chunk of its decision-
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making power over “planning, constructing, and operating power plants” as these powers 
were transferred to the Ministry of Energy. An immediate result of the rethinking of 
Iran’s unrealistically ambitious nuclear program was the scrapping of four plants under 
negotiation with KWU, two with Framatome, and some eight plants with Westinghouse. 
Shortly following the bureaucratic and policy overhaul, in October 1978, the 
Shah’s “bureaucratic superstar” and AEOI director, Akbar Etemad, now commonly 
perceived as the father of Iran’s nuclear program, along with a handful of his high-
ranking deputies resigned their posts amidst “allegations of mismanagement and 
embezzlement.” 238  Etemad’s replacement was his deputy in charge of Power Plant 
Projects, Ahmad Sotoodehnia, a U.S. trained nuclear engineer who had worked for the 
National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) before joining the AEOI.239  
On the environment front, the AEOI received a lot of public criticism following 
some headline grabbing news that the AEOI was making arrangements with the Austrian 
government, with the Shah’s consent, allowing the latter to use Iran’s Kavir Dessert for 
nuclear waste disposal purposes in exchange for receiving technological cooperation 
from Vienna. Concerns were also raised by a senior nuclear safety member at the IAEA 
alleging that the Bushehr reactors, in the interest of time, had not gone through some 
significant design modifications that would be imperative to make it operationally safe 
for a "relatively high seismic area." Not surprisingly, the AEOI officials categorically 
denied these allegations claiming no safety standards had been compromised.240  
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Ayatollah Khomeini and his allies in the anti-Shah political movements also 
mounted domestic pressure against the INP. The Ayatollah categorically repudiated the 
full gamut of nuclear options as un-Islamic, taghooti (idolatrous) and ethically 
reprehensible white elephant projects. 
The India Resemblance Raises More Eyebrows 
 
As Iran’s nuclear enterprise was moving along, the parallels between its nuclear 
development strategy and those of India were becoming more curious and visible. One of 
these areas was Iran’s keen interest and heavy investment in R&D that betrayed an Indian 
connection. At the core of Iran’s nuclear R&D program was an ambitious plan to build 
the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC) as the primary center for as diverse 
functions as nuclear reactor operator training, fuel fabrication, and uranium chemistry.  
Modeled after India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), the overall 
function of the massive facility, containing some 15 buildings, was to maximize the 
facility, velocity, and scope at which Iran could generate, absorb, or indigenize all 
manner of nuclear technology. As much as the ENTEC in its entirety raised suspicions in 
the United States, the main concern of the Americans was the Metallurgy division at the 
ENTEC whose function was “to study materials to be used in reactors and other facilities 
in which radioactive substances are manipulated.” In U.S. judgment, the ENTEC’s 
inclusion of a “hot cell for handling highly radioactive substances” constituted an 
important “first step toward a reprocessing facility.”241  
These concerns came to a sharp relief following a February 1977 tour by an Oak 
Ridge National Lab (ORNL) delegation of the ENTEC designed by the French 
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Technicatome Company. The ORNL team couldn’t help but notice the similarity in 
location, sandwiched between two mountains, between the ENTEC facility and the U.S. 
Sandia Weapons Laboratory. On top of that, in the U.S. delegation’s judgment, the 
facility's "unusually large size" made it technically suitable to “produce weapons-grade 
plutonium.” Based on these disconcerting factors, the U.S. delegation deemed the 
ENETC facility a potential cause for alarm that merited “watching.”242 
The AOEI’s extensive plans to build an extensive manpower base to completely 
indigenize its technological platform also seemed to have been modeled after India. 
According to one expert, the AEOI had about 150 personnel with nuclear physics training 
in 1975. The number was slated to increase by 100 times to 15,000, according to one 
estimate, to indigenously staff the projected nuclear facilities by the mid-1990s.243 
This goal was pursued vigorously in two phases: identifying and luring nuclear 
scientists and technicians in Diaspora, especially in the United States, back to Iran and 
concluding academic cooperation programs with foreign institutions to train Iranian 
students in the field of nuclear engineering. In the interim, the AEOI started hiring 
internationally where Iranian nationals were not on hand. As part of implementing the 
first objective, the AEOI, on Dr. Etemad’s initiative, launched a comprehensive program 
to send Iranian students for training in nuclear engineering to countries as diverse as the 
USA, the UK, France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, and India.  
In 1978, Iran had almost 2000 students in various countries receiving all manner 
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of nuclear training. The most strategic of these relations were the educational and training 
relations AEOI had established with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the MIT.244 
The relationship with the MIT proved an extremely controversial issue. Modeled on the 
Indian experiment of establishing a national flagship technical university at Kanpur (IITK 
or Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur) whose primary purpose was to serve Indian 
national interests, the AEOI-MIT collaboration, worth $1.3 million, was a two-year 
“special Master’s program” to train Iranian students “at a premium.” The program, 
geared toward the technical and HR needs of the AEOI, was devised to train thirty 
Iranian students every year in cooperation with MIT’s Departments of Physics and 
Nuclear Engineering. The partnership soon infuriated much of the MIT faculty.245 Things 
reached a crescendo when a Computer Sciences professor wrote the polemically titled 
“Selling MIT: Bombs for the Shah” article in which he argued “the Iranian nuclear-
engineering students would end up making bombs for the Shah."246 MIT’s collaboration 
with Iran was not limited to the AEOI as, for example, the United States’ most advanced 
missile technology center at MIT’s Draper Laboratory was in preliminary talks with 
Aryamehr University of Technology (AMUT) in Tehran to “to provide a comparable 
facility” to Iran.247 
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As a matter of fact, the issue of human resources-- in all aspects of a vibrant 
nuclear program including nuclear operators, technicians, researchers, and 
administrators-- was of such a high priority for the AEOI that Eemad, along with two of 
his most qualified confidants, Mahdi Sarram248 and Cyrus Manzour249, were in charge of 
coordinating and streamlining this effort.250  
AEOI’s Strategic Hedging  
 
As the prospects for the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory agreement between 
Tehran and Washington were growing dimmer, Iran was stepping up its efforts to reach 
full-fledged independence in the fuel cycle from whatever source it could lay its hands 
on. The bulk of this effort was directed toward securing long-term fuel supply sources. In 
this period, the Shah’s nuclear footprint was practically everywhere as Etemad was 
travelling all over the world to secure nuclear deals, some public, others secret. 
According to one source, the AEOI had some fifty-four joint exploration projects 
searching wide and far for uranium across five continents. 
The U.S. documents describe the pace and scope of the AEOI’s efforts “to 
procure supplies of uranium and to obtain mining concessions as “feverish.” As part of 
this effort, the AEOI launched a three-year comprehensive uranium-prospecting program 
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conducting aerial radiometric and gravimetric survey of half Iranian territory for 
economically viable uranium deposits.251  
 Another component of Iran's hedging strategy consisted of adopting a nuclear 
development policy with maximum supplier diversity. The choice of pressurized water 
reactors (PWR) over heavy water or boiling-water power stations constituted a significant 
chunk of this policy. Apart from the technical and industrial advantages of PWRs, as 
Etemad later explained, the decision was part of a conscious policy to have 
maneuverability between suppliers: "We have, for instance, made a comparison between 
light-water power stations and the Canadian heavy-water power stations. The Canadian 
power stations seemed to us rather more expensive, and there has been less industrial 
experience with this type of reactor. Furthermore, we would only have had one 
supplier.”252 
On the international front, the AEOI concluded agreements with Australia, Gabon 
and Niger for uranium prospecting. However, arguably the most important aspect of the 
Shah’s strategic hedging effort to secure nuclear fuel supply was focused in South Africa. 
In 1975, rumors were afloat that South Africa had “negotiated a [secret] agreement with 
Iran according to which Iran would invest in the South African enrichment project in 
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return for the enriched uranium” Tehran needed for its nuclear program.253 On October 
12, 1975 The Washington Post reported that the agreement provided for the purchase of 
some “$700 million-worth of uranium from South Africa and put up part of the money 
for a huge uranium-enrichment plant to be built in South Africa.” Following the 
agreement, speculations were rife that this was the reason why the South African 
Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) withdrew from a massive deal with the FRG 
Company Steag.254 
Iran’s non-compliance with OPEC’s oil embargo on South Africa was 
undoubtedly instrumental in Tehran’s nuclear ties with Pretoria. It is worth noting that 
South Africa in the mid-1970s was deemed by the nuclear expert community a “near 
nuclear” state on a par with Germany and Taiwan well ahead of Brazil and South 
Korea.255  
The AEOI also launched a massive effort to obtain shares in different uranium 
enrichment joint stock companies. The most important of these was European Gaseous 
Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium commonly known as Eurodif. In 1975 Iran 
invested some $1 billion to obtain 10 percent share that initially belonged to Sweden in 
the consortium. This made Iran a stockholder alongside France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium 
in the France-based facility entitling the AEOI to 10 percent of the uranium enriched at 
the plant. The financial contribution of the Shah to Eurodif gave Iran “a blocking power 
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in the consortium” as “the largest shareholder.” This would enable Iran to have a decisive 
say “on ‘sensitive’ production lines, in particular those of enriched uranium for military 
use.”256 Iran also held a 25% participation share in another uranium enrichment facility in 
France named COREDIF.257  
In June 1974, Iran also signed a liberally articulated blank agreement with France 
under which the two countries would cooperate, in Etemd’s words, on “almost all aspects 
of the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology.”258 The inking of this Franco-Iranian 
agreement essentially made Iran the first oil-producing country trying to get a foothold in 
the elite league of nuclear energy.259  
 As time wore on, Tehran and Paris signed more concretized agreements to 
operationlize the initial agreement. One of the most important of these was an agreement 
concluded in November 1974 for the construction of two 900 MWe power plants, to 
come on stream in 1982 and 1983, on the banks of the Karun River. The Light Water 
Reactors (LWR) were essentially Westinghouse reactors manufactured under license by 
Framatome, a French affiliate of the Creusot-Loire. France and Iran also concluded an 
agreement in May 1975 to build the Esfahan Nuclear Research Center (ENTEC) by 1980.  
The ENTEC was conceived by the AEOI to act as “the mainstay of Iran's nuclear 
energy program.” Iran, in Etemad’s words, intended to station some 1000 nuclear experts 
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in the center and use it for "training its team of experts and to perform "operation and 
maintenance" of power stations. Additionally, the center was planned to be equipped with 
a Minerva-type research reactor to conduct “research on power reactors, particularly 
breeder reactors, and for access to installations enabling [Iran] to familiarize itself with 
fuel cycles.” According to Etemad, Tehran was “particularly” interested in manufacturing 
"the fuel elements of the light-water power stations and learn to handle uranium and 
plutonium."260 
Iran’s nuclear ties with Germany didn’t hit a major snag like the one with 
Washington under the Shah either. As a matter of fact, the FRG’s close ties with Tehran 
was an issue of concern in Washington as the Americans were concerned what would 
happen should Iran enter into a comprehensive nuclear deal with Bonn that included 
transfer of reprocessing technology, training, and equipment. The issue came up a few 
times during internal deliberations in the State Department on proliferation and reached a 
pitch during a July 2, 1976 conversation between the FRG Ambassador to the United 
States Berndt Von Staden and Secretary Kissinger. The Americans, visibly miffed at the 
fact that the Germans had not kept them in the loop prior to making a commitment to the 
Shah on the issue of reprocessing and before signing the FRG-Iranian Agreement for 
Nuclear Cooperation, let the Ambassador know that the agreement would not be “greeted 
with enthusiasm by the US.” According to the U.S., although Washington was not 
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looking for “controversy with the FRG,” it couldn’t avoid registering its displeasure at 
the agreement.261  
Toward the late 1970s, the Americans were especially concerned over the issue of 
spent fuel rods from the four nuclear reactors under contract at Bushehr and Darkhovin. 
According to one estimate, the combined capacity of the four reactors already under 
construction (42,00 MWe) would give Iran the capability to “produce enough plutonium 
to fabricate about a bomb per day” if Tehran acquired reprocessing capability.262  
Tehran also initiated nuclear cooperation with Japan in the late 1970s. The most 
important component of Tehran-Tokyo nuclear cooperation materialized in December 
1977 with the conclusion of a protocol with a Japanese consortium to construct two 
"nuclear energy operated water desalination plants" near Bushehr. The plants, to be 
powered by the nuclear reactors IR-I and IR-II under construction by KWU, would 
produce "about 100,000 cubic meters of desalinated water daily from the Persian Gulf. 
This project would make the otherwise desolate city of Bushehr the most large-scale 
water desalination site in the world.263 
In the United States, Iran, through its private sector companies, was testing the 
waters to enter into a joint venture contract for a gaseous enrichment facility with 
Bechtel, Goodyear, and Williams. Apart from that, the AEOI had visionary plans to 
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invest in new enrichment technologies like jet nozzle, gas centrifuge and laser enrichment 
techniques in the United States.264  
The AEOI also had forged a very close relationship with the Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEK) both within the multilateral context of the Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD)265 and the close bilateral bonds between 
Mohammad Reza Shah and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The center of gravity of this relationship 
in the nuclear context was the close personal ties between Etemad and PAEK’s longtime 
chairman Munir Ahmad Khan. As Etemad later recounted, the Pakistanis and especially 
Khan were exceptionally unreserved with the AEOI about divulging their private 
thinking on the atom and its military applications.  
As a matter of fact, Etemad recalls Khan arguing with him that Iran shouldn’t be 
dismissing the military dimensions of a nuclear program out of hand. This was apparently 
part of Pakistan’s tentative plans to foster an intimate and strategic AEOI-PAEK 
relationship especially in the R&D sector where the Shah’s deep pockets and Pakistan’s 
know-how could generate a symbiotic thrust forward.266 A clear indication of this 
willingness could be traced in Prime Minister Bhutto’s courting of the AEOI to jointly 
operationalize the reprocessing facility Pakistan had signed a contract to obtain from 
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France in March 1976.267 Islamabad was basically interested in Tehran financing the 
reprocessing facility to be located on Pakistani territory.  
It is noteworthy that although such an arrangement would have jibed rather well 
with Washington’s notion of multinational reprocessing facilities, Etemad was against 
entering into it particularly if it was located on foreign territory. The other concern Iran 
raised with the Americans was that Islamabad was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons 
program Iran had no interest in.268  
According to Etemad, at the heart of Khan’s arguments for strategic partnership 
with Iran was a longing to create esprit de corps between the two countries against those 
Western nuclear weapons states that wanted to perpetuate their monopoly on nuclear 
technology and put it beyond reach for the orient. Etemad later recalled extensive talks 
with the Shah regarding the feasibility and advisability of fostering such team with 
Islamabad. HIM’s consistent judgment was that the strategic equilibrium of power 
between Iran, India, and Pakistan was so delicate and fragile that it could not 
accommodate a close nuclear cooperation between the AEOI and the PAEC. In such an 
atmosphere, the broader regional considerations forestalled the two countries’ nuclear 
solidarity from going operational despite the fact that Iran kept the communication 
channels with Islamabad open for contingency and intelligence purposes.  
As much as Iran’s neighbor to the east was eager to pool resources and join forces 
with Tehran to put up a united nuclear front, Iran’s Baathist adversary to the West was 
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bent on a keeping its nuclear program as shielded from Tehran’s piercing eyes as 
possible. This was such an unnerving cause for concern for the Shah and the AEOI that 
Etemad exhorted the French to keep Iran in the loop on Baghdad’s nuclear dealings with 
Paris. 
Further afield, the AEOI had also initiated preliminary contacts with China as 
Beijing in the mid-1970s was exploring the idea of having a nuclear energy program 
alongside its military program. Etemad recalls that during his visit to China in early 1977, 
the Chinese showed great interest in receiving legal, administrative, and logistical advice 
on how to kick-start a civilian program comparable to Iran’s. During the trip, the 
Chinese, already alienated from Moscow following the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960’s, 
were enthusiastic to test the waters for a strategic cooperation with Tehran as they 
considered Iran a viable gateway to the West.   
As part of its strategic hedging policy, in April 1977, Iran also held an 
International Conference on Transfer of Nuclear Technology in Persepolis. As mentioned 
before, the conference, organized by the AEOI (mainly planned by Mahdi Sarram, AEOI 
Deputy in Charge of Nuclear Safeguards and Training), came right on the heels of 
President Carter’s anti-nuclear energy policy that essentially amounted to a paradigmatic 
shift in Washington’s energy policy away from nuclear technology269 especially with 
regards to “reprocessing of nuclear fuel and fast breeder reactors.” As the State 
Department put it, the conference proved a “historic forum for interchange of views 
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between nuclear supplier nations and Third World countries.”270 The architect of the 
Carter Administrations new nuclear policy, however, was less enthusiastic about the 
conference. From Joseph Nye’s perspective, the conference that “condemned Carter’s 
policies” was essentially an example of the sentiments represented by a momentous 
“transnational nuclear elite” who were “bitterly opposed” to the change of heart on 
nuclear energy advocated by the Carter White House.271 
Perhaps the most proliferation-relevant aspect of the Shah’s strategic hedging in 
this period, however, was going on, under the American radar, between Tehran and Tel 
Aviv. The secret nuclear cooperation was despite Israel’s initial concerns over France's 
nuclear cooperation with Iran. For instance, in early 1976, Israeli Foreign Minister Yig'al 
Allen registered Tel Aviv's dissatisfaction over the issue seeking "certain clarifications" 
from Paris on the transfer of nuclear technology and reactors to Tehran.272  
The scene started changing toward the late 1970s however, as Tehran and Tel 
Aviv came to increasingly sympathize with one another’s strategic perceptions. 
According to documents allegedly left behind in Tehran by Israelis following the 1979 
Iranian revolution, within an oil-for-arms collaborative arrangement, codenamed Flower, 
Iran and Israel were jointly cooperating in the development of sophisticated surface-to-
surface and submarine-launched missile systems. 
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According to the records, 1650-pound missiles with a range of 300 miles were 
scheduled for assembly and test firing near Sirjan in the southern Iranian province of 
Kerman. The United States was kept so completely out of the loop on the project that, 
according to a 1986 New York Times articles, U.S. officials in the State Department, the 
Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council were caught 
unawares by the revelation of the intimate engagement between Tehran and Tel Aviv on 
a nuclear-relevant missile technology project.  
The remarks made by Harold Saunders, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs on the issue couldn’t be more revealing: ''Israel built a lot of things 
for the Iranians that we did not know about. But it surprises me that the Israelis would 
have brought the Iranians into the development of a missile that may have been part of 
their nuclear program. If that is the case, I am surprised we did not know about it.''  
The Shah’s military confidant General Toufanian was Iran’s interlocutor in 
negotiating the deal with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and Minister of Defense 
General Ezer Weizmann. Toufanian, recounting his memories after the Iranian 
revolution, made no secret of the Flower project’s special appeal to the Shah because of 
its nuclear potential. Reiterating Iran’s disinterest in a nuclear weapons capability at the 
time, Toufanian observed, ''that did not mean we would not be interested in another 
decade.''273  
The inclusion of Tehran in Tel Aviv’s nuclear doctrine was the ultimate 
manifestation of the proximity of the Iranians’ and Israelis’ strategic reading of the 
Middle East’s security environment and power relativities as two strategically lonely 
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countries. One could bring into relief the special relation between Iran and Israel in this 
era by contrasting it to Tel Aviv’s vociferous complaints over the decades against 
provision by the United States to the Middle East Arab states of any ballistic missiles 
capable of striking Israel. What really makes the Flower project oddly unique, however, 
is the fact that Israeli officials made a point of letting Iran in on the perfected 
technology’s compatibility with nuclear warheads. Israel’s willingness to secretly 
incorporate the Shah’s Iran into the military dimension of its nuclear program, while 
aware of Washington’s hypersensitivity to the issue, has been one of the most intriguing 
and contradictory aspects of Tel Aviv’s attitude toward proliferation in the Middle East.  
Conclusion  
 
In a March 1976 interview with Le Monde, the Shah put his vision regarding the 
indivisibility of military prowess and economic prosperity in the most categorical terms: 
“There is no such thing as economic strength without military strength,” HIM told 
Jacqueline Grapin, Le Monde’s financial and economic correspondent.274 This vision set 
the broad stage for the initial threat interpretations of HIM’s nuclear program.  
 These proliferation fears were only being accentuated by the Shah’s carefully 
calculated insistence in the following years that he harbored no atomic ambitions, not 
particularly out of respect for Tehran’s contractual non-proliferation commitments, but 
primarily due to hardheaded pragmatic calculations. HIM’s most lucidly articulated 
position on the issue came during an interview with the BBC’s Panorama on December 
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13, 1976. Pressed on the question of Iran’s future military ambitions, the Shah expressed 
optimism that Tehran would be the world’s most formidable non-atomic power within 
five years. His Majesty expressed the rationale for this position in the most realistic 
terms: “I am not thinking of this, because I could never be a first-class nuclear power. I 
could never be a match. Because the only nuclear power around us with which we could 
eventually have a clash is the Soviet Union, and what is the use of a few silly little 
[atomic] bombs against those 50-megaton weapons? I mean it is not an intelligent 
policy.”275  
In another interview with the French Radio in June 1977, the Shah tied Iran’s 
quest for non-nuclear supremacy to a well thought-out Iranian quest to extract extended 
deterrence from the Western bloc. “My regular army should become so strong that a 
country with bad designs against us would be obliged to use nuclear weapons to beat us. 
By using nuclear weapons it would begin a world war, which I believe everyone is trying 
to avoid."276 
The Shah expressed sentiments along the same lines to his chief civilian nuclear 
ideologue Akbar Etemad when the AEOI Director pressed him on pursuing a nuclear 
weapons option during a private meeting: Considering "the geopolitical position of Iran,” 
and its “vital need for the free flow of oil,” the Monarch stated, “the military nuclear 
option would create tensions and upset our foreign policy.” The Shah added, however, 
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that the “only factor that may bring about a dramatic change and weaken our position is 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one of the countries in the region."277 
If the Monarch’s sentiments are to be taken at face value, an all-important 
question becomes one of how can one satisfactorily explain Iran’s seemingly 
uncompromising attitude toward the Americans on the issue of full fuel cycle? This 
requires delving deeper into the political psyche of the AEOI especially its chairman 
Akbar Etemad.  
One has to bear in mind that there was a fundamental difference between 
Etemad’s narrative on the nuclear issue and that of the Shah. While His Imperial Majesty 
had been baptized into the nuclear world through a functional paradigm-- that tended to 
reduce a nuclear enterprise to its energy, security, and prestige components—in Etemad’s 
view, there was an all-important normative dimension associated with an indigenous 
nuclear program that required a holistic understanding of such an enterprise; one that was 
not reducible to its spin-off benefits such as security and the like.  
Whatever dividends derivatively accrued from such a holistic enterprise, in 
Etemad’s view, would find their organic context within the country’s international 
placement rather than being subsumed or shaped by it. Based on his later comments on 
the Islamic Republic era, Etemad thought that such a subsumption had befallen the Iran’s 
post-revolution nuclear program—one consumed by its security implications—since it 
lacked such strategic forethought and organic contextualization.  
From Etemad’s perspective, this aspect made national nuclear programs unique 
cross-generational undertakings whose successful implementation required a broad-based 
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national consensus, a durable unity of purpose, and a hospitable international 
environment. Such an alignment of the stars, in Etemad’s view, was extremely rare 
especially among Third World countries. Iran under the Shah, in Etemad’s judgment, 
stood at such a historically propitious juncture in the mid-1970s: a moment that might 
never repeat itself in the future.278 As explained in a piece he wrote in the mid 1980s, 
embarking on the nuclear enterprise was a multilayered undertaking of "psychological, 
social, economic, political, and cultural implications" that required a “genuine national 
mobilization effort.”279 As the Islamic Republic’s nuclear struggle vividly demonstrated 
decades later, AEOI chief’s judgments were presciently on the mark.  
Another way of explaining Iran’s diehard and, at times, go-it-alone nuclear 
attitude under the Shah would necessitate reading it through the prism of the Monarch’s 
close confidants. Based on such a reading, despite the comments by the Monarch to the 
contrary, the scope, scale, pace, and energetic thrust of Iran’s nuclear program from 1974 
to 1978 was such that even the innermost circle of Iran’s political, scientific, and strategic 
elite couldn’t help but read nuclear weapons ambitions to it.  
For example, during an interview in 1987, Fereydun Fesharaki, a well-known 
economist and energy advisor to the Shah’s government revealed a letter he wrote to the 
Shah counseling, “if he wished to pursue the bomb route, expensive nuclear power plants 
were not the right way.”280  
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The Shah’s Minister of Court and arguably his most intimate confidant Asadollah 
Alam also believed that HIM was actively considering the ultimate nuclear option. His 
posthumously published diary reads “HIM has a great vision for the future of this 
country, which, though he denies it, probably includes the manufacturing of a nuclear 
deterrent.”281  
In an interview in 1985, Hassan Toufanian, the four-star general in charge of the 
Shah’s military procurement cryptically hinted in the same direction claiming Iran had 
hatched plans to secure “deterrent weapons” from Israel that he could not disclose, but 
for which he ordered the shipment of $260 million worth of petroleum to Israel.282 
The shah’s Foreign Minister, Ardashir Zahidi, voiced similar sentiments: “The 
Iranian strategy at that time was aimed at creating what is known as surge capacity, that 
is to say to have the know-how, the infrastructure, and the personnel needed to develop a 
nuclear military capacity within a short-time without actually doing so. But the 
assumption within the policymaking elite was that Iran should be in a position to develop 
and test a nuclear device within 18 months.”283 
These sentiments, especially those expressed by Zahedi, jibe well with the Shah’s 
repeated strategy that he would drift with the nuclear tide in the Middle East broadly 
conceived. Given the Shah’s obsession with having an unmistakable and formidable 
deterrent posture— in no small part since the Monarch believed that the Middle East 
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Arab states, especially Iraq, were prone to misperception and miscalculated risk-taking—
one would be extremely hard put not to lace HIM’s nuclear program with at least some 
medium-term potential for weaponization. From that perspective, one could safely argue 
that Iran’s nuclear program following the Indian PNE had a tacit security subtext to it.  
Surveying the documents from this era, despite an unfortunate lack of access to 
the CIA side of the INP story, leads one to the conclusion that the Americans were 
perceptibly concerned about the sustainability of a purely civilian nuclear program by the 
Shah considering his progressively assertive and autonomous foreign policy posture, his 
desire to exercise authoritative leadership domestically, his high-expectation national 
security psyche, his fascination with procuring the state-of-the-art military hardware, and 
the inextricable link he systematically drew between military and economic 
modernization.  
On a balanced reading of evidence available and at the risk of taking a step into 
speculation, a verisimilar judgment on the Shah’s nuclear vision in the mid to late 1970s 
would look something along these lines: faced with the major dilemma of not having the 
technical know-how to compete with the Indians and Israelis on its periphery while at 
pains to avoid the appearance of being on a crash course toward nuclearization (that 
would antagonize the Americans), HIM opted for a two-track policy: aim for maintaining 
the Middle East a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) at the doctrinal level while, as an 
auxiliary insurance policy, build a massive civilian nuclear infrastructure that could 
derivatively churn out a weaponizable capability in short order.  
In other words, the Shah kept the political decision open to revision by pursuing a 
massive civilian nuclear program (commonly referred to as the Japan option). This 
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option, also termed the “breakout capability,” entailed possessing all the “knowledge, 
infrastructure, and materiel, which usually lie beneath the threshold of suspicion, but 
which can be rapidly adapted or reorganized to allow for weaponization processes to be 
undertaken.”284  
Related to this, one wonders whether it was conceivable, in the Shah’s mind, for 
Iran to shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding peace and stability in the Middle East 
without having a nuclear capability especially since Israel and India already possessed 
that capability. In other words, wouldn’t a non-nuclear gendarme in a nuclear 
environment constitute a contradiction in terms?  
Pausing a bit further on the same subject, one also has to bear in mind that despite 
a progressively rising political temperature over the INP in Washington, only generic-
level concerns comparable to those expressed toward other proliferation-prone US allies 
were expressed toward Iran. A close scrutiny of the declassified documents indicates that 
while a comprehensive securitization of Iran as a clear and present proliferation threat 
was absent from the United States’ strategic thinking, the Iranian nuclear program was 
well on its way in the politicization segment of the securitization spectrum toward the end 
of the Shah’s regime.    
In this period, the de-securitizing pressure to the INP was attributable to a 
systemic-level macro-securitization arch where the US-USSR rivalry subsumed and 
defined all other security concerns. In other words, the main US-USSR security paradigm 
exercised such a tight grip on the security culture of the United States in this period that 
other concerns found prominence only though contextualization in the US-USSR arch 
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rivalry and rarely emerged to the surface independently. The INP’s under-securitized 
status in this period was despite the fact that a 1974 Memorandum for Secretary of 
Defense on the long-term implications of Iran’s nuclear program drew a staggeringly 
sobering picture predicting "the annual plutonium production from the planned 20,000 
MW Iranian nuclear power program [would] be equivalent to 600-700 warheads.”285  
In this period, it is also noteworthy that despite the U.S. intelligence community’s 
pinning hopes on Iran’s NPT membership to produce a long-term non-proliferation 
behavior, this assessment is poorly substantiated by the Shah’s private and public 
articulations of what would incentivize or dissuade Iran from seeking a nuclear 
capability.   
As far as the Shah was concerned, that decision would have more proximately 
been shaped by how Iran interpreted its security environment with the NPT exercising 
only permissive influence on it. This position of the Shah is in stark contrast to the 
Islamic Republic’s justification for why Tehran would not go nuclear where its inviolable 
treaty commitments under the NPT assume, at least rhetorically, prominence and the 
security dividends of nukes are either de-emphasized or downright derided. If this 
observation holds true, an all-important counterfactual question is whether the Shah’s 
Iran would have withdrawn from the NPT faced with the formidable odds the Islamic 
Republic’s nuclear enterprise has been up against?
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
1979-1988: NUCLEAR DORMANCY 
 
With the forward momentum of the AEOI already severely compromised during 
the transition from Etemad to Ahmad Sotoodehnia, the Iranian nuclear program lapsed 
into a virtual coma when the Islamic Revolution swept across the country in 1979. 
Following the toppling of the Shah’s regime, the head of the AEOI, Sotoodehnia, was 
imprisoned for almost four years.  
As touched upon before, Ayatollah Khomein’s demonizing of the nuclear 
program as a white elephant project essentially slammed the brakes on an enterprise 
whose institutionalization on a national scale was far from complete under the Shah. 
Khomeini’s rather categorical renunciation of all matters nuclear arguably deprived the 
Islamic Republic of much flexibility in reviving the Shah’s nuclear energy program. The 
massive exodus of nuclear scientists following the revolution could also be, at least 
partially, attributed to the ideological and moral tone of Khomeini’s unqualified anti-
nuclear policy that found a rather curious hasty implementation by the Transition 
Government of Mehdi Bazargan. 
The contrast between Ayatollah Khomeni’s sentiments on the issue with its 
straitjacketing impact on Iran’s official nuclear discourse and the finesse-saturated 
statements of Prime Minister Nehru in 1957 is quite revealing. “No man can prophesy the 
future,” the Prime Minister said before adding, “but I should like to say on behalf of any 
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future Government of India that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we 
shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes.”286 
In any case, whether one ascribes Khomeini’s position to revolutionary fervor, 
ideological overconfidence, or strategic misguidedness, the founder of the Islamic 
Republic took away much vital ambiguity from Iran’s domestic and international nuclear 
discourse forcing Tehran to either publicly qualify the founding father’s sentiments on 
the issue or embark on a clandestine path in the years ahead. In reality, Tehran opted for a 
little bit of both, a policy that, retrospectively viewed, proved an ill-conceived 
combination as it exposed glaring contradictions between Tehran’s discourse and 
behavior and gave rise to a massive and growing trust deficit between Iran and the 
international system.  
In those heady days following the revolution, under the Interim Government of 
Iran established under the premiership of Mehdi Bazargan in 1979, a petroleum geologist 
by the name of Fereydoun Sahabi was placed at the helm of an anemic AEOI. Almost 
immediately after assuming office, Sahabi launched a scathing criticism of Iran’s nuclear 
enterprise under the Shah. Taking to task the activities of the AEOI under the previous 
regime as "directed improperly in order to create a consumer market for the industrial 
products of other countries in Iran,” he emphasized that in the future, "no foreign 
manpower will be utilized in the AEOI.”287 Sahabi went on even further questioning the 
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very raison d’être of the AEOI as an organization  “imposed upon the Iranian people” “in 
the wake of the former regime's modernization policy.”288 These sentiments naturally 
translated to a wholesale nuclear de-mobilization in the months ahead. 
In such an atmosphere, on July 31, 1979 head of KWU office in Tehran, Norbert 
Schmitt announced the company's unilateral withdrawal from the two nuclear power 
plants in Bushehr. The KWU letter addressed to the AEOI mentioned that the German 
company "no longer felt bound by the contract" it had concluded with Tehran.289 
Following the KWU announcement and caught up in the revolutionary fervor of 
the time, Abbas Taj, Iranian Minister of Energy cast aspersions on the contract the AEOI 
had concluded with KWU: "Because this contract was not in Iran's interests; because 
implementation of the contract would have made [Iran] dependent on outside sources 
from the standpoint of technology, raw materials, and foreign engineers; and since the 
contract embodied colonialist features and had not been formulated in Iran's interests, it 
was therefore rejected by the Iranian Government.”290 Tehran estimated the damage 
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inflicted by the KWU withdrawal at DM 5 billion claiming financial compensation by the 
German company.291  
Soon after the termination of the KWU deal, in February 1980, Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh, Iranian Foreign Minister and one of the most vocal anti-nuclear hawks in 
the transition government, announced Tehran's desire to withdraw from the Eurodif 
consortium in line with Iran's strategy to scrap all its nuclear energy involvements. 
Following those remarks, French Minister of Industry Andre Giraud announced that Paris 
would not reward Iran’s unilateral pullout and would not "refund" Tehran's share of the 
enterprise.292 
Although the Islamic Republic’s rather impulsive decision to make a u-turn on the 
Shah’s nuclear energy policy de-nuclearize its energy sector enjoyed initially strong 
ideological and some pragmatic support on the domestic scene, the experts closely 
analyzing Iran’s future energy trends predicted a return to the Shah’s paradigm sooner or 
later. Manour Kashfi, for instance, argued as early as 1980 that the structural economic 
imperatives on the ground would propel Iran, over the next two decades, towards 
resuscitating the previous regime’s nuclear energy program.293  
These sentiments proved prophetic as barely two years into the repudiation of all 
matters nuclear the initial signs of a change of heart on the issue appeared in Tehran. In 
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May 1981, for example, at the initiative of the AEOI, a seminar in Isfahan was held to 
investigate the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran. The range of issues covered 
in the papers presented—including economic necessity, technological feasibility, safety 
issues, full fuel cycle, training and manpower—demonstrated the AEOI’s newfound 
interest to put the Shah’s program back on track.294  
Shortly following that, in March 1982, the head of the ENTEC in the city of 
Isfahan made headlines going public with the Islamic Republic’s plans to make a foray 
into the field of nuclear technology.295 Iran’s interest in nuclear technology was decidedly 
on an upward moving trajectory now. In May 1982, the AEOI’s Nuclear Research Center 
sponsored a conference entitled “Radioisotopes Seminar and Its Application in Science, 
Medicine, Agriculture and Industry” where non-energy benefits deriving from the atom 
were also brought to the fore.296 It is important to bear in mind here that lacking a ringing 
endorsement by Ayatollah Khomeini as a national priority, the Islamic Republic’s initial 
attempts at following in the Shah’s nuclear footsteps were few and far from being linear 
and systematic until the mid 1980s.  
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According to a nuclear energy expert quoted in a 1988 intelligence report, the 
decision to discontinue the Shah’s ambitious nuclear program was taken in light of the 
fact that it would be "ridiculous to continue a program that depended totally on foreign 
expertise." The report, however, went on to warn that the infrastructural and scientific 
foundation developed by the Shah would facilitate the Islamic Republic to move towards 
developing a nuclear weapons capability.297 
This ideological diagnosis for termination of the program is radically different 
from the more pragmatic one argued by Fereydoon Sahabi who later claimed the program 
was simply not sustainable for a post-Revolution Iran in dire financial straits. Sahabi, 
who broke his almost three-decade silence on the Interim Government’s nuclear policy in 
2007, dismissed the conventional wisdom that Bazargan and his technocrat protégés had 
fundamental anti-nuclear energy predispositions. While explicitly endorsing the common 
perception that neither Bazargan’s nor Rajai’s cabinets had any clear understanding as to 
the wisdom of initiating a nuclear program in the first place, Sahabi’s remarks reflect a 
highly skeptical attitude by both Prime Ministers toward the real value of maintaining a 
highly capital-intensive nuclear energy program for an oil-rich country.  
The first chairman of the post-revolution AEOI claimed, however, that he left no 
stone unturned, under the most unenviable financial and political circumstances, to 
salvage what precious little he could of the Shah’s program. Up against insurmountable 
financial odds domestically and political challenges internationally, Sahabi put together a 
20-page report on the AEOI’s state of affairs to discuss with Bazargan. Upon a critical 
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assessment of the situation, the Prime Minister’s directive for Sahabi was to trim the 
AEOI down to a manageable and sustainable scale.  
Following the instructions by the Prime Minister, the AEOI, after much 
discussion with the nuclear and energy expert community decided on forging ahead with 
Bushehr power plants and scrapping all other projects. Chief among the withdrawn 
commitments, on seemingly budgetary grounds, were two 900 MWe power plants under 
construction on the Karun River by Framatome.298 However, as mentioned earlier, at this 
point in July 1979, a frustrated KWU had already suspended work on the Iran-I and Iran-
II projects in Halileh citing payment arrears and lack of a credible negotiating partner in 
Tehran.   
Such sweeping divestment by the Bazargan Interim Government in the energy 
sector has long been a contentious issue in the Islamic Republic’s domestic political 
debate. Sahabi’s disarmingly simple response to criticisms was that, in the final analysis, 
Etemad’s AEOI had simply bitten off more than it could chew and the bottomless pit the 
AEOI created under the Shah was not sustainable with dwindling oil revenues. There 
were reports after the revolution, for example, that the real cost of building the projected 
20 power plants would have well exceeded, by possibly three times, the official forecast 
of $30 billion.299 
In this period, it is curious to note that even though the U.S. officials 
acknowledged Ayatollah Khomeini’s termination of the Shah’s nuclear program as a 
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“satanic” enterprise, the remote likelihood that the Islamic Iran might have gained the 
equipment and know-how for uranium enrichment with laser beams made the headlines 
on August 22, 1979.300 This hyped reaction was the earliest indication of how the change 
in the nature of political regime in Tehran had altered the United States’ reading of Iran’s 
dabbling with the atom and Washington’s threat perceptions about it.  
Washington’s inflationary threat perception of the INP only continued to intensify 
in the following years in the face of physical evidence that Tehran had almost completely 
abandoned all nuclear enterprises. For instance, the US State Department suggested as 
early as October 1980, following the bombing of Iraq’s nuclear complex by Tehran, that 
Iran, along with Iraq, Pakistan, and Libya, was “bent on” developing a nuclear weapons 
capability.301 This was followed by a 1982 U.S. intelligence survey that included Iran 
among 31 countries who would be “able to produce nuclear weapons by the year 
2000.”302  
With threat judgments on the INP constantly escalating in the absence of a factual 
grounding, the difference in the modality of securitization pre- and post-1979 revolution 
was crystallizing in the 1980s. The gist of the difference was that if under the Shah’s rule, 
Tehran’s nuclear enterprise was designated as a proliferation challenge at the level of 
physical capabilities, under Khomeini’s regime the threat-designation bar was set at the 
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mere level of scientific know-how. Within the new paradigm in the making, the 
combination of the atom and Islam was viewed and internalized as an explosive cocktail 
worth moving heaven and earth to deter and defer at almost any cost. For the United 
States, Khomeini’s Iran was the manifestation par excellence of such a baleful 
eventuality if it got around to gaining nuclear capacity. Almost two decades later in 
October 2007, President Gerorge Bush most explicitly articulated this hyper-securitized 
paradigm, “If you’re interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be 
interested in preventing them [Iranians] from having the knowledge necessary to make a 
nuclear weapon.”303 
A side-effect of the premature securitization of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear 
behavior was the gradual formation and institutionalization of a conceptual framework 
within the new regime’s elite that the United States would have either embraced a nuclear 
Shah or at least looked the other way if he was hell-bent on going nuclear. This paradigm 
either explicitly or tacitly is predicated upon a set of perceptions well ingrained in Iran’s 
establishment elite ever since. The first taken-for-granted perception is that Washington 
was willing to extend to the Shah the “Israel treatment.” In the Iranian establishment 
elite’s judgment, this would translate into an either sympathetic or apathetic posture 
toward a proliferating Shah. As evident from the previous chapter, the declassified 
evidence on the United States’ nuclear approach toward the Shah hardly substantiates 
such a narrative.  
Second, they point at Western Europe’s expansive cooperation with the AEOI and 
the U.S. nuclear industry’s chomping at the bit to secure lucrative nuclear deals with Iran. 
From the pot-revolutionary Tehran’s vantage point, the fact that Washington blessed 
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these deals, full well aware of their undeniable proliferation implications, indicates a 
certain level of receptivity toward a nuclear Iran under the Shah. 
Last, and perhaps most important, the Iranians believe that it was inconceivable 
for a megalomaniac Shah to stand idly by while Islamabad, whom HIM considered Iran’s 
junior partner, acquired nuclear weapons. Iran’s senior nuclear negotiator under President 
Khatami was so convinced of this counterfactual that in 2010 he claimed, “the Shah’s 
ultimate goal was gaining nuclear weapons capability and if he was still in power, Iran’s 
nuclear arsenal would be comparable to that of India and Pakistan.”304 As evident in 
Mouavian’s remarks, in the Islamic Republic’s judgment, premised upon a purportedly 
unimpeachable truth that the Shah had proliferation intentions, Ayatollah Khmeini’s 
unequivocal renunciation of the atomic program was a counter-nuclear move of the 
highest order that effectively pulled Iran back from the proliferation precipice in 1979. 
This counter-proliferation move, however, failed to generate any de-securitizing 
dividends for Tehran in Washington.    
  With the current of Tehran-U.S. relations rapidly and irreversibly drifting to the 
security zone, the context of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities was further 
securitized in November 1979 with the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, 
apparently with Ayatollah Khomeini’s implicit blessing, and the ensuing 444-day hostage 
crisis. This event had massive implications for Iran’s subsequent nuclear activities, not 
least since it drastically undercut the credibility and inviolability of Iran’s commitments 
to its international contractual obligations like the NPT.  
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In the eyes of the international community, the embassy takeover was a vivid 
manifestation that the Islamic Republic was willing to match its unorthodox rhetoric with 
deeds. From that perspective, the embassy takeover demonstrated the kind of 
international irresponsibility the new Iranian regime was capable of and "provided some 
serious grounds for concern about long-term proliferation problems in this country."305 
With this broad context taking root in the international system and reinforced by Iran’s 
removal from the Western bloc (that exerted considerable dampening pressure on the 
public designation of Tehran as a proliferator under the Shah), the slightest sign that the 
Islamic Republic might pick up the nuclear baton where the Shah had left off was almost 
inevitably to be treated as a credible international proliferation threat.  
One would be well advised, however, not to read Iran’s commitment to its 
international contractual obligations exclusively through the prism of the embassy 
takeover. More panoramically viewed, for example, one could argue that the domestic 
psychological and normative inhibitions against breaching the non-proliferation regime 
were probably at their lowest in the years following the Iranian Revolution, particularly 
after the embassy takeover and during the Iran-Iraq war. There is no evidence, however, 
to suggest that the withdrawal from the NPT was considered as a viable option in the 
Iranian national security apparatus in this era.  
Another enduring legacy of the embassy takeover with some massive spin-off 
impact on the future unfolding of the INP was the introduction and, over time, 
normalization of an ever broadening, deepening, and tightening sanctions regime against 
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the Islamic Republic by successive US administrations.306 This was a policy decision 
that, in the judgment of many Iran observers, drastically transformed the direction and 
tenor of the Iranian Revolution and the behavior of the Islamic Republic. 
In any case, as the hostage crisis between Tehran and the United States was 
raging on, Saddam’s Ba’ath regime unleashed a massive military strike against Iran in 
September 1980. Merely a few days after the breakout of the war, the first nuclear related 
incident in the life of the Islamic Republic transpired. On September 21, 1980, two 
Iranian F-4 Phantoms struck Iraq's 40-megawatt thermal (MWth) reactor on the outskirts 
of Baghdad. Although Tehran scored a significant intelligence and a consequential 
symbolic hit by inflicting some damage on the laboratories and other supporting 
facilities, the reactor building escaped the attack mostly unscathed.307 The modestly 
successful attack, the first military strike against a nuclear reactor ever, was completed in 
a secretly coordinated Iranian-Israeli surgical operation conducted in June 1981 by a 
squadron of IAF F-16As.308 
On October 23, 1983 another turning point with strategic implications for the INP 
took place in Lebanon. On this day, Hezbollah, a newly created Shia militant group 
inspired by the revolutionary Iran, attacked the barracks of the peacekeeping 
Multinational Force in Lebanon killing 299 U.S. marines and French servicemen. These 
attacks marked the initiation of the triangulation of Iran’s nuclear efforts by terrorism 
through Tehran’s overseas proxies.   
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Out of this triangulation emerged the applicability to the INP of the concept of 
“nuclear terrorism” as an asymmetric strategy that would purportedly grant countries like 
Iran a comfort zone to pull off unconventional attacks on the west (using their non-state 
clients) with plausible deniability. Arguably, the most consequential and enduring impact 
of Tehran’s intimate association with these non-state actors was its deleterious impact on 
Iran’s deterrability as a responsible rational state in a nuclear context.  
In other words, the argument went, since these non-state actors had no territorial 
return address (a most fundamental imperative for deterrence to emerge and take hold) 
Tehran could transfer its nuclear capability to these extreme risk takers and challenge the 
very foundations of the doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence. “Nuclear blackmail” was 
the terminology of choice to capture the essence of the new reality. Over the years, the 
Islamic Republic’s failure to either rhetorically or operationally distance itself from these 
violent non-state actors (VNSAs) as its nuclear capabilities were advancing did little to 
inspire confidence in Tehran’s nuclear trustworthiness and its future deterrence 
credentials.   
In parallel with Tehran’s involvement through Hezbollah in Lebanon increasing 
came a major turn in the tide of Iran-Iraq War in favor of Tehran in 1982 and 1983. The 
Reagan Administration, concerned over the prospect of a strategic decisive victory by 
Tehran and its unexpected progress in the war effort, unleashed a new round of sanctions 
regime known as Operation Staunch. Within this new policy framework Secretary of 
State George Schultz urged U.S. embassies to put pressure on the host countries to curtail 
the transfer of arms and dual-use equipment to Iran. This shift in policy came on the heels 
of a decision by Washington in the previous year to lift dual-use sanctions on Iraq and 
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provide Saddam with ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) support.  
Operation Staunch, imposed at the height of Iran-Iraq war, exercised an enduring 
grip on how Tehran later came to perceive U.S. sanctions regime against itself. From this 
perspective, an ever-expanding sanctions regime was internalized as an inalienable part 
of Iran-U.S. relations in the post revolution era (that was only incidentally connected to 
Iran’s nuclear program) whose ultimate objective was to bring about regime change in 
Tehran.   
Securitization of the INP Gains Momentum 
 
On April 24, 1984 the authoritative Jane’s Defense Weekly quoted some 
unidentified West Germany intelligence sources as saying that Iran had entered the “final 
stages” of gaining a nuclear capability that had put it a mere two years away from the 
bomb.309 Although the British publication’s claim was immediately countered by the U.S. 
State Department as “unlikely,”310 it set in motion a never-ending trend of putative 
projections by different intelligence agencies-- ranging from a few months to a decade-- 
on what kind of timeframe stood between Iran and the bomb. ''We believe it would take 
at least two to three years to complete construction of the reactors at Bushehr,” the State 
Department stressed, adding that Bushehr’s light water reactors were not “particularly 
well-suited for a weapons program.” The State Department concluded by emphasizing, 
“There was no evidence of Iranian construction of other facilities that would be necessary 
to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel.”311 The Jane’s article was apparently based 
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on reports that West Germany’s KWU had started “preliminary assessment” of the 
feasibility of completing the two Bushehr reactors, a prospect pronounced highly unlikely 
by the FRG officials with the Iran-Iraq war still in full swing.  
The Jane’s article, however, brought some clarity and a foretaste of what was to 
come to Washington’s approach toward Iran’s nuclear status as an NPT member state. 
The U.S. State Department cited the Iranian Government’s “previous actions” as a 
ground that Tehran’s pledge to abide by its “international commitments” was less than 
complete. The DoS specified Iran’s state of war with Iraq as intensifying those concerns. 
Out of these set of anxieties emanated a policy articulated as the following:  “the United 
States will not consent to the transfer of U.S.-origin nuclear equipment, material or 
technology to Iran, either directly or through third countries, where such consent is 
legally required.'' Within this framework, the United States also discouraged ''other 
nuclear suppliers” from engaging in nuclear cooperation with Iran.312 
Faced with such inhospitable circumstances, Iran’s initial attempts to rekindle the 
Shah’s nuclear attempt were focused on Bushehr. Having realized that keeping the BNPP 
mothballed meant the waste of billions of dollars of capital already sunken, Tehran turned 
to a host of countries to complete the Busher-I reactor. Chief among these states, initially, 
were Argentina and China. Argentina had had a long history of working with the Shah’s 
program and had also helped Iran “convert Tehran's Research Reactor from highly 
enriched uranium (93 percent) to low-enriched uranium fuel and later supplied 20-
percent-enriched fuel under international safeguards.” China, according to a nuclear 
cooperation agreement concluded in 1987 would help Iran with "scientific exchanges and 
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the eventual purchase of miniature neutron source reactors and a heavy-water research 
reactor."313 Iran’s first multiple covert and overt attempts to resuscitate the BNPP with 
various countries were turned down, however, in no small part, under the U.S. pressure. 
Realizing the inhospitable international ground and feeling left to its own devices, 
Iran set out to take a leaf out of Pakistan’s book by finagling its way into the nuclear club 
through securing individual hardware and software components (or components of 
components, for that matter) in whatever way possible. This was a policy that triggered a 
long Whack-A-Mole between Tehran and Washington that has continued ever since the 
mid-1980s.  
According to US intelligence sources, Iran terminated the revolution-induced 
hiatus in its nuclear program in 1982 by attempting to “ resurrect at least part of the 
Shah's ambitious nuclear power plans" especially the BNPP and “a pilot-scale fuel 
fabrication plant and heavy water facility.”314 According to this analysis, the Islamic 
Republic reinstituted the program by picking up where the Shah had left off and trying to 
build upon the existing infrastructural and scientific foundations. The program was 
reinstituted apparently with Ayatollah Khomeini’s blessing under the supervision of Mir 
Hossein Mousavi. This report makes it explicit that Mousavi was not pushing for the 
development of a nuclear weapons program. During this era, the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran (AEOI) continued to oversee all elements of Iran’s nuclear program 
and reported directly to Prime Minister Mousavi.  
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The Islamic Republic faced an uphill battle in pursuit of the Shah’s nuclear 
program, however. Two factors were of paramount significance here: one was the 
revolutionary elite’s continued disdainful and dismissive attitude towards the Shah’s 
program. Under these circumstances, breathing life into the discarded program was a 
most formidable task. An enfeebled economy further compounded by Tehran’s 
revolutionary excesses and its confrontational foreign policy provided for the most 
disagreeable atmosphere for a normal nuclear awakening in the post-revolutionary Iran. 
Second, was the fact that Iran’s post-revolution nuclear consciousness was born and 
cultivated in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War with the international cards decidedly 
stacked against it. This second war factor had undeniable implications for the subsequent 
ease with which Iran’s nuclear effort, even the most innocuous aspect of it (the Bushehr 
Nuclear Power Plant), was securitized. In other words, the war atmosphere granted 
credence and credibility on the claims that Iran, at a minimum, was seeking a nuclear 
deterrent capability and no aspect of Iran’s nuclear program could be de-contextualized 
and disengaged from this broader fact. This prevailing theme essentially turned every 
aspect of Iran’s nuclear program into a proliferating behavior in the eye of the Western 
countries. 
It was in this atmosphere that in June 1985, Iranian Majlis Speaker Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Beijing visit --the first to a non-Muslim country by a high-ranking 
Iranian official since 1979-- triggered speculation about Iran’s secret nuclear dealings 
with China. It is important to note here that by the mid-1980s China had replaced France 
as Washington’s country of concern in transfer of sensitive proliferation-relevant 
technology to Third World countries. These allegations were floated within the context of 
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China’s apparently rogue proliferation behavior. The United States was concerned that a 
secret deal had been struck with Iran despite Beijing’s conclusion of a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with the Reagan Administration. The Americans viewed their 
April 1984 deal with China as a persuasive mechanism to bring China’s sensitive nuclear 
technology transfer in line with international non-proliferation norms and regimes and 
Beijing’s eventual accession to the NPT. This took place in 1992. 
  These concerns re-intensified in October 1985 when the U.S. intelligence 
community alleged that China was providing nuclear technology to Tehran. The 
intelligence reports substantiated allegations already going around in Washington that 
China was sharing sensitive proliferation-prone knowhow with, in Californian Senator 
Alan Cranston's words, "five nuclear outlaw" states- Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Pakistan, 
and South Africa.315  
As proved to be the case in numerous other proliferation disputes between Beijing 
and Washington, the two capitals seemed to be on different pages on the all-important 
question of what constituted nuclear proliferation and what a solid non-proliferation 
posture required. Put crudely, China believed that conforming to the United States’ 
highly broad definition of proliferation could hurt its commercial interests at a crucial 
juncture when Beijing was making a calculated and deliberate foray into the market-
based international economy.  
In the meantime, the U.S. intelligence community’s proliferation concerns were 
not even widely shared by the Reagan Administration whose senior officials were at 
pains to portray China as part of the solution, not part of the problem, in Washington’s 
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international counter-proliferation efforts. A senior US official, for instance, openly 
countered Senator Cranston’s sentiments claiming China had effectively reversed its 
attitude toward proliferation. “China used to think proliferation was good because it 
undermined the hegemony of the two superpowers,” the official observed, concluding; 
“now it thinks proliferation is bad."316 A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement promptly 
rejected Cranston’s allegations categorically denying any nuclear relationship between 
China and Iran.317 
In this connection, it is important to note that the U.S. intelligence community, by 
its own admission, did not have a good grasp on China’s proliferation behavior before it 
formally acceded to the NPT in March 1992. The U.S. viewed this as a sign that the 
Chinese were not entirely a bona fide partner in enforcing their arms control vision yet 
careful enough not to alienate the Americans.318 Much to the chagrin of the United States, 
this “juggling strategy” by China remained a perpetual feature of the Chinese approach 
toward cooperation with Iran on the nuclear issue over the years to come.  
At the end of this era, Khoemini’s death opened up the possibility for a wholesale 
change of heart and a reboot in the INP. Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union, which had 
been strained and surly, if not outright antagonistic, also started to thaw. A fair chunk of 
                                                        
316 Toth, Robert C. 1985. China: Cranston Cites Nuclear Exports China Exports Nuclear Items, Cranston 
Says. Los Angeles Times, Oct 21, 1985. http://search.proquest.com/docview/292206763?accountid=10901 
(accessed August 1, 2010).  
 
317 China denies atom aid to Iran And south Africa. New York Times, Oct 25, 1985. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/111124204?accountid=10901 (accessed August 1, 2010). 
 
318 Secret. CIA China Desk. Memorandum for the Record. Beijing's Middle East Proliferation Activities. 
January 31, 1992. http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001247931/DOC_0001247931.pdf (Accessed April 
17, 2011). 
 
 
 176
credit for the rapprochement should go to Rafsanjani whose presidency marked the era 
when Iran embarked on de-ideaologizing its relations with the Soviet Union. It is 
important to note that Rafsanjani’s success on this score was facilitated significantly 
“with the fallout from the Rushdie affair holding up the normalization of Tehran's ties 
with the West, [and when] the USSR found itself, at least temporarily, with a relatively 
clear field ahead for increasing its influence in Iran.”319 The BNNP reactor came to 
symbolize this relationship with Iran and Russia formally starting nuclear cooperation in 
1992. 
 It is also important to note that the United States, even before Khomeini's death, 
viewed the Ayatollah’s January 1989 letter to Gorbachev320 as indicative of "his approval 
of the warming trend already underway" signaling "Moscow that Tehran no longer 
regarded ideological differences as a major barrier to expanding political and economic 
relations."321 One noticeable element in the U.S. intelligence community’s reading of the 
evolving relationship between Iran and the USSR in 1989 was a conspicuous lack of 
mention of the nuclear field for potential future cooperation between Tehran and 
Moscow.322  
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Conclusion 
 
While the Iranians have consistently ruled out the notion that their nuclear re-birth 
following the 1979 Revolution had nothing to do whatsoever with the Iran-Iraq war, there 
appeared evidence in the years following the end of the war that this was hardly the case. 
Within this context, it is customary for the mainstream accounts of Tehran’s decision to 
accept the 1988 UNSC ceasefire resolution 598 to point mainly to the widespread war 
weariness, lack of breakthrough on the frontlines, recruitment challenges, fear of U.S. 
intervention, and Saddam’s use of chemical weapons.  
In 2006, however, former President Rafsanjani released a confidential 
memorandum by Ayatollah Khomeini addressed to the Iranian officials that set the stage 
for an alternative narrative. In the July 1988 memorandum, the Iranian Supreme Leader 
conveys the contents of correspondence between him and IRGC commander-in-chief 
Mohsen Rezaei a few weeks earlier where Rezaei insinuated an effective offensive could 
only be launched against Baghdad if Tehran possessed sophisticated weaponry including 
nuclear weapons.323 This was the first time and the earliest documented instance where an 
exhortation to militarily utilize a nuclear capability came from the nation’s top military 
brass.  
As much as Western media lavished attention on the released memorandum as 
indicating Iran’s nuclear weapons predilection, however, the apathetic response it drew 
from Khomeini at the time demonstrates the marginal role the IRGC played in Tehran’s 
nuclear policy under Khomeini. The letter by Khomeini also demonstrates that Saddam 
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Hussein’s use of chemical warfare during the Iran-Iraq war seems to have contributed to 
Iran’s decision to speed up the campaign to salvage the remnants of the Shah’s nuclear 
program. Furthermore, as Tehran was warily eying the resuscitation of Saddam’s nuclear 
program following the destruction of the Osirak reactor, a determination was taking deep 
roots in Tehran not to concede an erratic Ba’ath regime any nuclear edge.  
This document, additionally, demonstrates that the mid-1980s were perhaps the 
most crucial and formative years in the overall trajectory of the Islamic Republic’s 
nuclear socialization. Additionally, the war-born technological and equipment 
procurement activities associated with the INP in this period had an enduring impact on 
the international community’s attitude toward the trustworthiness of Iran’s international 
contractual commitments.  
This enduring impact was in no small part due to the fact that Iran never tried in 
the subsequent years to justify and recant the mid-1980s as an aberration era when it had 
to take a set of temporary emergency measures as a sovereign state in the face of 
overwhelming existential security challenges. As former IAEA Director General 
Mohamed Elbaradaei points out in his memoires, Tehran’s adamant reluctance to admit 
to some level of under-the-radar activity in its nuclear behavior during the 1980s 
significantly detracted from the credibility of its subsequent non-proliferation credentials 
and undercut the international community’s willingness to give Tehran the benefit of the 
doubt, look sympathetically on the era, and provide Iran with a tabula rasa.324  
Towards the late 1980s and as the Iran-Iraq war seemed to be stalemating, 
farfetched and fantasy-laced analyses and news articles were especially on the rise with 
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regards to Iran’s nuclear program. In what seemed to be no more than hunch- driven 
sensational journalism, for example, The Washington Post ran a piece authored by David 
Segal in April 1987 titled, “Atomic Ayatollahs: Just What the Mideast Needs-An Iranian 
Bomb.” The article, after drawing much attention inside the beltway for three weeks, 
turned out to be almost completely based on “misquoted, misrepresented, and fabricated” 
information the author claimed to have obtained from an interview with Fereydoun 
Fesharaki, a prominent economist who left Iran after the 1979 revolution.  
In what Segal called “a chilling glimpse of Iran’s desire to acquire nuclear 
weapons,” he related a meeting between Khomeini’s confidant Ayatollah Mohammed 
Beheshti and Fesharaki in May 1979 during which the Ayatollah pleaded Fesharaki to 
build the atomic bomb for the Islamic Republic since “our civilization is in danger and 
we have to do it."325 Fesharaki wrote a chastising letter to the Post a few weeks later 
essentially debunking all the claims attributed to him in the piece. “Ayatollah Beheshti 
did not tell me it is my duty to build a bomb,” Fesharaki wrote, adding, “As an economist 
(not a scientist, as Mr. Segal calls me), I am hardly capable of building a nuclear 
bomb.”326 Segal’s piece was only a foretaste of what was to come in the decades ahead as 
the credibility and reputational cost of getting Iran wrong kept hitting all-time lows year 
after year.  
 On a balanced reading, one notices that a sense of fatalism about Iran’s 
predilection for proliferation crept into the U.S. foreign policy establishment since the 
mid 1980s. In other words, in this period, the United States came to internalize 
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proliferation as part of, as it were, the DNA of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The 
documents declassified so far don’t shed a definitive diagnostic light on the inner 
workings of how this paradigm came about. However, the consensus view in Tehran on 
this has consistently been one of regime change. In other words, as far as Tehran was 
concerned, the United States instrumentally and opportunistically designated an 
innocuous civilian nuclear program as a proliferation threat in order to create an 
international atmosphere of contingency toward the Islamic Republic ultimately aimed at 
toppling the clerical regime. An analytical assessment of the securitization of the INP, 
however, reveals an infinitely more complicated trajectory.  
 On a more analytical reading, a host of political, economic, ideological, and 
military ingredients crept into the securitization process of the INP following the Islamic 
Revolution. On the economic front, the resuscitation of a previously renounced and 
denounced profligate program went right in the face of prevailing energy trends and 
raised proliferations concerns. From this perspective, the general sense in the mid 1980s, 
in diametrical contrast to the mid 1970s, was that the “peak oil” argument was far from 
an article of faith it was made out to be in the previous decade. As a matter of fact, the 
contrast in perception from the oil crunch of the mid 1970s to the 1980s oil glut couldn’t 
be starker. This development coupled with a sharp drop on the demand side in the global 
energy market tremendously decreased the economic attractiveness of capital-intensive 
and time-consuming nuclear power plants. The new situation was so dire that in the early 
1980’s, in the words of a U.S. intelligence memorandum, "the market in developing 
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countries for nuclear power reactors virtually collapsed."327 Under these transformed 
circumstances, only magnified by the woeful status of Iran’s coffers, a defiant push for 
nuclear energy could hardly make for a solid economic argument.  
 On the ideology front, the Islamic Republic never quite developed a consistent 
and cogent argument for the change of heart from the early days of the revolution when 
the Shah’s nuclear program was impugned as a satanic undertaking. This lack of 
explanation was consequential in the lukewarm reception of Ayatollah Khamenei’s 2007 
Fatwa (religious degree) on the Islamic non-sanctionability of a range of nuclear options 
including the development, acquisition, stockpiling, threats to use, or actual use of 
nuclear weapons from a Shi’ite perspective.  
 On the military front, as earlier argued, the Islamic Republic’s war-born nuclear 
awakening made a de-securitized narrative by Tehran hardly convincing while giving 
credence to proliferation intentions. Comparatively analyzed, if under the Shah the 
received rationale for why Iran might be incubating a nuclear weapons agenda was 
contextualized within the framework of the Monarch’s insatiable thirst for state-of-the-art 
conventional weapons, in the Islamic Republic era, Tehran’s alleged predilection for 
proliferation received a reverse mode of reasoning. Under the Shah, it was feared that the 
zestful conventional procurement could be naturally extended to the nuclear realm. In the 
Islamic Republic era, by contrast, it was either explicitly or implicationally argued that 
the ordeal of having been on the receiving end of Saddam’s WMD strikes combined with 
Tehran’s strategically disadvantaged position to procure conventional arms were factors 
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compelling enough for a lonely Islamic Republic to aspire to acquire at least some 
“threshold” nuclear capability for deterrence purposes.328  
 On the political front, the Islamic Republic’s idealistic approach to the NPT didn’t 
help decelerate the securitization of its nuclear behavior either. On this score, one has to 
bear in mind an important development that distinguishes the post-revolution Iran from 
the Shah’s on the all-important question of the nature of the NPT. Under the Shah 
especially since the mid 1970s Tehran tended to view the main function of the NPT in 
terms of maintaining a non-nuclear status quo in Iran’s strategic environment. Viewed 
from this perspective, the primary bargain of the treaty was one that was not even 
explicitly verbalized in the treaty, one that was only derivatively, circumstantially, and 
retrospectively visible. This was part of the reason why in the Shah’s era one notices only 
minimum public critique of the nature of the bargain between the nuclear haves and have-
nots and the former’s unfulfilled commitments under article VI to de-proliferate.  
By contrast, in the post-1979 era Iran came to internalize and interpret the nature 
and purpose of the NPT quite differently. This time around, viewed from Tehran, the 
defining feature of the NPT’s core bargain was article VI where the NNWS’ abstention 
should have been commensurately reciprocated by a verifiable denuclearization in the 
NWS camp represented by the U.S. and the USSR. For instance, on February 19, 1995 
Iran’s UN Ambassador Kamal Kharrazi threatened Tehran would oppose an indefinite 
extension of the treaty unless a revision was made “in the accord binding signatories to a 
deadline for the destruction of nuclear weapons.”329 Of course, over the years, especially 
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since the early 2000s and as Iran’s nuclear capabilities were advancing and its future 
nuclear horizons were widening, Iran shifted the thrust of its critique of the NPT back to 
article IV of the treaty.  
To pause a bit longer on this point an argument can be made that the defining 
feature of the Shah’s conceptualization of the NPT was that it tied in Iran’s contractual 
obligations under the treaty with the country’s broader strategic security environment 
thereby making his non-proliferation pronouncements credible and externally verifiable 
from a realist International Relations perspective. The Islamic Republic, on the other 
hand, through decoupling its interpretation of the core bargain of the NPT from its 
security context, made a realist and non-normative reading of its nonproliferation claims 
extremely problematic and allowed a mercurial and Janus-faced aura to surround 
Tehran’s entire nuclear posture.  
 Finally, in analyzing Tehran’s nuclear behavior and the United States’ response to 
it, parsing out a 1985 National Intelligence Council Memorandum’s diagnosis is 
illuminating. This polemic document essentially argued that subjecting the policymaking 
environment on the proliferation issues to "the normal pull and tug of domestic politics" 
acts as a retarding if not permanently revising force on the "incentive structure" of 
proliferation. However, the United States almost never pursued this advice in the case of 
the Islamic Republic.  
As a matter of fact, a case can be made that by inflating the military threat 
emanating from Iran’s nuclear program in the late 1980s, Washington inadvertently 
helped privatize Tehran’s nuclear decision-making away from the public and normal 
political arena into the more esoteric national security zone. This policy was in direct 
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conflict with the report’s most crucial assessment that:  
“Over the next five years or so, there is a good chance that today's relatively 
favorable nonproliferation regime will not be seriously endangered. The principal factor 
leading to this conclusion is that only arguments of national security, particularly if they 
involve serious fears about potential national annihilation, are likely to carry enough 
weight with decision makers to override the negative reactions they might anticipate from 
supplier countries, neighbors, the international community, and from domestic critics of 
decisions to develop nuclear weapons. Few, if any, countries with developing nuclear 
capabilities seem likely to perceive so ominous a threat to their survival during this 
period.”  
Furthermore, the memorandum, rather realistically, predicted that the physical 
impediments and technological challenges in the way of proliferation would, over the 
long term, lose their effectiveness compared to normative counter-proliferation 
mechanisms that gain ideational traction and sedimentation over time. On this point, the 
document concluded, “if the industrial capabilities for developing an advanced nuclear 
infrastructure continue to spread, as seems virtually inevitable, the United States and 
other supplier countries may need to focus more on attempting to boost anti-weapon 
motivations in Third World countries than on technological denial, seeking to take 
advantage of doubts that already exist about the potential regional security and domestic 
political costs of making pro-weapon decisions. The challenge here is to find ways to 
enhance those concerns without causing a nationalistic backlash against perceived foreign 
interference in sensitive domestic matters.”330 
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Based on such a judgment, the memorandum warned the counter-proliferation 
community against making simplistic causal analyses that made a unidirectional link 
between technological capability and proliferation. The memorandum cited this faulty 
reasoning as a major cause why Washington’s worst proliferation fears in the 1960s 
never transpired.  
The memorandum faulted those “earlier projections about the probable rate of 
proliferation” with having “too narrow a perception of the process by which the spread of 
a nuclear explosive capability comes about.” Due to this pathology, the report observed, 
“those predictions tended to be driven by straight line projections of such matters as how 
soon a country could have the ability to produce sufficient fissile material for an 
explosion, given its recent pace of technological acquisition.” The end result of this mode 
of analysis, the document argued, was a kind of technological determinism “implying that 
if a country acquired more and more of the technical ingredients that go into making a 
nuclear device, the decision to consummate that option would … eventually be made.” 
Drawing attention to the multifaceted nature of nuclear decision-making and 
warning against reducing it to its technical ingredients, the report explained how in 
parallel with “accretions” in technological capabilities, the decision-making process 
becomes more multidimensional and multisectoral since it has to take into account a 
whole slew of international and domestic economic, political, environmental, and societal 
considerations.331 As Washington’s inflated threat designation of the INP demonstrated in  
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the mid to late 1980s, almost none of these sentiments found their way into the 
paradigmatic framework within which Tehran’s nuclear behavior was construed. 
Another major development following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was an 
implicit transformation in the United States’ security culture of what constituted 
proliferation. Although this change was acknowledged in a 1985 memorandum where it 
tracked how various NIEs since the 1960s progressively pushed back the definition of 
proliferation from "weapon capability" to "primitive nuclear-explosive capability" to 
"sensitive nuclear materials and facilities that might contribute to an explosive (or 
weapons) capability,"332 its impact on the Islamic Republic was tremendously more 
visible.  
It was based on such a new threshold that a 1985 intelligence report placed Iran, 
along with Iraq, Libya, and Egypt, as a country of "proliferation concern" who "have 
shown interest in developing the kinds of capabilities that, if they succeed, might 
eventually bring them to the technological level where they could create an explosive 
device. But events and other governments have conspired in the last several years to 
place such major obstacles in their paths that there is virtually no chance any of them 
could reach that level in the next 10 years.”333As president George Bush famously 
declared in 2007, applied to Iran, simply “having the knowledge necessary to make a 
nuclear weapon” essentially amounted to a proliferation scenario to be averted at all cost.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
NUCLEAR EXPEDIENCY (1988-1997) 
 
Introduction 
 
The end of the eight year war with Iraq in late 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini’s death 
in 1989 and the ascendency of a technocrat Rafsanjani to presidency removed a host of 
ideological, material, and bureaucratic constraints that had reigned in a full and 
systematic resuscitation of Iran’s nuclear past. As opposed to what seems to have been a 
clandestine effort to contrive a “short-cut” route to militarily relevant nuclear capability 
during the mid to the late 1980s—partly in response to Saddam’s run for the bomb-- 
Iran’s nuclear strategy in the 1990s was mainly characterized by a systematic effort to 
build a full-spectrum indigenous nuclear infrastructure that would communicate a 
deterring nuclear breakout capacity to would-be aggressors by putting Iran on the 
threshold.  
The approach, commonly known as the “Japan option” in the non-proliferation 
circles, was essentially aimed at rekindling the Shah’s strategy whose ideal goal was to 
equip Tehran with all the hardware and software ingredients necessary to build a 
deliverable nuclear device stopping just short of a political decision at the top. Tehran’s 
thinking was that, in absence of a clear and present security threat, such a capability 
would enable it to reap the deterrent dividends of nukes “on the cheap” without having to 
pay the exorbitant economic, normative, and security costs associated with stockpiling 
them in a hostile environment.  
Discrete elements of Iran’s post-revolution nuclear thinking-- heavily influenced 
by what Tehran perceived was a conspiracy of silence by the international community in 
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the face of Iraq’s use of WMD during the 1980-1988 war-- began to cohere into a 
systematic conceptual and operational framework under the presidency of Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani. The technocrat cleric, who later showed a thinly disguised partiality 
to assume the mantle of the “father” of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program, was 
arguably the most instrumental figure in shaping Iran’s nuclear strategy and in elevating 
it to the top of the country’s national priorities in the post war period. 
 Iran’s nuclear program in this period was simultaneously the beneficiary and a 
victim of the tumultuous early 1990s that saw the implosion of the USSR and the end of 
the Cold War. The INP got a boost, especially in terms of enhanced capability to secure 
components, following a decision by the Bush administration to lift US sanctions on the 
sale of high-tech equipment to Eastern Europe. The easing of control mechanisms on the 
high-tech sector was especially important for Tehran by giving it window of opportunity 
to secure the so-called dual-use parts and components from the cash-strapped USSR orbit 
countries. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, in the same time, brought about a macro-
securitizational transformation in the international system depriving Iran of much vital 
maneuverability and structurally de-securitizing pressures that bipolarity had conferred 
exercised on the INP. In other words, the punishment and rewards structure of the 
international system had now changed in such a fundamental way that Washington could 
aggressively hyper-securitize and antagonize the Iranian regime without worrying about 
its balance of power implications.334 
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Within this new context, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Operation Desert Storm, the notion of  “ambitious” power, in some ways reminiscent of 
the Shah era, began finding applicability to the Islamic Republic in Western policy 
circles. A new conventional wisdom was shaping up in Washington in the early 1990s 
that claimed, with the Soviet threat to the north eliminated and the mortal Baath enemy to 
the west emasculated, the Revolutionary regime was presented with an unprecedentedly 
hospitable strategic environment to throw its weight around in its periphery. Acquiring a 
nuclear capability, the argument went, would be an indispensible and organic component 
in Tehran’s strategic toolbox to fulfill its ambitions. 
It is also extremely important to view the elevation of the INP as a top security 
priority for the United States within the context of Washington’s experience with 
Saddam’s clandestine nuclear program whose proximity to a weaponizable capability 
virtually caught the White House off guard. Following the dismantlement of Baghdad’s 
nuclear program after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the conventional wisdom in 
Washington was that considering Iranian intelligence elements’ penetrating capacity into 
Iraq’s nuclear program – demonstrated by its intelligence sharing with the Israelis before 
the Osirak strike—Tehran should also have tried to match, if not outstrip, it archenemy’s 
nuclear potential.  
The Soviet Collapse and the Cottage Industry of Securitizing the INP  
 
The unpredicted collapse of the Soviet Union particularly caught the U.S. 
counter-proliferation community off guard. The hard-currency-strapped nuclear remnants 
of the former empire, in the judgment of the U.S. intelligence community, generated a 
nuclear black-market where countries like Iran could tap to secure their technology, 
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fissile material, and manpower needs unfettered by vigilant government oversight. In 
1992, the Bush administration was already alarmed at the deluge of sophisticated 
conventional armaments like T-72 tanks and Su-24 and MIG-29 aircraft and a host 
unconventional know-how and hardware finding their way from the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) to Iran. In one U.S. official’s words, the new development had not only accorded 
Iran “parity” with its archenemy Iraq but could lead to an Iranian “dominance” over the 
Persian Gulf region where a heavily sanctioned Iraq was simply too anemic to offer much 
of a balancing act to a reinvigorating Tehran.335  
Within this broad context in mind, Washington came to view with increasing 
suspicion Iran’s laser-focused efforts to complete the BNPP. Put simply, in the George H. 
W. Bush Administration’s perspective, there was more to the Rafsanjani administration’s 
pull-out-all-the-stops campaign to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor than met the eye. 
Nothing but proliferation intentions could justify Tehran’s “single-minded pursuit of 
nuclear power plants in a country deficient in the capital required to build such plants and 
rich in natural gas that [could] fire power plants cheaply.”336 
Internalizing the unfolding situation in threat terms, in 1992 the United States 
passed the “Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act” essentially making it the official policy of 
the United States to “urgently” enlist the support of “other nations to oppose any transfer 
to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, 
wherever that transfer could materially contribute to either country's acquiring chemical, 
biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional 
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weapons.”337 This decision marked the beginning of the international securitization of the 
INP.  
In the Bush administration’s view, the opening of what amounted to a nuclear 
bazaar in the FSU coupled with the increasingly non-scrutinized availability of nuclear 
know-how – in no small part thanks to the exodus of the FSU’s nuclear scientists—had 
essentially given rise to an era of “nuclear ubiquity” where curbing a determined and 
well-off aspirant’s foray into the bomb was next to impossible. In a January 1992 
testimony before Congress, CIA Director Robert M. Gates put Iran exactly in this 
category alleging Tehran had “publicly” hinted at its interest to “have nuclear 
weapons.”338  
Although disputed by the U.S. military analysts, Gates’ January testimony in 
Congress on the galloping pace of the INP made such an alarming impression that 17 
ranking senators from both sides of the isle sent an “unusual classified letter” to Secretary 
of State James Baker inquiring about China’s proliferation-related assistance to Tehran. 
In the view of Congress, any concrete move by the administration to lift sanctions on the 
transfer of U.S. nuclear technology to China should have been conditioned on securing 
Beijing’s unqualified commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
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established in 1987 by the United States and its western allies to forestall the 
dissemination of WMD delivery systems. Especially raising the Senate’s ire was the 
prospect of the transfer of the newly commissioned M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles to 
countries like Iran.339  
Under such uncertain and highly dynamic circumstances, in 1992 Washington’s 
concerns that Iran would beat it to the draw in the FSU reached such a feverish pitch that 
the Bush administration dropped securing ironclad commitments on human rights, the 
START treaty, and market-based economy as part of the United States’ preconditions to 
establish full-fledged diplomatic ties with the newborn FSU countries in Central Asian 
and Caucuses.  This was a central component of the Administration’s efforts to keep tabs 
on Iran’s activities in Central Asia and the Caucuses, a region “up for grabs” by Tehran 
in Washington’s judgment.  As part of this effort, in February 1992, Secretary of State 
James Baker visited the region to speed up the establishment of U.S. embassies in 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to neutralize Iran’s 
expanding political sway.340 
As public and private expressions of concern by the U.S. over the INP were 
intensifying, an IAEA delegation conducted an inspection of Iran’s nuclear facilities at 
Tehran’s invitation in early February 1992. The nuclear watchdog’s findings couldn’t be 
more frustrating for Washington’s securitization agenda. In some disarmingly categorical 
remarks, Dr. John Jennekens, the delegation’s spokesperson reported, "there does not 
seem to be a shred of evidence on the allegations that were made in the media." Praising 
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the “ready access” Tehran had granted to six nuclear facilities and staff members, he 
added, "Nothing we have seen proves that there is any activity here against the peaceful 
principles of nuclear policy."341  
The IAEA report on two sites of concern was especially compelling in dispelling 
much speculation over Tehran’s nuclear intentions. One was the site of cauldron 
equipment in Isfahan that Washington suspected of having enrichment applications. 
Confirming Tehran’s claims that it was exclusively used to “produce stable isotopes of 
zinc for pharmaceutical purposes,” the IAEA concluded, “There are absolutely no 
facilities for handling or coping with radioactive material in the building housing the 
cauldron.” The other suspicious site in Moallem Kalayeh in Northern Iran, claimed by the 
Iraq based Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) to be a secret nuclear facility, was 
declared by the Agency a “motel-sized” recreational retreat for nuclear scientists. The 
IAEA team came so close to issuing the INP a clean bill of health that one of its French 
experts “deplored” the fact that Iran was “under a de facto embargo on nuclear 
equipment."342 
Following the IAEA report, the Bush administration backpedaled on its high-
density threat forecasts, conceding there was “no smoking gun in the way of weapons 
intent.”343 This reassuring report (and the follow-up report presented by IAEA Director 
General Hans Blix in 1993), however, didn’t manage to put the issue to rest as the nuclear 
watchdog organization was accused of credulity in its inspections by the United States 
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since it couldn’t unearth the more sophisticated clandestine aspects of Iran’s nuclear 
enterprise.  
The dust on the issue had barely settled down when in May 1992 a European 
newspaper, quoting unidentified intelligence sources, made the headlines claiming Iran 
had spirited in two nuclear warheads from the Atomic Research Institute of Kazakhstan 
in cahoots with president Nursultan Nazarbayev. The United States spurned the 
credibility of the intelligence citing lack of verifiability.344 
Shortly afterward, the INP hit the securitization zone again in November 1992 
when Vice President of Iran for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Ata’ollah Mohajerani 
made international news headlines by obliquely suggesting that Islamic countries should 
strive to match Israel’s nuclear capability.345 Although the crude statements were later 
repudiated and retracted as personal statements of desire by some junior politician, some 
policy circles in Washington and Tel Aviv were quick to interpret them as indicative of 
the Islamic Republic’s endeavor to develop nuclear weapons.  
Clinton and “Dual Containment” 
 
In 1993 and with the election of Bill Clinton as the 42nd President of the United 
States, Iran’s nuclear program plunged deeper into the securitization zone. Unhappy with 
the Bush Administration’s purportedly laser-focused attention on Iraq and its implications 
for tilting the fragile regional balance in Iran’s favor, the Clinton administration set out to 
rectify the perceived disequilibrium. Taking a swipe at its predecessor’s Iran policy, a 
Clinton administration official said the Bush people "had the notion that goodwill begets 
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goodwill," but "when we came into office, all we saw was an outlaw regime…. We 
cannot engage in the process of improving relations with an outlaw state unless we see 
change across the board." He concluded, "Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya and North Korea are 
unable to interact with the international system in a constructive, positive way, so they 
build links to each other. What they have in common is the effort to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction."346  
 “Dual containment” was the policy response reflecting the new thinking in the 
new White House. Incubated in the early 1990s by Martin Indyk at the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), the policy sought to subject the Iranian regime to 
a sweeping arms sanctions regime comparable to those imposed on Baghdad so the status 
quo could be restored at least over the short and medium term.  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Clinton’s most veteran diplomat on Iran 
and a leftover from the Carter Administration, was the public face of the new policy 
strategy. As the chief negotiator with the Iranians during the hostage crisis, Christopher’s 
vision of Tehran was deeply scarred by those crisis-ridden 444 days. Frequently referring 
to Iran as an “international outlaw,” Christopher made the rounds of international capitals 
urging his counterparts to treat Iran “as the most worrisome” state bent on acquiring a 
nuclear capability.347  
As the administration was scrambling to generate traction for dual containment, 
another classified letter sent to the Secretary of State by Senators Claiborne Pell and Jesse 
Helms on China’s under-the-counter arms dealings with Tehran injected a renewed sense 
                                                        
346 Quoted in The Washington Post, February 27, 1994.  
 
347 The Washington Post, June 10, 1993.  
 
 196
of urgency to create consensus across all the branches of government and shift the heat 
from the headache in Baghdad to the real challenge in Iran. The dilemma emanating from 
Iran’s nuclear defiance was even more worthy of acute attention, in the new conventional 
wisdom putting down roots in Washington, given the clerical regime’s intimate ties to the 
terrorist organizations in the Middle East.348  
Incrementally, the Clinton’s Administration’s efforts to isolate Tehran assumed 
such broad dimensions that some policy experts speculated Tehran had, for all practical 
purposes, substituted Moscow as the “New Evil Empire” in Washington’s eyes. An 
operational component to this new perception was the United States’ strenuous efforts to 
restrict Iran’s strategic options even in instances where Washington’s interests were not 
concretely at stake. A vivid manifestation of this was the Clinton administration’s policy 
to dissuade the FSU countries from piping their oil through the Iranian corridor. This 
obstructive attitude, as far as Tehran was concerned, constituted an example par 
excellence of a swaggering post Cold War White House whose hostility toward Tehran 
had grown gratuitous and incorrigible. Viewed in the same light in Tehran was the 
Clinton administration’s approach in stonewalling and squelching financially distressed 
Iran’s efforts to restructure its sovereign debt and secure additional international loans for 
post-war reconstruction projects.  
In this atmosphere of enmity, “the bill of particulars” leveled against Iran 
continued to thicken further in the early 1990s with Tehran’s obstructionist approach 
toward the two US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace initiatives: the 1991 Madrid Conference 
and the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords. Tehran’s miscalculation on this issue catapulted Israel 
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to the forefront of the INP’s securitizing agents. More internationally, with the 1991 
Persian Gulf War widely believed to have slammed the brakes on much of Baghdad’s 
nuclear capability, the INP became more conspicuous on the West’s counter-proliferation 
radar. Reflecting the altered circumstances, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin relayed 
to the Knesset in a January 1993 speech Tel Aviv’s estimate that Iran already possessed 
“the appropriate manpower and resources to acquire nuclear weapons within the next 10 
years…unless there is an appropriate international effort to prevent Iran from achieving 
its ends." In justifying Israel’s characteristically hysterical judgments on the INP, Rabin 
implied that Iran’s acquisition of Scud-C missiles technology from North Korea left no 
doubts about Tehran’s offensive intentions.349 A heightened sense of concern over the 
INP gained even more traction as David Kay, the former UN Chief Weapons Inspector 
drew a parallel between the INP and the initial stages of Saddam’s program.350 
The synergetic impact of these factors resulted in a tone-deaf attitude in 
Washington toward the conciliatory gestures of the pragmatic President Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani and a sense of vindication among the old-guard hardliners’ in Tehran who 
argued Washington’s animosity toward the Islamic Republic was categorical and not 
issue oriented. Based on this latter argument, advocated most prominently by Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Iranian nuclear issue, just like other 
allegations, was simply a tool of convenience opportunistically utilized by the United 
States to camouflage and facilitate a more fundamental regime-change policy. 
                                                        
349 The Jerusalem Post, January 21, 1993.  
 
350 The Times, March 9, 1993.  
 
 
 198
Bestowing even more credibility on the Iranian hardliners’ argument was an 
institutionalizing posture in Washington’s conservative policy circles that Iran’s 
proliferation behavior had almost nothing to do with the political configuration of power 
in Tehran as long as the cardinal framework was one of Islamic Republic. As a matter of 
fact, some even went so far as to claim that the real threat emanated from the pragmatists 
like Rafsanjani posing as moderates who were “most keen to develop conventional and 
nuclear arsenal.”351 
The policy of “actively” containing Tehran (masquerading as “dual containment” 
policy) was not without its vocal critics in Washington either. Viewing the Iran situation 
in light of the broader context of the United States’ counter-proliferation experience with 
North Korea and Iraq, the critics were pressing the point that the policy of not directly 
dialoguing with the ill-disposed proliferators was as simplistic as it was unproductive. 
Gary Sick, the prominent Iran veteran in the National Security Council under the Ford 
and Carter administrations was among the most vocal critics of the Clinton’s policy.  
From Sick’s vantage point, the policy ran the risk of unnecessarily escalating 
matters with an otherwise approachable and impressionable Tehran to a crisis level. 
These were not the only pathologies associated with dual containment though. The policy 
“is openly disregarded and privately mocked even by many of our friends in the region, 
as I learned in a meeting this summer with representatives of Persian Gulf states,” 
observed Gary Sick adding, “Contrary to prevailing pop analysis and wishful thinking, 
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our jawboning and obstruction of international development credits for Iran will neither 
transform nor bring down the Islamic revolutionary regime.”352  
Critics were also skeptical of “singling out” Iran based on a litany of grievances 
where others in the Middle East could hardly produce a more laudable report card. 
Labeling the administration’s obsessive fixation on Iran a “policy trap,” Edward Shirley 
tried to contextualize Tehran’s proliferation behavior against a more strategic backdrop. 
Echoing hardcore realist sentiments, he wrote: “Iran has probably sought to construct or 
purchase weapons of mass destruction. But who would not in the Middle East? Iran was 
gassed into surrender in the first Persian Gulf war; Pakistan, Iran's proselytizing Sunni 
neighbor to the southeast, probably has the Bomb; Saudi Arabia, its most ardent and 
reviled religious rival, has longer-range missiles; Syria is engaging in a major military 
buildup, courtesy of Saudi-American largesse during the second Persian Gulf war; Iraq 
and its Scuds are still just across the border; and Israel has both missiles and nuclear 
weapons. Iran, having been vanquished by a technologically superior Iraq, knows very 
well the proliferation nightmare that can ensue when the arms possessed are insufficient 
to deter…. If the theory of deterrence works in the Muslim world, the mullahs will be as 
subject to its roles as were hardcore Soviet communists. As long as Washington or 
Jerusalem maintains a serious counter-threat, the Iranian nuclear menace remains 
effectively checked by the West.”353 Shirley’s harangue was a frustrated reaction to the 
fact that the theory of nuclear deterrence- an article of faith for the majority of the Cold 
War baptized generation of the U.S. foreign policy establishment- had magically lost all 
its applicability to Iran. One could argue that the main reason for this otherwise eerier 
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lack of appetite for deterrence was that, it in the eye of Washington, it would complicate 
the securitizing of the INP by undermining the end-of-the-world paradigm within which 
Iran’s nuclear program was marketed and internalized. Put more crudely, viewed from 
Washington, securitization trumped deterrence and anything else that interfered with its 
proper articulation. 
In such an atmosphere where securitization reigned supreme, the international 
nuclear watchdog’s vouching for Iran’s compliance with its NPT commitments generated 
little ripple effect into the policymaking circles in Washington. In point of fact, the 
nonchalant fashion in which the IAEA reports on Iran’s nuclear bona fides was being 
received in Washington marked the beginning of “politicization of intelligence” on the 
INP. For instance, although in 1994 intelligence evidence concluded that shrinking oil 
revenues had slowed down the INP and forced a discretionary debate in Tehran on the 
cost-benefit wisdom of pushing the nuclear program forward, its impact on the policy 
level was miniscule.354 As if completely oblivious to the IAEA reports, in March 1994 
Anthony Lake wrote an influential article in Foreign Affairs where the National Security 
Advisor put Iran and Iraq in the category of “reactionary backlash” regimes bent on 
proliferation that needed to be confronted and neutralized.355 
Running in parallel to the politicization of intelligence- perhaps one of its spin-off 
effects- was a logic-defying tendency in Washington to read proliferation into every 
aspect of Iran’s nuclear program, no matter how far-fetched its weaponization 
implications. In this climate, it was hardly surprising that the conclusion of a preliminary 
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agreement in January 1993 with China to build two 330 MWe nuclear power stations and 
the signing of a contract with the Russian Federation in January 1995 to build a 915 
MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor (PWR) triggered a kneejerk hysterical 
reaction in Washington. This melodramatic response acquired more ironic proportions 
when some analysts pointed out that these reactors had no direct proliferation 
implications and were in fact comparable to the “light-water nuclear plants being offered 
cost-free to North Korea in return for its agreement to give up its graphite reactor 
technology.”356  
INP’s Russia Connection Sends Securitization to New Heights 
 
In 1995 an unprecedented surge, both in scope and depth, in the securitization of 
the Iranian nuclear program took place. The trigger came, by and large, from the formal 
conclusion of a January 1995 accord with Russia. Worth $800 million, the agreement was 
Iran’s first successful shot at completing the first unit of the BNPP within four years. 
Almost immediately following the agreement, however, came US Defense Secretary 
William J. Perry’s comments over the apocalyptic implications of a nuclear Iran.357  
The nuclear deal with Russia changed the dynamics of the Iranian nuclear 
program in the sense that whereas prior to 1995 U.S. threat designations of the INP were 
informed by speculation, analogy, intention-reading, and intelligence estimates, the 
conclusion of the 1995 deal provided a seemingly concrete platform to hammer home 
Washington’s securitizing posture and generate international consensus around it. 
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Additionally, it set the stage for the internationalization of a comprehensive sanctions 
regime heretofore unilaterally imposed by the United States.  
Despite the Clinton Administrations’ strenuous efforts to secure maximum 
international support for its sanction policy, however, America’s North Atlantic allies 
only put up a pro forma and reluctant attitude toward the proposed sanctions regime. This 
reluctance, on the part of Europe and Japan, was based on an implied conviction that the 
U.S. allegations against Iran still suffered from physical fact deficiency. In other words, 
from the European and Japanese perspectives, the body of damning evidence produced 
by the U.S. intelligence community on the INP was long on speculation, inference, 
intention judging, future scenarios, circumstantial evidence and short on direct evidence 
like satellite photos and steel and concrete facts. For example, word got around that 
during the 1995 US-Russian summit meeting in Moscow, president Clinton failed to 
present Yeltsin with a “satellite photograph of an Iranian nuclear headquarters from 
which a nuclear weapons program might be directed. This was because, a New York 
Times article explained, no such center existed.”358 This situation, in the words of the 
Washington Post’s investigative report, sensationally titled “The Atomic Ayatollahs,” 
made Washington’s sanctions touting argument vulnerable to the charge it was 
“overreacting because it remained obsessed with Iran's mullahs after 16 years of vitriol, 
hostage-taking and spilt blood.”359  
As touched upon before, introducing yet another kink to Washington’s argument 
was the fact that while the replacement of Yongbyon’s graphite moderated reactor with a 
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light-water version was being advocated as a counter-proliferation success in North 
Korea, Tehran’s projected acquisition of the same kind of reactor from Russia was 
deemed a proliferation event. The internal inconsistency in exactly what constituted 
proliferation coupled with a lack of smoking gun substantially detracted from the 
credibility of Washington’s slam-dunk judgments on the INP, making some allies 
question the authenticity of the United States’ panic button when it came to Tehran. As if 
the atmosphere was not already foggy enough, the IAEA added to the confusion by 
repeatedly certifying the INP’s compliance with the NPT. This was much to the public 
irritation of the Clinton administration whose top officials insisted Iran was in breach of 
the spirit of the treaty by shrewdly abusing its loopholes.360  
A side effect of this comprehensive securitizing move by Washington was the 
virtual foreclosing of nuclear diplomacy with Tehran so the INP could be buried deeper 
in the security zone. As a New York Times editorial pointed out in 1995, not only did this 
blanket securitizing policy ran the risk of “aggravating Iranian paranoia, and adding 
motivation to build the bomb,” it also managed to “impede efforts to halt Iranian bomb-
making by limiting diplomacy, and by trying to stop all other countries’ commerce with 
Iran instead of focusing on trade in bomb-building technology.”361 
 Immediately following the threat drumbeat issuing from Washington and Tel 
Aviv, Tehran and Russia orchestrated de-securitizing moves of their own. As part of this 
effort, along with reissuing comments by Moscow reminding the West of its 
unimpeachable proliferation track record following the ratification of the NPT, Iran’s 
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ambassador to the IAEA Mohammed Sadegh Ayatollahi announced Iran’s pledge to 
return to Russia the irradiated (spent) fuel rods that could contain plutonium isotopes (Pu-
239) suitable for weaponization. Not impressed with the arrangement, Warren 
Christopher minced no words letting the Russians know that the White House “will not 
ultimately be satisfied by anything other than the end of the nuclear cooperation 
program." The State Department’s rationale for pursuing such a “purist” policy was 
concerns that the BNPP could become the gateway for the transfer of militarily 
applicable nuclear technology to a rogue state.362  
 In the meantime, the US Congress, skeptical of Clinton’s “solicitous” attitude 
toward President Yeltsin, threatened to “cut off all aid to Russia” unless the Kremlin 
rectified what a Senator called its “inexplicably stupid moves.”363 A defiant Moscow shot 
back, calling the nuclear deal with Tehran “a high-stakes issue all around” and suggesting 
that Washington’s status as a “strategic partner” had eroded. Moscow went even further 
accusing Washington of “double standards” by opposing the Iran deal on commercial, 
and not proliferation, grounds while offering the same type of reactors to Pyongyang. 
Russia’s Atomic Energy Minister Viktor N. Mikhailov’s retort to Congress’s threat 
couldn’t be more bristling: “The [Russian] Atomic Energy Ministry has received $215 
million in U.S. aid to help Russia dismantle its own nuclear weapons but has lost $450 
million in potential sales of uranium to the American market because of U.S. anti-
dumping restrictions.”364  
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Almost caught in the Moscow-Congress crossfire and in an effort to meet halfway 
a consternated U.S. Congress’s push for crushing pressure on Iran and to demonstrate to 
US allies and rivals the priority of putting maximum teeth into the sanctions regime, 
president Clinton issued an executive order in March 1995 barring all U.S. entities from 
supervising, financing, and managing Iran’s petroleum projects.365 The measure was 
expanded and tightened further in June to include almost all trade with Tehran. The 
immediate effect was the killing of a pending $1-billion deal between a Dutch subsidiary 
of Conoco Oil Company and Iran to develop the offshore Sirri oil field. Panoramically 
viewed, the cancellation of the Conoco deal was a watershed event that marked the total 
departure of Iran-US relations from the economic zone after the 1979 revolution. In other 
words, this development dispossessed Iran-US relations from its most powerful de-
securitizing potentiality, i.e., U.S. commercial interests in Iran.  
In this atmosphere and as the triangular Moscow-Tehran-Washington thicket was 
spiraling out of control, a New York Times editorial warned the White House and 
Congress against pushing the envelope lest Washington ended up with the worst of all 
worlds. “The most likely outcome of all this is that Iran will get the reactors, the United 
States and Russia will be estranged, the destruction of Moscow's nuclear arsenal will 
slow and efforts to curb the spread of nuclear arms will be set back,” darkly warned the 
editorial.366 
Washington, however, kept clamorously pressing the line that Tehran was on a 
“crash program” to nuclearize. This time, the United States also pointed fingers at a “side 
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agreement” Tehran had presumably signed with Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry to 
obtain gas centrifuges to indigenously enrich uranium. Whereas in Washington’s 
judgment such a capability could only shortcut Tehran’s route to obtaining weapons-
grade fissile material, Moscow expressed confidence that, with proper monitoring, 
Tehran would exclusively use the equipment to obtain the LEU necessary for the BNPP 
and other civilian power plants.  
At this time, Tehran, having sensed the vulnerability of the United States’ non-
proliferation position in international forums, found the upcoming NPT review 
conference of 1995 (up for extension or expiration) a golden opportunity to diffuse its 
nuclear file. In an effort to bring into sharp relief the discriminatory fault line separating 
nuclear haves from have-nots, Tehran tapped into the numerical majority of the NAM 
countries. Already feeling the heat and the international trend U.S. sponsored sanctions 
were taking, the Iranian officials were making the rounds of NAM capitals soliciting a 
“vote against the NPT's extension unless the use of export controls against a country in 
compliance with the treaty is made illegal.” Depicting itself as the “Article IV victim” of 
a loophole-riddled NPT and losing no opportunity to throw light on Washington’s 
deafening and embarrassing silence on Israel’s nuclear anomaly as the weakest link in the 
United States’ counter-proliferation argument, Tehran, in the words of Jessica Mathews 
of the Council on Foreign Relations, “skillfully persuaded most of the non-aligned 
countries to turn its special case into a generic issue.”367  
Further raising the stakes on the 1995 NPT review conference, on February 19, 
1995 Iran’s UN Ambassador Kamal Kharrazi threatened Tehran would oppose an 
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indefinite extension of the treaty unless a revision was made “in the accord binding 
signatories to a deadline for the destruction of nuclear weapons.”368  Notwithstanding its 
out-of-the-ballpark rhetoric before the review conference though, Iran’s actual behavior 
at the venue was rather subdued. The most scathing comments at the venue came from 
Cyrus Nasseri, Iran’s Permanent Representative to the UN Office at Geneva who accused 
the United States of having “violated the terms of the NPT” by depriving Iran of its 
“rights” to have access to nuclear technology on the basis of some unauthenticated 
speculation and circumstantial evidence.369  
In the meantime, as the United States’ sanctions regime on Iran had generated 
crisscrossing rifts between Washington and almost the rest of the world, in May 1995, 
Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization chief Reza Amrollahi announced Tehran’s plans to 
build 10 nuclear power plants over the next two decades to generate some 20% of the 
country’s electricity needs. Amrollahi also disclosed that Tehran had already paid the 
“down payment” to the Chinese for construction of two 300-MWe pressurized-water 
reactors (PWR). This announcement, considering Beijing’s perceived technological 
limitation to independently conduct turnkey nuclear projects, came as a surprise to the 
Americans and its European allies.370   
While Washington was turning up pressure on Tehran at an accelerated rate, 
puzzled policy analysts were trying to come to analytical grips with the “exceptional” 
treatment Iran was receiving in Washington. The gamut of explanations ranged from the 
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influence of the Israel factor371 to the preparatory stages of taking kinetic action against 
Tehran. The New York Times’ David Sanger tried explaining “the Iran exception” by 
tapping into the configuration of lobby groups shaping and shoving policy inside the 
beltway. “Perhaps the real reason that the Administration was able to act so strongly 
today is simple politics,” he maintained, adding, “What Iran lacks in the United States, 
for understandable reasons, is any constituency in Congress. The Administration was 
under tremendous pressure from the business community last year to separate human 
rights from the issue of trade preferences for China. There is an active Vietnam business 
lobby, led by companies that realize that the country may be the last source of well-
educated, well-disciplined and very inexpensive labor in Southeast Asia. But by and 
large, American companies are not clamoring for a chance to work in a country that still 
routinely calls the United States the ‘great Satan.’”372   
In the meantime, Clinton’s sanctions executive order came to hurt Iran’s 
economic interests next door in the FSU sooner than Tehran anticipated; In April 1995, 
“bowing to U.S. pressure,” the Republic of Azerbaijan divested Iran of its 5% share in a 
consortium to develop the country’s offshore oil deposits in the Caspian Sea.373 Also 
under mounting US pressure and agitation, Moscow bowed out of the tentative agreement 
to sell a gas centrifuge plant to Tehran.374 A mix of U.S. pressure and dwindling oil 
revenues also convinced Beijing to drop out of a contract to sell Iran a uranium 
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hexafluoride conversion plant it was planning to set up at the Esfahan Nuclear 
Technology Center (ENTEC). The purchase of the uranium conversion facility (UCF) 
would enable Tehran to convert the yellow cake into pure uranium gas (UF6) required for 
gaseous diffusion enrichment. In Washington, this was deemed a key initial step in 
Tehran’s efforts to indigenously master the full fuel cycle. Whereas Iran claimed it 
needed the facility to manufacture fuel rods for its civilian nuclear reactors, the United 
States viewed it as part of a sophisticated scheme in Tehran to sneak its way into 
weapons-grade uranium.375  
Dual Containment and Its Critics 
 
 As Indyk’s prescription for countering Iran was coming under mounting pressure 
from multiple fronts in 1995, an increasingly hawkish Secretary of State was elevating 
the Iranian menace well beyond the dual containment policy. "Iran today is in a category 
all its own," Christopher said, adding, "No other regime employs terror more 
systematically as an instrument of national policy.”376 Shortly following the remarks, the 
Administration, accused of being slow on the trigger by both the Israelis and the 
Congress in turning up the heat on Iran, expressed support for a $ 20 million covert plan, 
led by House Speaker Newt Gingrich, to counter Tehran’s reckless behavior and 
destabilize the clerical regime by supporting to its diehard opponents.  
This development marked the entering of the INP to the covert military zone in 
the beginning of 1996.  A few months after this revelation, came news that the president 
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had signed into law the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) on August 5, 1996. The key 
provision of the act, first introduced by Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York, required 
“the President to impose at least two out of a menu of six sanctions on foreign entities 
and persons that [made] an investment of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s 
energy sector.”377  
As President Clinton was going hot and heavy against the INP, the critics of “dual 
containment run amuck” were growing increasingly vocal as well. Highly critical of the 
Administration’s policy in burning all the bridges to Tehran, Richard Murphy, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs took the rationality 
of these excessive measures to task. “The policy of ‘dual containment,’ that seductive 
phrase which quickly became part of the vocabulary of American Persian Gulf policy in 
1993, has helped paralyze our thinking about Iran”, he wrote, imploring the White House 
to step back and revisit its perspective on Tehran. Contrasting the United States’ Iran 
policy with the Cold War era, Murphy maintained, “Containment has lost the meaning 
we once gave it when we talked for nearly half a century of containing the Soviets. Today 
we routinely dismiss the Iranian Islamic regime as a pariah state. But history and 
geography work against that mindset. Iran is a major state in the region and sooner or 
later will again make its weight felt.”378 
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Also prominent among the critics of Clinton’s Iran policy was Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor, whose change of heart on the clerical 
regime was most visible. The onetime advocate of a military coup as an antidote to the 
Iranian Revolution was now all about engaging Tehran. “I do not see any reason why we 
should be pursuing a policy of isolating Iran,” he argued, reasoning, “because Iran, if we 
pursue hostility towards it, makes it more difficult to isolate Iraq.'' Pressing for the need 
to forge “a good strategic relationship with Iran in the longer run,” Brzezinski argued 
such a development would ensure stability in the Middle East and Washington’s access to 
the energy corridors of Central Asia. Similar sentiments were being echoed by Brent 
Scowcroft, the two-time National Security Adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and 
George H. W. Bush.  
These disparate voices for change finally coalesced in 1997 putting forward the 
most scathing critique of the administration’s policy by a bipartisan group of three 
foreign policy gurus. In a Foreign Affairs article entitled “Differentiated Containment,” 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy tore dual containment apart 
as more of an unsustainable “slogan than strategy” that was “far too blunt an instrument 
to serve American interests in the Middle East.” Critical of Clinton’s unilateral sanctions 
policy as “extraterritorial bullying,” they called into question the “justification for the 
treatment” Washington was visiting on Tehran over its nuclear program. “Instead of 
simply punishing the country,” they called for a policy of “pushing the controls and 
inspection provisions of the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime to their limits and 
continuing to make counter-proliferation efforts a top priority.”379  
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Such a sea change in policy, however, would involve a drastic trimming down of 
the Iranian threat package Washington had grown accustomed to, one that included more 
nebulous elements like opposition to the Middle East peace process and human rights 
abuses. As the administration’s INP policy was suffering from a threat deficit in absence 
of a smoking gun, such a radical re-articulation would enervate the securitization energy 
of Clinton’s Iran policy and naturally fell on deaf ears.  
In resonance with these domestic foreign policy heavyweights, key European 
allies France and Germany (with massive economic ties to Iran) wasted no time 
questioning the extraterritoriality of the seemingly disproportionate measures. The 
Clinton administration’s decision to forge ahead with the sanctions track was, in the 
judgment of the Europeans, a suboptimal policy choice considering its sloppy track 
record and the disheartening prospects for its future success in changing Tehran’s 
behavior, much less, its regime. Some observers even went so far as to suggest that a 
policy of hyper-securitization and its concomitant sanctions regime could further calcify 
Iran’s recalcitrance by depriving Iran of much-needed “maneuverability” to rediscover 
and, with any luck, redefine itself.380 Partly bowing to these pressures and concerned that 
the ILSA’s full implementation would widen the transatlantic difference of opinion on 
Iran, in 1997 the Clinton administration shied away, on national interest grounds, from 
penalizing Total SA of France, Gazprom of Russia, and Petronas of Malaysia which were 
developing the South Pars natural gas filed in Iran.381  
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In the meantime, some policy experts were insisting that Washington go even 
further and overhaul its Iran policy by wooing the regime’s potentially pro-west elements 
to its side. Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) argued, for example, that Washington stood a chance to make strategic gains by 
nurturing technocratic moderate elements in Tehran who didn’t view the United States as 
a sworn enemy.382 This line of thinking was in accord with the “critical dialogue” 
formula that the Europeans were vociferously advocating while airing their displeasure at 
what they perceived was an ill-conceived containment formula that assumed parity 
between Iran and Iraq.  
In view of the Europeans, since Washington’s short history of engagement with 
Tehran had been mainly through oil, anti-communism and terrorism, its policy response 
to Iran’s WMD challenge was blunt and lacked the kind of sophistication that would only 
come by paying attention to the country’s vibrant civil society and political discourse.383 
As one European diplomat put it, “Except for Turkey, Iran is the only real country in the 
region, with 3,000 years of history. It's a complicated country, with a real intellectual life. 
It's not Iraq.” In light of these conceptual and operational pathologies, as far as the 
Europeans were concerned, the policy of dual containment had turned so dysfunctional 
that it was isolating the United States more than it was isolating Iran.384 These so-called 
cooler heads, however, had a snowball’s chance in hell to prevail as whatever traction 
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they managed to muster was neutralized with Defense Secretary William Perry pointing 
at an Iran link in the Khobar Towers bombing of June 1996.385 
Furthermore, just as the White House efforts to bring its North Atlantic allies 
onboard with its securitization platform were looking futile, an opportunity to mobilize 
support and narrow down the differences presented itself. On April 10, 1997 a German 
court implicated high-ranking Iranian officials in the gangland-style assassination of the 
Iranian-Kurdish opposition leaders at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin. An intense 
diplomatic crisis ensued when the Berlin court’s verdict implicated high-ranking Iranian 
government officials in the incident. Shortly afterward, the EU countries summoned their 
ambassadors from Tehran signaling the end of “critical engagement” as Europe’s long-
term recipe to deal with Iran. The so-called Mykonos crisis, however, proved no more 
than a “passing storm”-in president Rafsanjani’s words- as Germany recoiled into a crisis 
control mode and the election of moderate president Mohammad Khatami pushed Iran-
EU economic relations to yet newer highs.386   
Washington, on the other hand, showed no interest in re-formulating its single-
mindedly securitizing paradigm that tended to treat an otherwise composite Iranian 
regime as a monolithic entity. For instance, as Iran’s 1997 presidential campaign, with 
the reformist underdog Khatami on the ticket, were heating up, new Secretary of State 
Albright wasted no time during her first overseas tour to signal a continuation of active 
containment of Iran irrespective of who replaced president Rafsanjani. With her 
characteristically point-blank style, Albright castigated the Europeans, the Italians in 
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particular, for their “critical dialogue” approach to Tehran and reminded her Chinese 
counterparts they couldn’t have the best of both worlds: seek closer ties to Washington 
while trading in high-tech with Iran.387 
On May 23, 1997, Mohammad Khatami pulled off an upset victory in a 
presidential election that saw a record 80% voter turnout. Washington’s reluctance to try 
out a more imaginative approach to Iran was, in no small part, driven by the domestic 
political environment in the United States as well.  Up against an intractable anti-Iran 
Congress led by house speaker Newt Gingrich and a consistently lackluster public 
opinion toward the clerical regime, the Administration kept shying away from a more 
interactive approach toward Tehran.388 
Faced with these domestic constraints and wary of jeopardizing the precious little 
receptivity the Europeans had recently shown to the containment policy following the 
Mykonos crisis, the election of a reformist president was actually met by an intensified 
international campaign by the U.S. to curb Tehran’s proliferation activities run amok in 
the judgment of the Clinton administration. Besides lodging the usual complaints with 
Moscow over its ballistic missile and nuclear cooperation with Tehran, now even a more 
substantial part of Washington’s proliferation-curbing efforts were focused on Beijing 
which had ongoing nuclear projects in Iran, among them a small research reactor and a 
zirconium production facility for nuclear fuel rods. Those efforts finally bore fruit in 
October 1997 when the administration managed to extract a written pledge from China to 
terminate all nuclear cooperation with Tehran, except for the two mentioned projects that 
were deemed proliferation-neutral, in exchange for certification by Washington of a 1985 
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nuclear cooperation agreement that would pave the way for exporting advanced U.S. 
nuclear technology and reactors to China. Despite Beijing’s formal acquiescence, 
however, Washington, especially Capitol Hill, continued to view China as a  “reluctant” 
partner at best and remained extremely skeptical of China’s long-term commitment to 
forswearing all nuclear dealings with Iran.389 As a matter of fact, as The Washington 
Post’s Smith Jeffrey indicated, the INP was so high on the agenda during the October 
1997 Clinton-Zemin summit meeting that Washington essentially put on the backburner 
all other high-stakes issues in Sino-US relations just to secure a strategic concession on 
the INP.390  
A Shift from the BNPP to MRBMs 
 
In 1997 one could also notice a shift of focus in the ingredients and stylistics of 
Washington’s securitization approach toward the INP. The change of focus came about, 
seemingly, due to the Clinton Administration’s failure to ferret out conclusive evidence 
on Iran’s purportedly “crash program” to go nuclear. In this year, through much closer 
intelligence sharing with Tel Aviv, the cutting edge of Washington’s threat 
pronouncements moved away from a dispersed, low-key, and deliberately paced nuclear 
program that defied slam-dunk verifiability toward Tehran’s ballistic missile program.  
At this point, especially alarming to the Israelis was intelligence that Iran had 
acquired the technological knowhow to indigenize North Korea’s No Dong missiles into 
Shahb-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that would put Israel within its 
operational range. Interpreting this capability in purely offensive terms, the Defense 
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Intelligence Agency (DIA) endorsed Israeli intelligence prediction that the new missiles 
could come in the pipeline in a matter of 18 months. On a different front, openly irked at 
Russia’s blasé attitude toward what he viewed a “vigorous” missile buildup, in 
September 1997 Vice President Al Gore asked his Russian counterpart Viktor 
Chernomyrdin to hold up his end of the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin bargain.391 This was a 
secret agreement concluded in June 1995 that called for Russia to terminate all “advanced 
conventional weapons” sales to Iran by 1999 in exchange for a pledge by Washington not 
to impose penalties on Moscow under the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.  
As a sense of alarmism over Iran’s delivery capabilities was setting in, the 
Israelis, backed by AIPAC and an increasingly hawkish Congress, were relentlessly 
pushing the line that the Russians were in breach of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement 
and were, in the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu's director of policy planning David 
Bar-Illan, “very actively” in cahoots with Tehran on “both the transfer of knowledge and 
material." In Tel Aviv’s judgment, by training Iranian students in missile technology, 
Moscow was basically putting Tehran in a position to have the capability to strike any 
target in Israel within a mere 18 months.392 
 The Tel Aviv-AIPAC-Congress axis had grown so momentous in 1997 that 
members of Congress were now openly accusing the Clinton Administration of a 
“consistent lack of candor and enforcement of arms control agreements with Russia." 
Republican House member Curt Weldon went so far as to introduce a bill that would 
require the U.S. government to contribute $110 million to assist Israel’s Arrow anti-
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ballistic missile interceptor system “for the purpose of protecting a United States ally in 
imminent peril." Concerned that the Congress’s obsessive focus and possible legislative 
action on the Iran-Russia missile nexus was threatening US-Russia relations at the 
strategic level, the Clinton Administration mobilized Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation, Robert Einhorn to appease the AIPAC and Congress. 393  
Washington’s efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapons delivery capability were not 
limited to Tehran’s missile acquisition efforts, however.  In a rather unusual move to beat 
Tehran to the punch, on November 5, 1997 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen 
announced that the United States had bought 21 Soviet-era MIG-29 fighter aircraft from 
Moldova over concerns Tehran was eyeing them.394 Fourteen of these jet fighters were of 
the high-performance nuclear capable MIG-29C model that disconcerted Washington the 
most and prompted the deal’s inclusion in the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) program conceived in 1992 within the Department of Defense to decommission 
the FSU’s WMD stockpiles.  
This heightened securitization of Iran’s missile capabilities widened the 
transatlantic rift even further. Within this context, the European prescription, especially 
after the enthusiastic election of President Khatami in a referendum-like victory for the 
reformist movement in Iran, was to seize on the opportunity and start a genuine forward-
looking dialogue with the moderate pro-change forces through persuasion rather than 
coercion. Rallying support for such a long-term strategic objective was next to impossible 
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in Washington though as a relentless barrage of intelligence reports was being leaked to 
the media on Tehran’s ballistic missile shenanigans and its apocalyptic implications for 
Israel once married to a nuclear capability. As a matter of fact, the framing of Iran’s 
missile capability as constituting an existential threat to the state of Israel had assumed 
such formidable momentum at this point that even the efforts of Prime Minister 
Netanyahu to resurrect “the doctrine of the periphery” failed to make much de-
securitizing dent in the ingrained paradigm in Washington and Tel Aviv.395  
Conclusion 
 
In this expediency period, although the elimination of Saddam’s imminent threat 
(in 1991) decidedly moved Tehran’s behavioral and rhetorical attitude towards one of 
pragmatic sophistication, a lack of a commensurate reward mechanism by Washington 
continued to produce suboptimal results for Clinton’s Tehran policy. Tehran found this 
attitude particularly malevolent. For example Tehran’s February 1995 formal 
announcement that it would sign the NPT “despite the flaws in the treaty”396 generated 
almost no resonance in the broader scheme of threat judgments meted out to it. The 
Clinton administration’s failure to reciprocate Tehran’s goodwill gestures, arguably in the 
most formative years of Iran’s post-War nuclear socialization in the mid 1990s, had an 
indelible impact in sedimenting the notion in Tehran’s conservative power corridors that 
the nuclear dossier was only incidental to the more profound regime-type bone of 
contention the U.S. had with the Islamic Republic.  
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Presented with the all-important dilemmatic question of whether the United States 
was against a nuclear Iran or a nuclear Islamic Republic of Iran397, the proponents of this 
paradigm- that culminated in the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005- strongly 
favored the latter. The intertwinement of the securitization of the INP with regime change 
in the mid 1990s essentially removed deterrence as a de-securitizing and stabilizing 
element in Iran’s relations with the United States.   
Another factor deepening the securitization of the INP in this period came through 
a change in the composition of the nuclear decision-making circle in Tehran. Although 
the Rafsanjani Administration (1989-1997) tried in earnest to place Iran’s nuclear 
decision-making at the policy level under civilian leadership and to present a united and 
unequivocal front on Tehran’s lack of interest in pursuing the nuclear weapons option, 
the IRGC’s occasional excursions into the domain betrayed that there was more to the 
INP than met the eye. As a matter of fact, one can track the initial signs of the IRGC’s 
involvement in the nuclear decision-making to the early years of Ayatollah Khamenei’s 
Supreme Leadership in the early 1990s. Mohsen Rezai was perhaps the first prominent 
military figure that weighed in on the issue in the public domain. The IRGC Chief 
Commander’s sentiments on the issue, however, were in keeping with the official line 
coming out of Tehran.  For example, in an interview with the Iranian daily Tehran Times 
in 1994 he cited “political logic, moral concerns and world realities” as determinants 
“stopping” Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability.398  
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The IRGC’s closer involvement in the INP resulted in the bifurcation of Tehran’s 
nuclear efforts into two parallel programs: A core civilian nuclear program 
predominantly oriented toward resurrecting the Bushehr power plants under the authority 
of the AEOI and a peripheral sanctions-busting enterprise run by the IRGC geared toward 
securing technology, material, and components to keep a surge capacity a feasible option. 
As expected, there was ever-increasing overlap between the two domains over the next 
two decades as along with the deepening securitization of the INP the IRGC assumed a 
more strategically consequential role, along the way marginalizing and almost consuming 
the AEOI in the late 2000s.  
The coming to power of the Clinton Administration further accelerated the 
securitization drift of the INP as the language of “existential threat” crept into Israeli and 
US discourse on Iran’s nuclear enterprise. The Clinton Administration’s strategy of 
choice to signal this heightened sense of alarm over the INP was one of putting more 
biting teeth into the sanctions regime already in place. The resultant Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 essentially torpedoed a pending $1billion deal between a Dutch 
subsidiary of Conoco Oil Company and Iran to develop the Sirri oil field and marked the 
total departure of Iran-US relations from the economic zone.  
In an interview with Mike Wallace in March 1997 an otherwise levelheaded 
president Rafsanjani could hardly hide his frustration at the fact that the leader of the 
capitalist world had written off its commercial interests over what Rafsanjani perceived 
was an ideological dispute.399 Equally shocking to the Iranians was the fact that their first 
major move toward normalization and joining the so-called Washington Consensus -
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opening up their energy sector to international oil companies following the 1979 
revolution- was being spurned and aborted by Washington upon arrival.  
Another important factor that made Washington’s securitizing moves partially 
successful in the era was a conspicuous lack of a democratic and diffuse domestic debate 
on the pros and cons of the nuclear option in all its manifestations. In the eyes of the 
majority of the Western states, the history of proliferation was rife with a tendency to go 
for the bomb in countries where a tightly knit nuclear decision-making apparatus 
operated in the shadows. Iraq under Saddam, Pakistan under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Israel 
under David Ben-Gurion, and South Africa under the apartheid rule were a few examples 
substantiating this notion. Although Tehran, well aware of the securitizing implications 
of hush-hush nuclear politics, embarked on a controlled opening up of the public space to 
the INP toward the late 1990s, this endeavor was largely unsuccessful in generating a 
vibrant public dialogue on the issue. This failure had to do as much with the democratic 
deficits of a theocratic system that tapped into the public space ex post facto for symbolic 
reasons as with the fact that it never went beyond a public opinion manipulation tool to 
genuinely make the public part of the country’s nuclear conversation.  
Further complicating the task of placing the INP on a popular mandate by the 
Iranian government was an inherent clash-whether perceived or real- between the 
foundational myth of Tehran’s clerical regime (as an Islamic Republic) and a rekindling 
of nationalistic fervor imperative for rallying the public around the nuclear flag. Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s personal apprehension, lest Iran reverted into a 
runaway nationalistic mood, was highly visible in this regard. In any case, one could 
hardly overestimate the degree to which excluding the general public from the nuclear 
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debate facilitated the targeting of the INP for securitization by the United States and the 
West.  
Despite being up against insurmountable odds, Tehran was hard at work in the 
late 1990s trying to forestall Washington’s securitizing posture vis-à-vis the INP from 
becoming mainstream international wisdom. President Khatami’s recipe to ease the 
stifling pressure was a policy of détente toward the international system in general and 
the Persian Gulf Arab States in particular. The culmination of this policy at the regional 
level was Tehran’s much-publicized hosting of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) summit in December 1997, the largest international event held in Iran 
after 1979 with over 50 member states in attendance. The détente policy had some 
limited success in diffusing the security energy of the INP at the international level as 
well when the Europeans saw an opportunity to seize on the moment and start a 
persuasive and forward-looking dialogue with Tehran’s moderate pro-reform forces.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
1997-2011: NUCLEAR APPEASEMENT & FLAMBOYANCY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Arguably the most consequential impact of the election of President Khatami in 
1997 was demonstrating to the international community Iran’s capacity to normalize and 
redeem itself from within. Khatami’s recipe to showcase this capacity and ease the 
stifling pressure on Tehran was a policy of détente toward the international system in 
general and the Persian Gulf Arab States in particular. As mentioned in the last chapter, 
the culmination of this policy was Tehran’s much-publicized hosting of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference in December 1997, the largest international event held in Iran 
with over 50 member states in attendance.  
As détente was yielding moderate results in de-securitizing the INP, however, the 
apocalyptic 9/11 attacks threw Iran’s nuclear program back into the military extreme of 
the securitization spectrum. The Bush Doctrine that emerged out of those attacks 
diagnosed the intersection of technology and ideology as the most intractable national 
security challenge facing the United States in the 21st century. In order to avert a nuclear 
9/11, preventive war was the prescribed policy as promulgated in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the United States. The strategy’s implications couldn’t have been 
graver for Iran’s nuclear program as President Bush placed Tehran front and center in the 
doomsday WMD-terrorism-tyranny triangle in his January 2002 “axis of evil” speech.  
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As Iran was coming to grips with the dizzying pace of events surrounding its 
nuclear program, in August 2002 an Iranian opposition group sent shockwaves through 
the INP by exposing two secret nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak. These revelations 
marked the beginning of the comprehensive securitization of the INP at the international 
level. Before long and as Tehran was trying to finesse its way out of the NPT non-
compliance accusations, the doctrine of preventive war found its first kinetic applicability 
in Iraq as the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to neutralize 
Saddam’s purported WMD capabilities. The Iraq War of March 2003 pushed, if only by 
association, the Iranian nuclear program even deeper into the military extreme of the 
securitization spectrum.  
Khatami’s Era  
 
Khatami’s détente policy, did not mean that Iran had stopped its shop-till-you-
drop nuclear policy of scouring the market to get its hand on as much nuclear heardware 
and software as possible before the post-Soviet collapse black-market closed. On a more 
formal level, Iran’s relations with Russia were on a progressively upward trajectory in the 
late-1990s as Moscow was increasingly viewing the “Oriental states” as a counterweight 
to Washington’s eastward expansion through NATO’s incorporation of the Eastern 
European members.  
For example, during a high-profile visit by Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri, Iran’s 
parliament speaker to Moscow in April 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin cordially 
referred to Tehran-Moscow ties as a “positive cooperation” that “showed a tendency to 
grow.” The same sentiments were voiced even more vociferously by Gennadi Seleznyov, 
the Communist speaker of the Russian Parliament during a press conference with Nateq 
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Nouri when Seleznyov put Iran’s embattled relations with Western Europe following the 
Mykonos crisis as part of ''the West's intrigue against the East.''400 Tehran, for its part, 
was incrementally viewing its ties to Moscow in a strategic light especially in terms of 
Russia’s capacity to keep in check the securitization thrust of its nuclear endeavor.   
As the military and nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Moscow was 
accelerating, the contours of a polarizing and heated debate in Washington on the long-
term implications of a nuclear Iran were crystallizing. On the one extreme, were Iran 
hawks in both Israel and the United States whose Iran analyses were frequently 
punctuated by the word “apocalypse,” as in their view nuclear weapons could only 
further embolden a reckless Tehran to defy the norms of responsible international 
behavior by granting it a critical zone of immunity.  
On the other extreme, however, were the more hardheaded Iran realists who 
believed nuclear weapons would actually have a sobering impact on Tehran’s foreign 
policy rhetoric and behavior. This latter view was not lost on some authoritative voices 
inside the state of Israel whose panic button on a nuclear Iran was deemed the quickest to 
go off. For instance, Martin van Creveld, a renowned Israeli military historian, went so 
far as to make an analogy between Iran and China on the issue: "When Mao and Stalin 
acquired nuclear weapons, they calmed down," he observed, adding "If Islamic states get 
the bomb, the effect will be the same. Once you have the 'absolute weapon,' war ceases to 
be fun. It becomes suicide."401 
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Foreign policy realists’ sentiments on the feasibility of deterring Iran, however, 
were quick to be drowned out as a deluge of doomsday prognostications about the INP 
soon overwhelmed the international public square. This came about in late 1997 as 
Israel’s Mossad went public with its intelligence on Russia’s secret nuclear and ballistic 
missile technology transfers to Tehran previously only shared with the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA). In a series of articles in The Washington Times, Bill Gertz 
catalogued Russia’s non-compliance with the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin deal on arms 
proliferation to Tehran. The visibly miffed Clinton Administration, under pressure from 
the Congress and the AIPAC, dispatched Al Gore to Moscow who publicly criticized 
Russia and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin over Iran's ''vigorous'' ballistic missiles and 
nuclear technology procurements.  
Washington, in this period, was especially concerned by the intelligence reports 
that the FSU’s cash-strapped scientific community was being lured and recruited into 
Iran’s military-nuclear industrial complex enabling Tehran to indigenously master the full 
range of nuclear and ballistic missile options. Moscow, careful not to let the controversy 
derail its strategic ties with Washington, relieved head of the Russian arms export agency 
(Rosvooruzhenie) Aleksandr Kotelkin of his post among accusation of corruption and 
promised to clean up the agency of the bad apples.402  
If Washington’s negotiations with Russia over transfer of WMD-relevant 
technology to Iran were yielding little concrete results, in October 1997 the Clinton 
Administration scored a major victory with China. Following months of an intense 
diplomatic effort spearheaded by National Security Council Director for Nonproliferation 
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Gary Samore and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn, Beijing pledged to 
drastically and verifiably curtail its nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran and, more 
broadly, bring its nuclear exports in line with the international nonproliferation regimes, 
especially Article III of the NPT, by formally joining the Zangger Committee (A.K.A. the 
Nuclear Exporters Committee). This concrete written commitment by Beijing would pave 
the way for President Clinton to authorize the transfer of advanced civilian nuclear 
technology and rectors to China.403  
The devil-in-detail problem however again reared its head despite the conclusion 
of the deal in the Jiang Zemin-Clinton summit meeting of October 30, 1997 when Iran 
hawks in the U.S. Congress criticized the agreement for failing to incorporate the two 
nuclear projects China had already undertaken in Iran. These two projects included “a 
small research reactor and a factory to manufacture a special metal sheath -- known as 
zirconium cladding -- for nuclear fuel rods.” Ever skeptical Congressional hawks were 
demanding the Administration seek the termination of these projects and include the 
banning of cruise missile sales to Iran as part of a comprehensive package.404   
In the meantime, as a sense of resignation was creeping into Washington’s 
strategic assessment of the prospects for consequentially sanctioning and isolating Iran, a 
new wave of clamor in the United States was pushing for diplomacy and dialogue with 
Iran now that a moderate president Khatami was trying to “remove tensions” from 
Tehran’s foreign policy. In a Foreign Policy piece, Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash 
echoed the sentiments expressed by numerous “former senior U.S. officials-both 
                                                        
403 The Washington Post, October 27, 1997. 
 
404 The Washington Post, October 30, 1997.  
 
 
 229
Republican and Democrat-from the National Security Council, the State Department, and 
the Central Intelligence Agency” who “publicly urged Washington to test the waters of 
constructive engagement through either European allies or direct dialogue.”405  
Reflecting the same sentiments and taking issue with hawkish opponents of 
diplomacy with Iran who saw Tehran’s penchant for proliferation as part of the DNA of 
the clerical regime, Graham Fuller, former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council at the CIA observed, “If a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement can come about--and this 
is not unattainable--it will go a long way toward lessening the intensity of Iran's need to 
develop these weapons or to use them against the U.S. or its allies. A rapprochement 
indeed takes two, but Washington must appreciate that Iran's weapons quest is as much 
the result of the present U.S.-Iranian hostility as it is the cause.”406 
Comments by President Khatami in a December 1997 interview with CNN on the 
need for Iran and the U.S. to create a “crack in the wall of mistrust” between the two 
states by engaging in a “thoughtful dialogue” helped further de-escalate the mounting 
tensions. Shortly afterward, Clinton dropped a de-securitizing line of his own by 
reciprocating Khatami’s olive branch: "I would like nothing better than to have a 
dialogue with Iran,” Clinton vowed.407 As an aura of rapprochement between Tehran and 
Washington was gaining momentum at least at the executive level, calls in Washington 
for directly engaging Khatami’s Iran, as the US did with China, were growing more 
vocal. In this transforming atmosphere, some Clinton White House officials went so far 
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as to praise Iran’s “key role in shaping" the December 1997 OIC Summit Conference's 
final communiqué that explicitly “condemned terrorism, called for dialogue between 
Islam and the West and -- significantly -- didn't call for lifting U.S.-supported sanctions 
against Iraq.”408 These calls for engagement managed to gain even some operational 
traction in the Clinton Administration when the President decided not to impose sanctions 
on French energy group Total for investing some $2 billion in Iran’s natural gas fields. 
Now, there was talk in Washington of charting a new path with Iran analogous to Sino-
American rapprochement in the Nixon Administration.409 On the nuclear front too, 
President Khatami categorically denied Iran’s desire to become a nuclear weapons state 
and pledged his Tehran’s commitment to cooperate with the IAEA.   
These conciliatory gestures and the accompanying new ground broken by Tehran 
and Washington, however, fell well short of bringing about a Gorbachev-Reagan-like sea 
change in Iran-US relations as foreign policy hawks in both capitals regained command 
of the discourse. In Tehran, the hardliners closely affiliated with Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khamenei threw into doubt the revolutionary credentials of President Khatami, 
likened him to Gorbachev as a westoxicated and intimidated figure (Mar’oob), and 
accused him of derailing the Iranian Revolution from its anti-imperialist right path. In 
Washington, foreign policy hawks were scoffing at the naïveté of Clinton’s putative 
policy of dialoguing with Iran and claiming, “dialogue is an instrument of policy, not a 
policy.” Peter Rodman of the Washington Post wrote,” The conflict between Iran and the 
United States has been a clash of fundamental purposes -- Iran's assault on Western 
positions in the Middle East, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, its sponsorship 
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of terrorism and hostility to Arab-Israeli peace, and our resistance to the same. It is naive 
and absurd to think that these issues are a product of misunderstanding or a failure of 
communication.”410 
The ongoing tug of war in Washington on whether to isolate or engage Iran 
continued up until President George Bush’s “axis of evil” speech of January 2002. The 
nest result of this lack of unity of purpose on Iran was the relaying of conflicting 
punishment and reward signals by Washington to Tehran, a misaligned and rudderless 
policy where carrots and sticks neutralized, rather than reinforced, each other. For 
instance, in June 1998, Secretary of State Albright, seemingly intrigued by Khatami’s 
extended hand for dialogue, observed, Iran "is participating in diplomatic efforts to bring 
peace and stability to Afghanistan and is making a welcome effort to improve relations 
with Saudi Arabia and other neighbors in the [Persian] Gulf," adding “we are ready to 
explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings.”411 These 
comments were expressed about the same time when Bruce Riedel, “the top Iran policy 
official on the National Security Council” emphasized the need to “maintain a policy of 
seeking to constrain the dangerous behavior of Iran,” citing Tehran’s opposition to the 
Middle East peace process, while trying to see if the changes in Tehran offer an 
opportunity for a better long-term relationship." In the meantime, he was emphasizing 
Iran's continued status as “the principal state sponsor of terrorist groups throughout the 
region."412 
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Faced with the double-dilemma of conflicting signals issued by Washington and 
the power struggle in Tehran between the reformists (who saw a normalization of ties 
with the United States as a natural extension of Khatami’s policy of détente) and the 
conservative old guard (who saw anti-Americanism as one of the defining and 
indispensible features of the Iranian Revolution), Khatami’s foreign policy team 
demanded the White House operationalize its conciliatory rhetoric by easing sanctions on 
Tehran and dropping its opposition to the passage of the Caspian Basin oil pipelines 
through Iranian territory.  
For instance, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and later UN Ambassador 
Mohammad Javad Zarif observed, “We see a move at least in rhetoric on the part of the 
United States to better understand the realities of the Islamic Republic as well as of our 
region,'' before adding, ''Where it matters, where it will be taken seriously by Iran -- 
regarding the policies of the United States, the behavior of the United States -- we see the 
remnants of a Cold War mentality.” Especially disturbing to the Iranians, in this regard, 
were ubiquitous allusions by the U.S. officials to Iran’s attempts at acquiring Weapons of 
Mass Destruction.413 These speculative WMD allegations, in Tehran’s judgment, were 
symptomatic of the fact that the United States’ Iran policy had become hostage to the 
Israel factor and betrayed Washington’s psychological unpreparedness to disengage itself 
from the weight of history and embark on a de-securitized path with Iran. 
 As the Clinton Administration was showing all manner of confusion on how to 
deal with Iran, the tentative atmosphere for rapprochement took a double hit in 1998. 
First came news in July 1998 that Iran had test fired a strategic medium-range ballistic 
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missile (MRBM) with a range of 800 miles. This would put Israel within the operational 
range of the liquid-propellant missile. Second, was an unprecedented move by federal 
prosecutors in New York who, for the fist time, publicly accused Iran of giving 
operational training to members of Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization that had 
“sent emissaries around the world in an effort to procure nuclear weapons.”414  
The combined result of these twin events was the paving of the way in Israel and 
the United States for the designation of Iran’s nuclear program as an “existential threat.” 
It was within such an atmosphere that Efraim Sneh, a Labor Party hawk in the Israeli 
Knesset speculated that a “pre-emptive strike” on Iran might become imperative since 
“international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring missile technology and developing a 
nuclear capability had failed.” Following Sneh’s remarks, Israeli Defense Minister 
Yitzhak Mordechai quickly rejected the military option out of hand.415  
 In the meantime, Washington’s relations with Moscow were precipitously souring 
as different elements in the Clinton Administration, the US intelligence community, and 
the Congress were accusing Kremlin of either complicity or criminal negligence over the 
steady outflow of nuclear technology, scientists, and hardware to the rogue states. 
Matters reached a fever pitch in January 1999 when White House national security 
adviser Sandy Berger announced unilateral U.S. sanctions on three Russian institutes, 
Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, the Mendeleyev 
University of Chemical Technology, and the Moscow Aviation Institute.  
 Moscow’s reaction to these measures was uncharacteristically trenchant. A 
Foreign Ministry statement termed “any attempts to speak with [Russia] in the language 
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of sanctions and pressure” “absolutely unacceptable” and vowed retaliation. The 
Communist Party leader was far less diplomatic in lashing out at the U.S. punitive 
measures: "The United States of America has imagined that they are a gendarme, 
prepared to dictate conditions not only to countries, bombing foreign states, but to ban, 
and even to dictate conditions to, separate universities and scientific laboratories," 
Gennady Zyuganov vented.416 
One could call 2000 a watershed year in Iran’s relations with the Russian 
Federation. After Vladimir Putin assumed presidency in May 2000, Moscow wasted little 
time notifying Washington of its intent to rescind a 1995 deal with the United States to 
mothball new battlefield weapons contracts with Iran. Almost immediately following that 
came another blow for the lame duck Clinton’s dual containment policy. In December 
2000, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev made a three-day official trip to Iran, the 
first official visit by a Russian defense chief to Tehran since the 1979 Revolution. During 
the high-profile visit, which included meetings with President Khatami and Iran’s 
Defense Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, a publicly defiant Sergeyev expressed 
great satisfaction at the termination of the 1995 pact that had caused a “great pause” in 
Tehran-Moscow military cooperation and reassured his Iranian counterpart that “there 
will be no pauses from now on.”417 
The termination of the secret Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and the strategic 
trajectory of Tehran-Moscow ties became even more manifest during a high-profile state 
visit by President Khatami to the Kremlin in March 2001. This marked the highest-
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ranking meeting between the two countries in almost four decades. During the visit 
President Putin officially announced Russia’s agreement to resume the sale of 
conventional weapons to Iran and reiterated his country’s commitment to complete the 
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. In some candid remarks bound to rankle Washington and 
Tel Aviv, Putin commented, “politically, Iran should be a self-sufficient, independent 
state that is ready to protect its national interests.”418 
The resumption of ballistic missile cooperation between Tehran and Moscow in 
this period finds even a more strategic context once analyzed against the backdrop of the 
newly sworn-in President Bush’s plans to pull out of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) treaty (long deemed an indispensible nuclear arms control keystone) and erect a 
National Missile Defense (NMD) system aimed at shielding the United States from 
nuclear blackmail by rogue states like Iran and North Korea. The Bush Administration’s 
decision to withdraw from the treaty and forge ahead with the NMD as an “urgent” 
military objective, spearheaded by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was a clear 
indication that Washington was giving up hope, at a strategic level, on the Russian 
Federation’s non-proliferation bona fides.419 
 Within this strategic context, the Bush Administration’s first specific encounter 
with Iran came in mid-2001 when the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was due to expire 
in August after five years in effect. Faced with the dilemma of renewing or easing the 
ILSA, Bush’s response was one of muddling through. This was a clear sign that the 
Administration’s Iran policy was yet to coagulate. "As far as Iran goes, it's too early at 
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this time in our relationships to really -- I mean, it's one thing to consider, it's another to 
act, to act on sanctions, and I don't intend to do that anytime soon," the President 
equivocated.420 
 A few months after these remarks came the 9/11 attacks in New York City and 
the Washington D.C area that marked a major reorientation in the U.S. foreign policy 
toward the rogue states. Iran’s initial response to the attacks was a guarded expression of 
sympathy coupled with promises of intelligence sharing and operational cooperation with 
Washington in sweeping the Taliban and Al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan. The commonality 
of interests was further reinforced in the UN-brokered and US-sponsored Bonn 
Conference in December 2001 aimed at creating an interim Afghan government when 
Iran threw its weight behind the U.S. candidate for Afghan presidency Hamid Karzai and 
extended a cooperative gesture toward Washington’s nation-building strategy in 
Afghanistan.  
The Bush Administration, however, failed to reciprocate these goodwill gestures, 
as the new paradigm of the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWoT) reigned supreme in 
Washington. It was within this context that Iran was promoted from a rogue state to a 
member of the ''axis of evil'' in George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address.421 The 
president, in the speech, placed Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, at the intersection 
of a hostile ideology and a penchant for acquiring WMD. This, in Bush’s judgment, 
rendered Tehran “a grave and growing danger” against which a pro-active preventive 
policy was imperative. "I will not wait on events while dangers gather,” the President 
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said, before warning, “The United States of America will not permit the world's most 
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."422 This 
speech, institutionalized in the Bush Administration’s national security documents of 
2002 and 2006, marked the militarization drift of the Iranian nuclear program and set the 
stage for the language of “surgical strike” to enter the United States’ Iran terminology.  
Triumphant and euphoric, following the impressive success of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in sweeping the Taliban from power and shortly after the President’s 
“Axis of Evil” speech, Washington initiated a concerted effort to accelerate the 
militarization of the threat package issuing from Tehran. In February 2002 Secretary of 
Defense Donald accused the Iranian government of obstructing Washington’s anti-
terrorism campaign. "We have any number of reports that Iran has been permissive and 
allowed transit through their country of Al Qaeda," Rumsfeld said.423 Reflecting the same 
sentiments, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice placed Iran front and center in 
Washington’s most urgent security concerns following the 9/11 attacks: nuclear 
terrorism. "Iran's direct support of regional and global terrorism, and its aggressive efforts 
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, belie any good intentions it displayed in the days 
after the world's worst terrorist attacks in history," Rice said.   
Tehran interpreted the Bush Administration’s combative language as indicative of 
the fact that Washington was aggressively incubating a “regime change” policy vis-à-vis 
Tehran. In a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Kamal Kharrazi registered Tehran’s “strong indignation” at the Bush’s State of the Union 
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address and the Administration’s escalatory follow-up remarks. The letter took to task the 
fundamentals of the GWOT paradigm and Iran’s placement within it as a nuclear 
proliferator. It labeled the GWOT as a "self- centered, unilateral and naive" policy 
smacking of imperial hubris that utilized "threat or use of force against what the United 
States has arrogated to itself to call terrorism.”  
In Iran’s judgment such an arbitrary policy “undermined the global resolve to 
embark on a real and comprehensive war on terrorism” and made it look like the United 
States was “confronting the entire Islamic world."424 The cumulative impact of this new 
atmosphere was enervating the overall energy of Iran’s foreign policy under Mohammad 
Khatami otherwise geared towards bringing Iran back into the international fold.  
In the meantime, Tel Aviv found in the GWOT and the United States’ growing 
animosity toward Tehran a most hospitable ground to push for internationalizing the 
securitization of the INP. In New York, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres accused 
Iran of developing nuclear weapons and supplying Hezollah with medium-range missiles. 
The Foreign Ministry also launched an international campaign by “preparing a letter for 
Israeli ambassadors to present to foreign governments urging them to cut ties with Iran if 
it doesn't stop developing missiles and nonconventional weapons.”425  
These provocative developments and escalating expressions of mutual hostility 
were progressively feeding into the militarization energy of the INP. Now, Iran was 
publicly concerned that Israel was hatching operational plans to unleash a military strike 
on its nuclear facilities analogous to Operation Opera against Osirak in 1981. Iranian 
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Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani’s response to these speculations was unmistakably 
defiant: "If Israel carries out any military action against Iran, it will face a response that 
will be unimaginable to any Israeli politician,” the Rear Admiral threatened.426  
In such an atmosphere, the Europeans were equally confused and shocked as the 
Iranians on what was driving the Bush Administration’s newfound militant policy against 
Tehran. In remarks indicative of the growing transatlantic rift on the GWOT and the 
extent of its applicability to Tehran, a senior EU diplomat observed, “Bush can say what 
he likes and we listen to him. But we've seen in the past how Washington's policy of 
containment with regard to Iran and Iraq has led nowhere. We have our own foreign 
policy interests as much as the US has its own." Another EU diplomat put Europe’s sense 
of loss and dismay at where Washington was going with its new saber-rattling Iran policy 
in most disarmingly simple terms: "We don't get [it] with Washington. One day, the US 
praises Iran for its part in the post September 11 war against terrorism. The next day, as 
Condoleezza Rice said herself, Iran's aggressive efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction, belie any good intentions it displayed after September 11. Is that a foreign 
policy?"427 
As the securitization thrust of the INP was precipitously moving upward, another 
shock in mid-August 2002 pushed Iran’s nuclear program deeper into the military zone. 
On August 15, 2002 came revelations by the Iranian opposition group the National 
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) with links to the terrorist organization Mojahedin-
e-Khalq Organization (MEK) accusing Iran of secretly building a nuclear enrichment 
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facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant in Arak.428 Following the whistle blowing, the 
IAEA insisted on inspecting the sites, especially the Natanz facility.  
The IAEA director reported to the Board of Governors the startling progress Iran 
had made in terms of the scale of its undeclared nuclear activities. In the words of the 
IAEA Director General, two aspects of the Natanz facility were especially disconcerting: 
“The first was the scale of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which required a sharp reassessment 
on our [IAEA] part. Up to this point the hallmark of Iran’s nuclear program had been one 
power reactor under construction at Bushehr, for which Russia had contracted to supply 
the enriched uranium fuel. But Natanz, when fully operational, would have the capacity 
to supply the fuel for two to three one-thousand megawatt reactors. What other facilities 
was the AEOI planning or constructing? The second aspect was still more disconcerting. 
Aghazadeh [the AEOI Chairman] told us [IAEA inspection team] that Iran’s centrifuge 
development program was entirely indigenous.”429 
The timing of these revelations couldn’t have been worse for Iran as they 
coincided with mounting U.S. push to launch the first counter-proliferation war on Iraq 
on March 20, 2003 and North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT on 
January 10, 2003. The military implications of the clandestine aspects of Iran’s nuclear 
program were not lost on the Iranians either, as soon following the uncovering of the two 
nuclear facilities and Tehran’s lackluster and lethargic cooperation with the IAEA, the 
United States unleashed Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003 removing Saddam 
Hussein from power over allegations of a WMD program.  
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Tehran, concerned it would be the next target in the Bush Administration’s 
regime change master list, wheeled into action by trying to undertake whatever initiatives 
it could to de-securitize its nuclear profile. Iran’s de-securitizing strategy was two 
pronged: First was an international confidence-building and credibility-restoration 
campaign to scatter the clouds of apprehension surrounding its nuclear program and 
threatening to poison its relations even with Russia. Second, was an under-the-counter 
effort to strike a comprehensive threat reduction package deal directly with the United 
States.  
On the first front, Tehran agreed, within the Tehran Declaration of October 21, 
2003 and the follow-up Paris Agreement of November 14, 2004 to furnish the IAEA with 
full information on its nuclear profile, temporarily and voluntarily suspend all enrichment 
and reprocessing activities, broadly conceived, and abide by the provisions of the 1997 
IAEA Additional Protocol that enabled the Agency to conduct more intrusive inspections 
of Iran’s declared and undeclared facilities and activities, including its laser enrichment, 
reprocessing, and heavy water projects.  
Coming on the heels of these trust-building measures by Iran, ElBaradaei’s 
November 10, 2003 report to the IAEA Board of Governors on the INP was nothing if 
not equivocal. The Director General, on thin ice with Washington over his position on 
Iraq’s WMD program and accused of having a pro-Iran bias by John Bolton, the U.S. 
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, concluded his report 
by confirming Iran’s non-diversion of nuclear material for weaponization purposes. This 
key judgment by the IAEA, much to Washington’s chagrin, put Iran in the ballpark as far 
as its compliance with the NPT was concerned. El Baradaei wrote, “to date, there is no 
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evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to 
a nuclear weapons program,” before adding the caveat, “However, given Iran’s past 
pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the Agency is able to conclude that 
Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.”430 The IAEA report had 
significant impact in decelerating the militarization drift of the INP in the mid-2000s.  
The second component of Iran’s de-securitization campaign was even more 
unprecedented and unorthodox for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In early May 2003, the 
Iranian Government sent, through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, a secret proposal to 
Washington, with the apparent blessing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The 
comprehensive proposal’s objective was to try and “test the waters for a ‘grand bargain’ 
with Washington, a rapprochement along the lines of Nixon’s China strategy.” The step-
by-step proposal’s long-term goal was to deescalate Iran-U.S. relations from one of 
ideologically driven, wholesale animosity to a realistic negotiation compartmentalized 
into manageable wish and woe lists. The Iranians believed that such a problem-solving 
approach would pave the way for a breakthrough in the vicious circle of mutual 
exclusivity in defining national interests between Iran and the US and contribute to an 
atmospheric change where cooler heads on both sides could prevail. The Bush 
Administration, however, spurned the Iranian offer, apparently due to the premature 
triumphalism unleashed by the "Mission Accomplished" moment in Iraq. Even if it was 
no more than obliquely expressed, buried in Tehran's unofficial offer was an 
unprecedented readiness to disengage Iran's national security interests from its nuclear 
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program and forge a nuclear-free modus vivendi with the United States in the Middle 
East.431 
On a balanced reading, the Khatami administration’s de-securitization campaign 
fell well short of making an enduring dent in what seemed to be turning into the INP’s 
institutionalized securitization in the international system. One can hardly overstate the 
domestic political cost of the grand bargain’s failure for President Khatami and his pro-
West reformist camp. As far as Iran’s anti-West conservatives were concerned, the 
unreciprocated unclenching of fist by Khatami on Iran’s nuclear program essentially 
vindicated Ayatollah Khamenei’s long-held conviction that the INP was simply a tool of 
convenience opportunistically wielded by the United States to engineer regime change in 
Tehran.  
In the meantime, Khatami’s transparency policy with the IAEA was producing 
sub-optimal results under the mounting pressure applied by the United States. The June 
17, 2004 report by the IAEA was especially strongly worded and lamented the fact that 
"Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely, and proactive as it should have been.”432 
As the international institutional pressure on Iran was escalating, Tel Aviv and 
Washington were employing the language of kinetic force as an antidote to Tehran’s 
seemingly recalcitrant nuclear behavior with more frequency and visibility. The IAEA 
was also coming under increasing pressure by Washington to refer Iran’s nuclear dossier 
to the UN Security Council for the imposition of targeted sanctions under Chapter VII of 
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the UN Charter, a scenario Iran was endeavoring to avoid at all cost without appearing 
intimidated.  
In the meantime, the EU’s role on the INP in this period was reduced to delaying 
the physical militarization of the nuclear faceoff between Tehran and Washington-Tel 
Aviv axis. IAEA Director General Mohamed Elbaradei later recalled a conversation 
between him, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, and German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer when the Europeans told him, “the EU-3 [the UK, Germany and France] was 
trying to act as a kind of ‘human shield,’ through their dialogue with Iran, to protect 
against the risk of military action by the United States or Israel.”433  
Ahmadinejad’s Nuclear Obsession  
 
In mid 2005, as the Bush Administration’s WMD rationale for the Iraq war was 
proving nothing more than a deliberate subterfuge for regime change, the “Coalition of 
the Willing” was showing all symptoms of breaking apart, the post-invasion Iraq was 
turning into a full-blown military and diplomatic quagmire for the United States, and 
Iran’s encirclement fears were dissipating, President Khatami’s seemingly lenient posture 
toward the West on the INP came under scathing criticism in Iran’s conservative power 
corridors. The cumulative result of these determinants was a presidential campaign run 
by the conservatives on the nuclear self-determination platform.  
As part of this strategy, a perennial theme in presidential-hopeful Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s numerous stump speeches during his 2005-election campaign was to 
castigate the reformists’ unreciprocated pandering to the West on the INP. After a 
firebrand Ahmadinejad assumed Iran’s presidency in 2005, Tehran’s nuclear attitude 
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entered an era of nuclear flamboyancy and saber rattling, a drastic departure from 
President Khatami’s period when Tehran was meticulously endeavoring to avoid being 
relegated into an international outcast. Having made the reformists’ allegedly faint-
hearted nuclear policy into something of a campaign manifesto, the new President found 
himself with no choice but to allow nuclear brandishing brand and govern his foreign 
policy as well.  
Veteran political observers inside and outside Iran were offering different 
narratives on who the new President’s nuclear exhibitionism was and what to make of the 
reckless and provocative rhetoric coming out of Tehran nearly three decades into what 
was generally perceived to be a maturing Revolution. Whatever the private reasoning 
behind this strategy, one can hardly overstate the securitizing implications of such 
nuclear flamboyancy for the Islamic Republic in the Ahmadinejad era.  
President Ahmadinejad’s facilitating role in accelerating the drift of the INP 
toward the militarization extreme was not limited to his nuclear revisionism though. A 
few months into his new post, the President touched off an international outcry against 
Iran by advocating the elimination of the state of Israel “off the map” and calling into 
question the existence of the Holocaust in October and November 2005, respectively. 
Following these perplexingly unorthodox remarks, even for Iran’s rather unwonted 
domestic political scene, the notion of “nuclear holocaust” figured with credibility in the 
international discourse on the INP. The net result was an unprecedented mobilization at 
the international level behind the designation of Iran’s nuclear program as an imminent 
international threat.  
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Within this context, the President’s inflammatory rhetoric simply conferred 
credibility on the Israeli argument that an Iranian nuclear capability was not simply an 
existential threat to the Jewish state, rather it constituted an international challenge that 
called for the full energy of the international community. Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric also 
tremendously granted Tel Aviv and Washington the luxury of sustaining and 
mainstreaming the language of kinetic action against Iran in absence of any “smoking 
gun” evidence on the existence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran.  
Iran’s IAEA and UNSC Dilemma  
 
While Ahmadinejad’s harsh and anachronistic rhetoric was helping galvanize 
global public opinion against Iran’s nuclear effort, international institutional 
securitization of the INP was facing decreasing obstacles. At this point, the EU, for all 
practical purposes, had lost almost all credibility with the Iranians to hold in check, let 
alone reverse, the energized momentum of the INP toward militarization. Europe’s 
debilitated status became even more evident in August 2005 when its highly publicized 
incentives package (aimed at perpetuating Iran’s suspension of indigenous enrichment 
activities) was deemed by Tehran smacking of the Old Continent’s colonial legacy. As a 
matter of fact, Tehran found the EU proposal so “insulting in its language and paltry in its 
benefits”434 that it actually incentivized Iran to terminate its suspension of uranium 
conversion activities at the ENTEC in Isfahan.  
The IAEA Board of Governors’ reaction to Iran’s decision was to up the ante in 
its September 24, 2005 report by claiming “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its 
obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement constitute non compliance in 
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the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.”435 The trigger word “non-
compliance” in the report paved the way for Iran’s referral to the United Nations Security 
Council and officially marked the end of an era of appeasement in Iran’s nuclear policy. 
From then on, Iran and the United States-Israel axis were engaged in a delicate game of 
chicken while Europe was standing idly by.  
Iran shot back to the Board decision by announcing, on January 3, 2006 its 
intention to resume its uranium enrichment Research and Development activities at the 
Natanz pilot facility. The result of this upwardly spiraling chain of events was a non-
unanimous decision by IAEA Board on February 4, 2006 to refer Iran’s nuclear file to the 
UNSC. Tehran, determined not to appear buckling under pressure, retaliated by scaling 
back its policy of détente with the IAEA even further. On February 14, 2006 Tehran 
announced its suspension of implementing the Additional Protocol.  Tehran’s referral to 
the UNSC gave even more credibility to speculations, already in wide international 
circulation, that the United States was pursuing a carefully cultivated policy of “courting 
failure” on the INP to set the stage for taking kinetic action against the Iranian regime 
and, with any luck, decapitate it.  
Washington’s obstinate position that Iran suspend all enrichment activities as a 
precondition for negotiating with Tehran to start and the Bush Administration’s 
unreasonable insistence on Iran scuttling the entirety of its pilot-scale uranium 
enrichment R&D activities were vivid manifestation of this bellicose posture. In the 
words of the IAEA Director General, “‘not one centrifuge’ had taken on vast importance 
for those Beltway ideologues who saw the United States as a global disciplinarian and 
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who listened only to one another, perpetuating beliefs that were utterly removed from 
reality.”436 
With no easing of Washington’s humiliating prerequisites to talk to Tehran in 
sight, the E-3 took another shot at wooing Tehran back onto a diplomatic track. This time 
around, the E-3 initiative, enjoying the support of the five UNSC permanent members (P-
5), consisted of a fairly intriguing incentives package that would address a good chunk of 
Tehran’s nuclear demands short of indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. Just as 
expected, however, the proposal had an infinitesimal chance to succeed in the face of 
formidable securitizing forces pounding on the INP and symbolized by the phrase “all 
options are on the table,” as President Bush was fond of repeating. Under such stifling 
circumstances, Tehran was not even given enough time (Tehran wanted until August 22, 
2006 to mull over the details) to formally submit its final response.  
On July 31, 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1696 under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter demanding Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities and work out its 
outstanding issues with the IAEA. Reference to Article 41 of Chapter VII in the 
resolution sent an unmistakable message to Tehran: the INP had been catapulted to an 
international security threat, the international institutional process on addressing the INP 
was more political than legal-technical, and the IAEA’s de-securitizing capacity was 
drastically curtailed.  
The head of the IAEA later put the irreversible impact of UNSC Resolution 1696 
in most illuminating terms: “In my view, Security Council Resolution 1696 was not only 
counterproductive from a policy perspective, but also a misuse of the council’s authority 
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under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It was staggering to compare the difference in 
treatment of North Korea and Iran. North Korea had walked out of the NPT and made 
explicit threats about developing nuclear weapons, yet the Americans were ready to join 
them in a direct dialogue…. By contrast, Iran… was penalized for possibly having future 
intentions to develop nuclear weapons…”437 
Under such hyper-securitized conditions, rendered more complex with the Israelis 
beating the drum for an imminent military strike unless the UN sanctions regime on Iran 
kept tightening and expanding and Iran’s Arab periphery secretly imploring Washington 
to “cut off the head of the snake” by striking Iran438, the IAEA and EU-3’s diplomatic 
dexterity hit insurmountable roadblocks and yielded no breakthroughs. Shortly thereafter, 
on December 3, 2006 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737 under Article 41, Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter introducing a fresh set of sanctions against private and legal entities 
involved in Iran’s "proliferation sensitive” activities. These punitive measures were 
intensified and expanded on March 24, 2007 with UNSC Resolution 1747.  
In the meantime, the INP had picked up enough securitization energy to move 
forward on its own momentum. Now, talk of military attack on Iran was well on its way 
to become a mainstream issue in the U.S. foreign policy discourse on Iran. The increasing 
frequency with which President Bush, Secretary Rice, and Vice President Cheney, among 
others, utilized the code word for a conventional or, for that matter, nuclear war against 
Iran, “all options are on the table,” was testimony to this atmosphere.  
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As all the de-securitizing actors of the INP seemed utterly exhausted and on the 
defensive, the U.S. intelligence community put a pause on the galloping pace of the INP 
toward a military conflict. On December 3, 2007 President Bush authorized, with delay 
and reluctance, the release of a declassified version of the NIE drafted in November 2007 
and entitled: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The NIE, “the Intelligence 
Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues 
designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national 
security interests,” was unmistakably emphatic in its key “high confidence” judgment 
that “in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program.”439  
 The release of this document threw into sharp relief the reality gap in the 
mainstream American and international discourse on the INP where Tehran’s 
determination to weaponize its nuclear capability had turned into something of an article 
of faith. NIE 2007 was a seminal document on several fronts. First, its counterintuitive 
key judgment indicated the intelligence community’s success in de-politicizing its 
intelligence judgments following the Iraq fiasco and restoring its credibility and 
objectivity. Second, it’s judgment that Iran had halted its weaponization activities in 2003 
vindicated the hardheaded foreign policy realists who had long insisted Iran’s alleged 
nuclear weapons program was directed against the Baath regime in Iraq and not Israel. 
Third, the timing of Iran’s cessation of nuclear weapons activities, following the toppling 
of Saddam’s regime in 2003, demonstrated that Iran’s nuclear behavior was rational and 
prone to cost-benefit calculations. Naturally, this meant that Iran was a deterrable actor 
even in a nuclear context.  
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 Just as expected, realizing the long-term implications of NIE 2007 in de-
militarizing the political discourse about Iran in Washington, the securitizing agents and 
actors of the INP quickly sprang into action questioning the credibility of the coordinated 
judgment of the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies. Peter Hoekstra, a Republican congressman 
and the former chairman of the House Intelligence Committee called the 2007 NIE “a 
piece of trash.” A livid President Bush later termed the document as “eye-popping,” 
lamenting its deleterious impact on the securitizing “momentum” of the INP.440 The 
neoconservatives in the Bush Administration were mainly concerned that the report 
would undo the accumulation of pressure on Iran, would inject second thoughts into the 
international community’s judgments on the credibility of the U.S. President’s 
proliferation judgments and threat perceptions, and would make the consensus building 
process to tighten the noose on the Iranian regimes more arduous.   
 The public venting of anger over the results of the NIE 2007, was arguably the 
most vivid manifestation of the widening gap between clinical intelligence on the INP 
and the expectations of the politicians in charge.  In the meantime, as far as the Islamic 
Republic was concerned, the NIE’s confirmation of Iran’s suspension of its nuclear 
weapons program, its delayed and reluctant publication by the Bush administration, and a 
lack of visible change in Washington’s rhetoric vis-à-vis Tehran following its release 
were all signs that the nuclear was simply a pretextual issue and the securitization of the 
INP had nonfactual underpinnings.  
 A most visible sign the securitization of the INP had grown fact-resistant was the 
adoption, on March 3, 2008 of yet another UNSC Resolution (1803) under Article 41 of 
the UN Charter extending and escalating the previous rounds of punitive measures. This 
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was followed, on September 27, 2008 by UNSC Resolution 1835 that further expanded 
the scope of entities subjected to UN sanctions and tasked Iran with proving “the 
exclusively peaceful nature of “ its nuclear program to the international community if it 
wanted to “be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon.” The 
speedy adoption of these resolutions helped solidify the notion in Tehran that the UNSC 
was completely devoid of any de-securitizing agency when it came to dealing with the 
INP as it was hopelessly politicized.  
 Iran, having given up all hope on institutional international mechanisms to 
prevent the militarization of its nuclear enterprise à la Iraq, was testing the waters to turn 
to the United States directly. However, as this approach was being worked out, there 
appeared a fundamental and growing gap on the nuclear issue, at both diagnosis and 
remedy levels, between the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. This 
discrepancy essentially boiled down to the fact that whereas president Ahmadinejad 
viewed the nuclear dispute as inextricably intertwined with the broader context and 
legacy of Iran-US relations, the Supreme Leader favored viewing those as two separable, 
if not already discrete, issues. From Khamenei’s perspective, the nuclear crisis was a 
marginal issue that was only incidental to Iran’s hardcore grievances with the West. One 
can analyze President Ahmadinejad’s persistent attempts to forge a rapprochement with 
Washington, despite never enjoying the Supreme Leader’s public blessing, during both 
Bush and Obama administrations within this context. Under the prevailing conditions, 
President Ahmadinejad’s multiple efforts at incorporating the nuclear issue into part of a 
package security deal with the United States did not succeed as they never received the 
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Supreme Leader’s definitive green light and as the Bush Administration was approaching 
the end of its lame-duck year in office.  
INP’s Covert Militarization and Domestic De-Nationalization 
The election of President Barak Obama injected a guarded sense of optimism into 
Iran’s leadership on the prospects for a de-militarized Iranian relationship with the United 
States and to resolve the INP standoff. Viewed from Tehran, President Obama’s Iran 
policy seemed one of impressing on the Iranians that the Unites States was willing to 
drop the language of regime change, cultivate a strategic sub-nuclear modus vivendi with 
them, and find, through aggressive direct diplomacy, a non-coercive solution for the INP. 
More importantly, the Iranians publicly appreciated the fact that the new President was 
deliberately distancing the U.S. from the maximalist “suspension before negotiation” 
position of the Bush Administration. That position had struck the Iranians as a sinister 
plot to lend more international credence to and cloak the underlying strategy of “regime 
change” by Washington. 
President Obama’s INP policy got off to a lethargic start, however, as the task of 
cleaning up after his predecessor’s twin wars in Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with the 
financial meltdown on the home front and severe global economic recession consumed 
much of the President’s attention. Another factor in this regard was the unchanged status 
of the NIE 2007’s key judgments and intelligence reports that Iran’s commercial-scale 
enrichment operations at Natanz had hit technical snags. As a result, Gregory Schulte, the 
U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency under Bush, stayed in his 
position well into Obama’s first year as president until June 2009.  
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As the new Administration was getting ready to put into action its more pragmatic 
Iran policy by directly engaging the top Iranian leadership (Obama sent a letter directly to 
the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei), Iran’s domestic political scene went through a 
tumultuous transformation. In June 2009, a botched up presidential election significantly 
eroded the united front Tehran had been strenuously trying to put up vis-à-vis the 
international scene. Following the post-election upheavals, Mir Hossein Mousavi, the 
one-time Prime Minister and presidential hopeful emerged, for the first time in Iran’s 
nuclear history, as a domestic opposition figure who had the capacity to challenge and 
undo the state’s nuclear judgments and decisions with long-term consequentiality. The 
fact that the Green Movement leader’s nuclear attitude was more hawkish than that of the 
incumbent firebrand Ahmadinejad, in some experts’ view, warranted caution in lending 
unqualified support to Mousavi, whose name received mention in the U.S. intelligence 
community’s memoranda as one of the founding fathers of the post Revolution INP. 
 Following the election crisis, the Ahmadinejad Administration, with its domestic 
legitimacy compromised and his image deeply scarred, was scrambling to score a 
substantial foreign policy victory to reassert its credentials. This led to Iran’s surprisingly 
lenient posture on the nuclear issue in 2009 when Tehran agreed in October to ship a 
whopping 75 percent of the 4000 lbs LEU in its possession to Russia and France to be 
converted into 20% enriched fuel plates Iran needed for the Tehran Nuclear Research 
Reactor.441 Faced with Mousavi’s blistering criticism of the deal as “squandering away” 
Iran’s nuclear gains, a humbled Ahmadinejad backed out of the agreement and publicly 
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accused Mousavi of throwing a monkey wrench into the government’s foreign policy 
decisions.  
 In this period, one could see the embryonic signs of the de-nationalization of the 
INP following the election crisis where the nationally electrifying effect of nuclear 
program seemed teetering on the brink of dissipation. The opposition “Green Movement” 
that grew out of Mousavi’s ill-fated presidential bid even came close to presenting a 
domestic securitization challenge to Iran’s nuclear program with some self-appointed 
prominent Green figures referring to the INP as an anti-democratic enterprise being 
imposed on the Iranian people by an authoritarian regime. This securitizing move, 
however, fizzled out rather quickly in no small part thanks to Mousavi’s hawkish stance 
on the nuclear swap deal.  
Following the election fallout, Ahmadinejad’s nuclear obsession also came under 
mounting pressure by the right-wing traditional principlists (osoolgarayan-e sonnat-i) 
who took the president to task for reducing the Iranian Revolution and the political 
system that came out of it to the nuclear standoff with the West. Their argument was that 
Iran’s recognition (as a regional power) should be premised upon the more fundamental 
and durable virtues the Iranian Revolution stood for, (like justice, freedom, and self-
determination) rather than being consumed, contaminated, and exhausted by some 
nuclear saber rattling with the West.  
In the meantime, further complicating nuclear deal-making with Iran following 
the 2009 elections was the highly dynamic state of affairs in Tehran and the President’s 
substantially emasculated credentials, dubious legitimacy, and uncertain hold on power. 
Now the question was whether Ahmadinejad could still be treated as an authoritative 
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interlocutor on Iran’s nuclear program. The fallout from the 2009 elections and the 
overwhelming pressure applied to the Obama White House by the U.S. Congress and 
domestic public opinion to put America on the right side of history and side with the 
opposition Green Movement essentially meant that Obama’s pragmatism was dead on 
arrival. This situation left the President with no choice but to follow in the footsteps of 
his predecessor. At about the same time, a deluge of reports started leaking to the 
mainstream media that the U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies had furnished the IAEA 
with incriminating evidence alleging Iran had conducted recent weaponization studies on 
its nuclear program. These reports further torpedoed any hope for charting an alternative 
path to deal the INP. The result was the continuation of the United States’ broad strategy 
to put the INP on a securitized path at the international institutional and state levels.  
A significant even further consolidated the Obama Administration’s change of 
mind, if not heart, about the INP toward late 2009. In September 2009, Tehran revealed 
to the IAEA its almost completion of a secret enrichment facility, known as the Fordow 
Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), buried some 265 underground near the city of Qom. Once 
fully operational, the facility’s depth would, according to some estimates, put it beyond 
Israel’s conventional bunker-busting capabilities to take it out. Fordow’s proximity to the 
holy city of Qom would also make a nuclear operation against it look like a countervalue 
(city-busting) strike. The combination of these factors would essentially grant Iran the 
capability to deter by denial an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities. From this point on, 
the language of “zone of immunity” entered the Israeli conversation on Iran’s nuclear 
program, a moment when Iran’s nuclear facilities would be physically shielded against a 
successful attack.  
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Iran-Turkey-Brazil Axis 
 
In May 2010, Iran launched its last offensive aimed at garnering much-needed 
foreign policy credibility for a legitimacy-deficient President Ahmadinejad and diffusing 
the mounting talk of an eventual strike by Israel with or without Washington’s consent. 
Brzail, an emerging “diplomatic giant” with permanent membership aspirations at the UN 
and Turkey with a neo-Ottomanist paradigm shift toward the East under the stewardship 
of Prime Minister Erdogan became active interlocutors in Iran’s nuclear dossier in 2010. 
The two countries, with discrete regional and international agendas, found the INP a 
once-in-a-blue-moon opportunity that comes medium-sized powers’ way to punch above 
their actual weight.  
Turkey, anxious to utilize its “strategic depth” as prescribed in the doctrine 
promulgated by political scientist turned Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, became 
especially active on Iran’s nuclear conversation in 2010. As a matter of fact, Ankara’s 
relations with Tehran became so cordial under Davutoglu that, for the first time since 
1979, Turkey removed Iran from the list of strategic threat countries in the 2010 edition 
of Turkey’s main national security document, the so-called Red Book.  This development 
coupled with the addition of Israel to the “threat list” gave Ankara unique credentials - as 
a regional Muslim state- to sway Tehran’s nuclear calculus toward a more conciliatory 
path.  
Brazil complemented Turkey in diffusing the gathering storm on the INP. As a 
one-time nuclear defiant Brasilia had been on the receiving end of what it perceived was 
a discriminatory non-proliferation regime in the 1970s and 1980s before it finally came 
clean with its secret nuclear weapons program in the 1990s and acceded to the NPT in 
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1998. As two-time Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim later recalled, this legacy 
enabled Brasilia to reflect on the INP and argue with Tehran from a position of sympathy. 
Particularly appealing to the Iranians was President Lula and FM Amorim’s stance on the 
imperativeness of recognizing “Iran’s right to develop her own peaceful nuclear program, 
including her capacity to enrich uranium” as “the missing link” in the West’s approach to 
the INP.  
From Amorim’s perspective, such recognition would give Iran the much-needed 
assurance that it would not be indefinitely discriminated against because of its clandestine 
nuclear activities in the past if it adopted a full-disclosure policy going forward. Likening 
Iran’s position to someone whose credit card had been suspended due to payment default, 
Amorim believed Iran’s non-proliferation creditworthiness should not be “stripped 
forever” once it rectified its suspect past. In some pointed and charged remarks, bound to 
be music to Tehran’s ears, he went on saying, “just as one should not be deprived of 
access to credit because of religion or race—or even because one lives in a ‘bad 
neighborhood’ (the analogy holds)—a country cannot be deprived of access to a 
technology because it is Muslim or is situated in a dangerous region, especially if one of 
its neighbors is known to possess not only the same technology, but the actual 
weapons.”442 
Within this atmosphere of camaraderie, in the Tehran Declaration jointly issued 
by Turkey, Brazil, and Iran on May 17, 2010, the parties reaffirmed “the right” of the 
Tehran to all nuclear fuel cycle activities including uranium enrichment. Tehran, on the 
other hand, demonstrated unexpected flexibility to swap 1200 kilograms of its LEU in 
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exchange for 120 kilograms of 20% enriched plates required to fuel the Tehran Research 
Reactor.443 Arguably, the most significant aspect of the Declaration was Iran’s consent to 
deposit more than fifty percent of its LEU in Turkey in one tranche, a significant 
departure from its earlier rejection to transfer its LEU stockpile to foreign territory. This 
agreement, however, failed to make much de-securitizing dent in the INP as the Obama 
Administration refused to endorse its provisions and chose, instead, to forge ahead with a 
new and escalating set of punitive measures against Iran. As ElBaradi later wrote in his 
memoires, Washington’s nonchalant dismissal of the Tehran Declaration was yet another 
sign, “The West refused to take yes for an answer.”444 
INP Enters Kinetic Militarization Zone 
 
With the INP deeply ensconced in the military extreme of the securitization 
spectrum, Iran’s nuclear program came under a host of unconventional attacks. The 
general perception in Washington and Tel Aviv was that if the program couldn’t be 
knocked off its feet, it could at least be knocked off its stride while more comprehensive 
solution were being conceptualized. The subversive measures that included, among other 
things, cyber warfare (e.g. the Stuxnet virus attack), sabotage, and targeted assassination 
of Iranian nuclear scientists picked pace and became increasingly aggressive after mid-
2010. According to analysts, in absence of an attractive military option in the near term 
the United States and Israel had settled for the intensification of these “measure short of 
war” in 2010 to retard Iran’s crossing of the proverbial “point of no return.”  
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An alternative view, however, was that the cumulative impact of these 
unconventional measures-- along with an ever-stiffening sanctions regime and the 
singling out of Iran in the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as the 
only non-nuclear weapons state subjected to a nuclear strike by the US—actually 
constituted a curtain-raiser to a full-blown military attack on Iran by modulating its shock 
value. This view was partially based on the Iraqi experience with the UN where 
successive resolutions demonstrated how quantity (11 UNSC resolutions) could turn into 
quality (the 2003 invasion). Whatever the private reason behind these covert measures, 
their accumulative impact demonstrated that the INP had already entered the kinetic 
extreme of militarization in 2010, only one step removed from an all-out military 
confrontation.  
 The INP also came under some domestic securitizing pressure in 2011 following 
the March 11 tsunami in Japan and the partial core meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant. As the incident deeply stigmatized nuclear energy and cast a 
shadow over its future sustainability, the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) set up a blue ribbon 
committee whose official mandate was to investigate the delay in commissioning the 
BNPP, but which had a broader agenda: soul-searching on the issue of nuclear energy in 
Iran. In April 2011, Hassan Ghafouri Fard, a nuclear expert and chair of the investigative 
committee, in some unprecedented public remarks, called for mothballing the BNPP 
indefinitely as its high capital cost had rendered it uncompetitive compared to building a 
new plant from scratch.  
In the meantime, the INP hyper-securitizers saw in the global nuclear abolitionist 
movement that grew out of the “Fukushima factor” yet another opportunity to question 
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the expediency of the BNPP in a seismically active region in southwestern Iran. Lacking 
incontrovertible technical credibility, this securitizing move had a fleeting lifespan, 
though, as the BNPP went critical on May 8, 2011.  
Furthermore, in 2011 the INP became the passive beneficiary of the Arab Spring 
as the democratic whirlwinds in the Middle East and North Africa pushed the Iranian 
nuclear program onto the backburner of the United States’ strategic foreign policy 
priorities. The Arab Spring’s de-securitizing energy, however, proved no match for the 
INP as Tehran’s nuclear effort assumed newfound significance in late 2011. On 
November 8, 2011, in a report to the IAEA Board, Yukiya Amano, Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency used the unverified intelligence provided by the 
United States and Israel, previously deemed of dubious authenticity by the IAEA under 
ElBaradaei, as incriminating evidence Iran was on a structured path to nuclear 
weaponization. The report claimed a range of activities carried out by Iran that were 
deemed “relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” These included 
“efforts… to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military 
related individuals and entities; efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production 
of nuclear material; the acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and 
documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network; and work on the development 
of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components.”445  
The report, both in its letter and spirit, demonstrated how quickly the ElBaradaei 
legacy had grown undone and the extent to which the IAEA’s judgments on Iran under 
the new Director General had fallen in line with the securitizing actors of the INP. The 
                                                        
445 IAEA Report On Iran Nuclear Safeguards Sent to IAEA Board, November 8, 2011. 
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf (Accessed December 24, 2011).  
 
 262
result was a candid outcry of accusations of duplicity, lack of credibility, and double-
standard from the INP’s now sizable epistemic community. Arguably the most trenchant 
critique came from Robert Kelley, a nuclear engineer and the IAEA's chief weapons 
inspector in Iraq, who called the report “highly misleading” and accused the IAEA of 
having fallen victim to a “misinformation campaign” that was leading the international 
community “by the nose.” For Kelly, “the way the data [had] been presented” in the 
November 2011 report produced “a sickly sense of déjà vu,” reminiscent of the prelude to 
the 2003 Iraq War.446 The Amano report was also in direct contradiction with the latest 
U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 2010 on the INP that essentially repeated the key 
judgments of NIE 2007.  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                        
446 Robert Kelly, Bloobmberg, January 10, 2012. Nuclear Arms Charge Against Iran Is No Slam Dunk: 
Robert Kelley. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-11/iran-nuclear-weapons-charge-is-no-slam-
dunk-commentary-by-robert-kelley.html (Accessed January 18, 2012).  
 
 263
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the span of some five decades since its inception, Iran’s nuclear program is 
still far from full-fledged fruition. This has turned the INP into the most expensive and 
longest civilian nuclear program in the making in the world, the most politicized 
enterprise in Iran’s history, and a development that has internationalized Iran’s domestic 
scene like never before. 
Panoramically viewed, the story of the Iranian nuclear program has been one of 
progressively moving on the securitization spectrum toward kinetic militarization.  The 
opening salvo of the securitization trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program could be traced 
back to May 1974 when India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion triggered a fundamental 
change of heart in Washington on the Atoms for Peace Program’s long-term 
sustainability, imbued indigenous nuclear enterprises with proliferation concerns, and 
cast doubt on the effectiveness and sufficiency of the international non-proliferation 
regime’s safeguards to detect, much less deter, clandestine diversion of nuclear material 
from civilian nuclear facilities.  
The coincidence of such a massive overhaul in proliferation thinking in 
Washington with the Shah’s full-fledged nuclear bid marked the beginning of the 
designation of the INP as a proliferation concern. These U.S. concerns were only 
accentuated in the mid-1970s once set against the backdrop of the Monarch’s rapid 
morphosis into a “national security leader”, his high security expectations, and windfall 
petrodollars that made HIM’s military and nuclear extravaganza financially feasible.  
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As these generic factors were defining the broader contours of the securitization 
package of Iran’s nuclear enterprise in the mid-1970s, Tehran’s premature insistence on 
indigenously possessing the full nuclear fuel cycle further heightened Washington’s 
proliferation concerns. The Shah’s cavalier attitude toward Tehran’s NPT commitments 
and his thinly disguised irritation at the existing international nuclear order (exemplified 
by Iran’s outright indignation at its exclusion from The Nuclear Suppliers Group), only 
helped intensify Washington’s apprehensions. Further fueling the securitization drift of 
the INP in the mid 1970s was a perceived lack of proportionality between Tehran’s 
declared long-term civilian nuclear ambitions and the Iranian economy’s absorptive 
capacity to actually utilize them.  
On a balanced reading, an argument can be made that although the macro 
architecture of the international system, defined by the arch rivalry between the US and 
the USSR, exercised a dampening impact on the full-blown designation of the INP as a 
proliferation threat, the securitization drift of the INP started in the mid-1970s. After the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran’s adoption of the policy of neither east nor west (na 
sharqi na qarbi) substantially removed this de-securitizing impediment at the systemic 
level and Iran’s war born nuclear awakening during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) came 
under mounting securitization especially by the United States.  
Over the years after the 1979, a revisionist Tehran’s declared policy of exporting 
its revolution to the Middle East and, concomitant with it, Iran’s ties to violent non-state 
actors in the Middle East set the stage for the contextualization of the INP within 
international terrorism. In the 1990s Iran’s efforts to acquire ballistic missile technology 
and it’s clandestine nuclear procurement activities on the black market further intensified 
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the proliferation concerns of the United States and pushed Tehran deeper into the 
militarization extreme of the securitization spectrum. By the late 1990s, one could argue, 
the securitization of the INP was, by and large, institutionalized and a host of state, non-
state, and organizational actors were couching Tehran’s nuclear efforts in proliferation 
terms. By the early 2000s, the securitization framework of the INP had grown so 
hegemonic that a technocrat President Rafsanjani and a reformist President Khatami’s 
efforts to bring Iran back into the international fold proved no match for dismantling this 
template. In the early 1990s Iran’s policy of throwing its weight behind derailing the 
Middle East peace process catapulted Israel onto the forefront of an internationalizing 
securitizing campaign vis-à-vis the INP.  
Although Tehran’s efforts at adopting a full-disclosure nuclear policy and its 
more generic détente policy toward the Middle East after the defeat of its archenemy 
Saddam Hussain in the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War bore some moderate de-
securitization fruits, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the September 11 
attacks of 2001, neutralized those gains and threw Iran back into the foreground of 
international proliferation concerns. Tehran’s inclusion by the George Bush 
Administration in the so-called axis-of-evil was the most vivid manifestation of the INP’s 
elevated placement in US national security anxieties. The presidency of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in 2005 further consolidated this prioritization as the new president 
reversed Tehran’s conciliatory posture toward the international non-proliferation regime, 
exemplified by Tehran’s suspension of its enrichment activities as a confidence building 
measure. Ahmadinejad’s unorthodox inflammatory rhetoric on Israel only helped 
intensify the securitization of the INP and its unprecedented galloping toward 
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militarization in the late 2000s. Now the INP’s securitization template had grown so 
powerful that even the U.S. intelligence community’s consensus verdict (NIE 2007) that 
Iran had halted the weaponization component of its nuclear program did little to make a 
dent it. 
With the first decade of the 2000s coming to a close, the securitization of the INP 
was progressively moving toward kinetic militarization. The most significant 
manifestation of this kinetic phase was the unfolding of a full-fledged covert warfare 
characterized by kidnapping and targeted assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists and a 
cyber warfare against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The highly politicized IAEA’s November 
2011 report on Iran (long on speculative extrapolations and short on factual/physical 
judgments) and the subsequent ratcheting up of Israel’s international pressure campaign 
that the INP was approaching the so-called “zone of immunity”, where a conventional 
military strike would prove incapable of taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities especially in 
the deep underground Fordow uranium enrichment site, is a most vivid indication of how 
perilously close the INP has come to being subjected to a massive military strike.  
This ever expanding and deepening trend of the INP’s securitization leads one to 
speculate that unless a comprehensive international de-securitization of the INP takes 
place (through regime change or a drastic change of heart in Tehran, both unlikely 
scenarios in the foreseeable future) the securitization juggernaut of Iran’s nuclear 
program would erupt into a de-proliferating military operation on Tehran. 
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